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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles-vidence-Use of Radar Speedmeter
Several cities' have recently2 begun using a radar device commonly
called the "Whammy" 3 to aid in obtaining evidence to secure convictions
of speeding motorists.4 The introduction of this device was greeted with
conflicting opinions by North Carolinians 5 but 100% convictions have
6
been obtained where this evidence was relied upon for conviction.
A brief explanation of the history and operation of the radar speedmeter may be helpful in weighing the legal questions relating to the
admissibility of evidence obtained by its use. The machine utilizes the
principle of "pulse radar" for its operation. Although active work was
' For a list of early users of the radar speedmeter, see MuNiciPA. L. J., Feb.,
1951, p. 11.
2The radar speedmeter was first introduced in North Carolina in 1950 when
the City of Greensboro purchased one unit and used it for a period of one year
solely for the purpose of making speed checks or counts on major thoroughfares
and in school zones. Letter to writer from Jeter L. Williamson, Chief of Police,
Greensboro, N. C., March 26, 1952.
' Durham (N. C.) Sun, April 8, 1952, p. 2, col. 6.
'The evidence obtained by the use of the radar speedmeter is used in local
recorders or municipal courts to obtain convictions in Durham (The Durham (N.
C.) Sun, April 15, 1952 §B, p. 1, col. 5), Raleigh (Raleigh (N. C.) News and
Observer, March 28, 1952, §1, p. 18), Greensboro (letter to writer from Jeter L.
Williamson, Chief of Police, Greensboro, N. C., March 26, 1952) and possibly
others. The admisison of this evidence has been justified in practice by having
the local judge observe and certify the machine as acceptable. Greensboro (N. C.)
Daily News, Aug. 19, 1951, §4, p. 1, col. 1; Raleigh (N. C.) News and Observer,
March 28, 1952, §1, p. 18; Address by Hon. Ralph L. Custer, Mayor of Garden
City, N. Y., at the N. Y. State Mayors Conference in Syracuse, June 14, 1949,
p. 3. Some city officials, however, have expressly admitted that they proceed on
the more utilitarian theory that victims will pay the fine rather than appeal the
case to courts of last resort to test the validity of the evidence. N. Y. Times,
Nov. 18, 1950, p. 17, col. 4
' State newspapers have taken various attitudes toward the "Whammy." One
view is illustrated by an editorial stating that "A battalion of Whammies. ...
ought to be set out on North Carolina highways to do their stuff. If they
reduce the speed of cars . . . . they will reduce the state's toll of death, injury
and destruction." Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, Nov. 12, 1951; the opposite
view is illustrated by an editorial labeling the device as a "speed trap." This
paper predicts that "as an aid to traffic safety it will prove a colossal flop. But
as a method to antagonize the public it undoubtedly will be a big success." Durham (N. C.) Sun, May 21, 1951. For an expression of the conflicting opinions
of several citizens who witnessed a demonstration of the "Whammy," see The
Durham (N. C.) Sun, April 15, 1952, §B, p. 1, col. 5.
Greensboro, N. C.: arrests through March 20, 1952, approximately 400 with
100% convictions, see note 2 supra; Winston-Salem, N. C.: 55 arrests and 55
convictions, letter to writer from John M. Gold, City Manager, Winston-Salem,
N. C., March 26, 1952; Raleigh, N. C.: 2 cases prior to April 8, 1952, and 2 convictions, Durham (N. C.) Sun, April 8, 1952, p. 2, col. 6.
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begun on pulse radar at the Naval Research Laboratory in 1934, 7 the
earliest success was achieved in 1939, when a radar set was given exhaustive tests during battle maneuvers.8 Radar employs the echo-timing
principle by which distance is measured by the elapsed time between transmission of a radio wave and the receipt of its reflection.0 This particular radar device operates in the following manner:
When a series of waves is sent toward an object which is moving
toward the transmitter, the length of the reflected wave is shorter than
the wave length as measured at the transmitter itself. The greater the
speed of the object, the greater the difference between the frequency of
the transmitted and received wave lengths. The two waves are mixed
in the transmitter and the difference frequency (which tells the speed
of the moving object) is converted so as to be read on a meter calibrated
directly in miles per hour or registered on a graphic recorder.
The reading on the meter must be taken during the short period
that the car remains within range of the speedmeter. The range depends to a great extent on the height of the instrument. On the ground,
the range is from 75 to 100 feet but at a height of three feet, the range
increases to 150 feet. The device is subject to considerable error if
mounted at an angle with the road. While errors due to angularity
are less than 2% at any distance within 15 feet of the traffic path, at
distances between 15 and 25 feet the error may increase to 5%.10
The speedmeter has not been the subject of appellate review," thereSchooley, Pulse Radar History, 31 INSTITUTE OF RADIO ENGINEERS PRoCEED405 (1949).
RADA
'RIDENouR,

INGS

SYSTEM ENGINEERING 14 (1947).

' Shoran, Precision Bombing Aid, Now it Use, 251
564 (1951).

FRANKLIN

INSTITUTE

J.

10 The above was digested from an article, Highway Radar, Radio-Craft, Nov.,
1947, p. 22; for a more detailed and technical explanation, see Barker, Radar

Measures Vehicle Speed, 2 TRAFFIc Q. 239 (1948).
"1A thorough search was made of all state reports since this device was first
marketed, with particular emphasis on those states where information from the
manufacturer indicated the device had been used in prosecuting violators. The
Attorney General of North Carolina, however, has given a ruling on the issue.
In a 1951 opinion, he said: "It would seem that the opinion of an officer based
upon the magic eye apparatus, provided that the magic eye can qualify as a

reliable speed recording instrument, would be no more objectionable than his
opinion based on his speedometer reading." POPULAR GOVERNMENT, June, 1951,
p. 15, col. 3. This, however, seems to beg the question to a large extent as almost
any scientific instrument would surmount objections if it could "qualify as reliable." There is also some doubt that the courts would accept a comparison of
the radar speedmeter with the auto speedometer. The officer reading the auto
speedometer has nothing to do with its accuracy and operation, while the officer
reading the radar device must be trained, not only to read the meter, but to
set up and operate the entire device. He must be able to compute error due to
angularity, if such error be present. Radar is affected by certain weather conditions. See. What Does Rain Do to Radar, 51 AVIATION WEEK 21 (1949). The
officer should know if and to what extent this particular device is affected by
such conditions and be able to compensate for error if there be any. Furthermore,
the auto speedometer itself operates on a very simple mechanical principle that
could hardly be compared with the complex electronic circuits and principles that
combine to make a radar transmitter and receiver.
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fore the admissibility of evidence based upon its operation must be
examined in the light of judicial standards previously set for the use
of other scientific devices. The courts have consistently followed the
rule that evidence obtained from the use of scientific devices is inad12
missible unless there is general scientific recognition of their accuracy.
The reason is that expert testimony based on scientific tests can be very
convincing to a jury, and therefore these tests should be as scientifically
reliable as possible. The courts feel that it is for the scientist to determine the soundness and accuracy of new developments in their
fields.' 3 A scientific principle or discovery must pass from the experimental to the demonstrative stage by gaining general acceptance in the
4
It is
field to which it belongs before it may be admitted in evidence.'
largely because of this rule that evidence obtained by the use of such
5
devices as the lie detector (polygraph) is generally excluded' while
evidence relating to fingerprinting'

6

and ballistics 17 is admitted since it

has been determined by experts that reasonable certainty can follow
such tests. This rule also seems to be the basis for the admissibility of
8
chemical analysis of body fluids to determine intoxication,' while results
of tests made by the "drunkometer" for the same purpose are subject
9
to conflicting decisions as to their probative value.'
",'Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. Cir. 1923); State v. Duguid,
50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937) ; People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d
503 (1942); People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 913 (County Ct.
1938), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31 (1938); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis.
651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933).
"' See State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933); 37 HARv. L.
REV. 1138 (1924).
CARDOZA, LAw AND LITEaRAuRE 70 (1931).
15 Results of lie detector tests were properly excluded from evidence in ab-

sence of general scientific recognition of such tests or reasonable certainty of
results thereof. People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942) ; People
v. Forte, 279 N. Y. 204, 18 N. E. 2d 31; "The case law on this subject is meager,
but the majority hold there is not sufficient scientific recognition of the efficacy
of the polygraph to warrant the judicial acceptance of its recording as evidence

of the truth or falsity of the testimony of the subject witness."

See Cashen,

Admissibility of Evidence as to Results Obtained from Use of Lie Detector, 13
U. DERoIr L. J. 40 (1949). STANSBURY, NORTHr CAROLINA EVIDENCE §86
(1946) ; but see 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §999 (3d ed. 1940), citing some authority

for the admission of such evidence on behalf of the accused.

"8Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198 P. 288 (1921) ; State v. Conners, 87 N. J. L.
419, 94 Atl. 812 (1915) ; State v. Huffman, 209 N. C. 10, 182 S.E. 705 (1935);

Stacy v. State, 40 Okla. Crim. Rep. 154, 292 P. 885 (1930).
" State v. Quterbridge, 82 N. C. 617 (1880) ; Inbau, Firearms Identificatioll-"Ballistics," 24 J. Cuam. L. 825 (1934).
18 "We have been unable to find any case where the blood test to determine
intoxication has been excluded because of its unreliable value as proof." Kirschwing v. Farrer, 114 Colo. 421, 166 P. 2d 154 (1946); State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz.
276, 72 P. 2d 435 (1937) ; the American Medical Association has stated that the
percentage of alcohol in the blood is a reliable index of the degree of intoxication, especially when it is considered along with other external symptoms. 119
J. Am. MED. Ass'N. 653 (1942); but see, Kurokse v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234
Wis. 394, 291 N. W. 384 (1940).
"0 People v. Morse, 35 Mich. 270, 38 N. W. 2d 322 (1949) ; Newman, Proof
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Whether or not the radar speedmeter has received sufficient general
scientific recognition to satisfy the courts remains to be seen. True,
radar as such, has received wide technical acknowledgment in many areas
and is now being successfully used for such purposes as tracking hurricanes20 and guiding aircraft.2 1 However, the fact that the use of radar
is accepted generally for some purposes does not mean that evidence
obtained by its use in connection with measuring speed will be accepted.
Another rule regarding scientific evidence is that such evidence must
be introduced through an expert witness.2 2 The special training necessary to qualify police officers in the operation of the radar speedmeter
is "very slight,

' 23

in some cases only two hours.2 4 It will be interesting

to see if this lack of extensive training, when considered along with
other factors, will qualify an officer as an expert witness in radar.
Evidence obtained by a somewhat similar device has been admitted
in Massachusetts. 2 5 A photographic speed recorder obtained the speed
of a moving car by taking two pictures of it from behind, one picture
about a second later than the other. The second photo was necessarily
smaller than the first since the car had moved through a certain distance
during this interval. Thus by measuring the difference in size of lines
on the two photos, the distance the car travelled during such period and
its speed of travel was readily determined by mathematical formula.23
The acceptance of this device, however, seems to a large extent to have
been based upon the general scientific acceptance of the accuracy of its
component parts and the fact that this court did not require such evidence
27
to be introduced through an expert witness.
Since the speedmeter only clocks speed for a few feet it could not
of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky. L. J. 266 (1946) ; but see, State v. Hunter, 4
N. J. Super. 531, 68 A. 2d 274 (1949), admitting the drunkometer tests but imposing high standards of care in its use. See Note 30 N. C. L. REV. 302 (1952).
"Radar Tracks Hurricanes; Results Promises Aid in System Operation, 133

91 (1950).
"1Radar Landing Systems, 63 AERo

ELEc. WORLD

DIGEST 34 (1951).
2-People v. Fiorita, 339 Ill. 78, 170 N. E. 690 (1930); Conley v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 78, 95 S. W. 2d 1094 (1936) ; but see, Commonwealth v. Buxton,
205 Mass. 49, 91 N. E. 128 (1910).
" "The special training necessary to qualify an officer in the operation of the
speedmeter is very slight and can be accomplished in a relatively short period
of time." Letter to writer from Jeter L. Williamson, Chief of Police, Greensboro, N. C., March 26, 1952.
24 Letter to writer from John M. Gold, City Manager, Winston-Salem, N. C.,
March 26, 1952.
22' Commonwealth v. Buxton, 205 Mass. 49, 91 N. E. 128 (1910).
6 Ibid.
" Ibid. State introduces extensive evidence showing the trustworthiness of
the stopwatch mechanism and that of the chronometer, which was part of the
device. As to the rule that such evidence must be introduced through an expert,
the court said: "Nor is the fact that the experimenter was not an expert fatal to
the introduction of the machine. A man may testify to the existence of thunder
and lightning and the disastrous results therefrom without being an expert on
electricity or electrical phenomenon."
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be used for enforcement of speed laws on state highways of New York
or states having similar statutes requiring that a motorist exceed the
speed limit for a specified distance before such excess speed shall be
unlawful. 28 However, the situation was met in Garden City, New
York, where the speedmeter is presently in use, by the passage of a new
ordinance eliminating any specified distance over which speed must be
maintained. 29
Another interesting problem is presented by the method of making
the arrest and the presentation of the evidence. The North Carolina
law forbids an officer to make an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence. 30 Whether an offense has or
has not been committed "in the presence" of the officer has been the
subject of much litigation. 31 The criteria is that the acts constituting
the offense must become known to the officer through one of his senses
at the time the offense is committed.32 Although some courts have
held this to be too broad and require that the offense become known
through a combination of two or more of the officer's senses,33 there
seems to be a uniform requirement that a criminal offense cannot be
said to have been committed in the presence of an officer unless three
elements are present: one, the officer must not merely be present, he
must know of the offense through his senses; two, the officer must know
of the very acts which make up the offense, not merely acts showing
or evidence indicating that an offense has taken place; and three, he
4
must know of the acts at the time, not become aware of them later.
28 "A rate of speed by a motor vehicle or a motor cycle on any public highway in excess of fifty miles an hour for a distance of one-fourth of a mile, except
where a greater speed is permitted by the state traffic commission, shall be un-

lawful." Consol. Laws of N. Y., Vehicle and Traffic Law, §56(3) (1932).

But

see, People v. Mangini, 194 Misc. 615, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 34 (1948), holding that this
statute did not prevent municipalities from enacting valid speed ordinances which

did2not include the one-fourth mile provision.

Address by Hon. Ralph L. Custer, Mayor of Garden City, N. Y., at the
N. Y. State Mayors Conference in Syracuse, June 14, 1949, p. 4.
"Alexander v. Lindsay, 230 N. C. 663, 55 S. E. 2d 470 (1949); MACHEN,
THE LAW oF ARREST 38 (1950).
" For a good discussion of what is "in an officer's presence" see MACHEN,
THE LAW OF ARREST 70 (1950).
" State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 151, 195 N. W. 789, 791 (1923); State v.
Godette, 188 N. C. 497, 125 S. E. 24 (1924) ; but see, Robinson v. Commonwealth,

207 Ky. 53, 268 S. W. 840 (1925), where arrest without a warrant for carrying
a concealed weapon was held valid.

As one of the elements of carrying a con-

cealed weapon is the concealment, how can the offense be seen? The Kentucky

court, however, held that Where an officer saw the imprint of a pistol in the defendant's pocket well enough to know that it was a pistol, it was a crime in the

officer's presence and it was still a concealed weapon because hidden from ordinary
view.
"' The sense of smell was held not enough in itself to indicate to an officer that

a crime was being committed in his presence, United States v. Swain, 15 F. 2d

598 (N. D. Cal. 1926) ; United States v. Di Corvo, 37 F. 2d 124 (D. Conn. 1927);
but see, United States v. Fischer, 38 F. 2d 830 (M. D. Pa. 1930).
" MACHEn, THE LAW OF ARREST 70 (1950).
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Ordinarily, the officer making the arrest in speeding cases is the
officer who personally clocked the speed of the violator and no question
arises as to the offense having been committed in his presence. However, with the use of the speedmeter, the general practice is for the
officer reading the indicator not to pursue an offender. Rather, he relays
by radio the description of the speeding car, with or without the license
number to a second officer who stops the car when it reaches his post
or station.35 This second officer makes the arrest or issues the summons without a warrant and without having witnessed the crime.
. Even here no problem would seem to arise if the second officer only
issues a summons and does not detain the motorist further if the summons is refused, as the issuance of a summons is not an arrest.80 If,
however, the motorist refuses to accept the summons, his arrest by the
officer would seem to be unlawful.
In conclusion it may be said that in the absence of a showing of
general scientific acceptance, appellate courts would probably refuse to
admit testimony founded upon information obtained by the use of the
radar speedmeter. It would also appear that evidence based upon the
device may not be given the probative value conceded to certain other
scientific devices because the limited training course may prevent the
operator from qualifying as an expert witness in radar. Furthermore,
the arrest procedure now generally used in connection with the machine
does not seem to meet the strict requirements of the North Carolina
law of arrest.
J. KENNETH LEE.

Bankruptcy-Discharge of judgments Arising Out of
Automobile Accident Suits
When a money judgment is obtained for damages resulting from an
automobile accident, and the judgment debtor is subsequently declared
bankrupt, a difficult question is frequently presented. Does the judgment survive the bankruptcy proceedings or is the judgment debtor
discharged?
Section 17(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Act' provides that:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts, 2 whether allowable in full or in part, except such as
15N. Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1950, p. 17, col. 4; Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News,

Aug. 19, 1951, §4, p. 1, col. 1; personal observation by writer of speedmeter in
actual operation in Greensboro, N. C., and Winston-Salem, N. C.
" MACHEN, THE LAW OF ARREST 8 (1950).
130 STAT. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §35 (Supp. 1951).
2 It must be borne in mind that non-provable claims are never dischargeable.
In order to be provable, a claim arising out of an automobile accident must be
rediced to judgment before the filing bf the petition in bankruptcy, or the action
must be instituted prior to and pending at the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §103 (Supp. 1951).
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. .are liabilities . . .for willful and malicious injuries to the person
or property of another." The United States Supreme Court has not
yet directly answered the question of what constitutes a "willful and
malicious injury," and has delegated to the various state courts the duty
3
of interpretation of the effect of an order of discharge in bankruptcy.
*

It is universally held that liability for simple negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle which results in an injury to another is not
excepted from a discharge in bankruptcy as a "willful and malicious"
injury.4 Moreover, it is also well settled that liability arising out or
clearly intentional injury is not discharged. 5 However, the courts have
disagreed as to whether liability for injury resulting from acts of a
character greater than simple negligence, yet short of intentional injury,
is discharged in bankruptcy.
A majority of the courts,6 influenced by a dictum of the Supreme
Court in Tinker v. Colwell,7 have adopted the theory that no degree of
negligence can produce a "willful and malicious injury" as contemplated
by the Bankruptcy Act. Although this dictum was handed down long
before reckless driving of automobiles became a public menace, and at
a time when the court could only have had in mind the negligent opera'Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234 (1934); Harrison v. Donnelly, 153
F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946). While the Federal Court has paramount jurisdiction
of the matter, and may, if it so desires, assume jurisdiction, it has been the announced policy of the United States Supreme Court to permit the federal courts
to exercise jurisdiction only where unusual circumstances are present.

' Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; In re Kubiniec, 2 F.
Supp. 632 (W. D. N. Y. 1932); In re Madigan, 254 Fed. 221 (S.D. N. Y.
1918) ; Bissing v. Turkington, 113 Conn. 737, 157 Atl. 226 (1931); Bielawski v.

Nicks, 290 Mich. 401, 287 N. W. 560 (1939); Wyka v. Benedicts, 226 App. Div.
1025, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 907 (1943) ; Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.
2d 664 (1947) ; Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519 (1918).
In re Wegner, 88 F. 2d 899 (7th Cir. 1937); fi re Phillips, 298 Fed. 135
(S. D. Ohio 1924) ; It re Wilson, 296 Fed. 845 (D. Md. 1920) ; Rodgers v. Doody,
119 Conn. 532, 178 Atl. 51 (1935).
Rodgers v. Doody, 119 Conn. 532, 178 Atl. 51 (1935); Prater v. King, 73
Ga. App. 471, 37 S.E. 2d 155 (1946); Campbell v. Norgart, 73 N. D. 297, 14
N. W. 2d 260 (1944) ; Freedman v. Cooper, 126 N. J. L. 177, 17 A. 2d 609 (1941) ;
Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W. 2d 664 (1947) ; Panagopulas v.
Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P. 2d 614 (1937); Ely v. O'Dell, 146 Wash. 667, 246
Pac. 715 (1928) ; Francine v. Babayan, 45 F. Supp. 321 (E. D. N. Y. 1942) ; In re

Ellman, 48 F. Supp. 519 (W. D. N. Y. 1942); In re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877
re Vena,
(N. D. Ga. 1936); In re Longdo, 45 F. 2d 246 (N. D. N. Y. 1930); I1n
46 F. 2d 81 (W. D. Wash. 1930); In re Phillips, 298 Fed. 135 (S.D. Ohio
1924) ; In re Roberts, 290 Fed. 257 (E. D. Mich. 1923) ; In re Wilson, 269 Fed.
845 (D. Md. 1920); Ex parte Harrison, 272 Fed. 543 (D. Mass. 1921); In re
Madigan, 254 Fed. 221 (S.D. N. Y. 1918). See Laugharn, The Effect of Discharge it Bankruptcy Upon Automobile Accident Judgments, 281 INs. L. J. 394
(1946).

7193 U. S.473 (1904). "Itisnot necessary inthe construction we give to the
language of the exception in the statute to hold that every willful act which is
wrong implies malice. One who negligently drives through a crowded thoroughfare and negligently runs over an individual would not, as we suppose, be within
the exception. True he drives negligently, and that is a wrongful act, but he does
not intentionally drive over the individual."
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tion of the horse and buggy, it has been consistently cited as authority
for the discharge of automobile accident judgments. Under the Tinker
rule "not only the action producing the injury but the resulting injury
must in intentional. A willful and malicious injury is one caused by
design."' 8 But a "spirit of spite, hate and malevolence is not essential."
In recent years, however, there has been a distinct trend in state
and federal court decisions away from the dictum of the Tinker case. 10
As early as 1918 one state court 1 held that liability resulting from
a "wrongful act done intentionally and without cause or excuse falls
2
within the exception.'
Under this latter view "willful and malicious conduct" has been frequently defined as "that degree of neglect arising where there is a reckless indifference to the safety of human life, or an intentional failure to
perform a manifest duty to the public. . ".."13 It is interesting to note
that while the courts which adopt this view necessarily repudiate the
Tinker dictum, they very frequently quote other language 14 contained
in the opinion in support of their position. 1 Thus there are two groups
of authorities citing the same opinion as supporting opposite views.
Many of the opinions are confusing because courts following one
rule often cite and quote from cases based on the opposite view. 10 What
was said in regard to a particular fact situation, or as to words used
in a pleading or finding in a case decided under one view has no application to a similar fact situation or to the meaning of those words in a
decision based on the other view. The meaning and effect of language
'Rodgers v. Doody, 119 Conn. 532, 178 AtI. 51 (1935).
'Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P. 2d 614 (1937).
10 Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946); Greenfield v. Tuccillo,
129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; In re Green, 87 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 127, 177 P. 2d 364 (1947) ; Breitowich (Tharp) v.
Standard Process Corp., 323 Il. App. 261, 55 N. E. 2d 392 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U. S. 801 (1945) ; Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950) ; McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N. W. 2d 153 (1949) ; Mockenhaupt v. Cordie,
181 Minn. 582, 233 N. W. 314 (1930); Wyka v. Benedicts, 266 App. Div. 1025,
44 N. Y. S. 2d 907 (1943); Doty v. Rodgers, 213 S. C. 361, 49 S. E. 2d 594
(1948) ; Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 AtI. 519 (1918) ; Saueressig v. Jung, 246
Wis. 82, 16 N. W. 2d 417 (1944).
"'Ex
parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519 (1918).
2
I at 521, 106 Atl. 519 (1918).
Id.
13 See, e.g., Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950) ; Reell v. Central
Illinois Electric and Gas Co., 317 Ill. App. 106, 45 N. E. 2d 500 (1942) ; It re
Dutkiewicz, 27 F. 2d 335 (W. D. N. Y. 1928).
"' "... [A] willful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an action
which is against good morals, and wrongful in and of itself, and which neces-

sarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully

and maliciously, so as to come within the exception." Tinker v. Colwell, 193
U. S. 473, 485, 487.
" See, e.g., Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Greenfield
v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; In re Green, 87 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir.
1937) ; Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 A. 519 (1918).
' See, e.g., In re Wegner, 88 F. 2d 899 (7th Cir. 1937) ; In re Kubiniec, 2 F.
Supp. 632 (W. D. N. Y. 1932).
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used in opinions depends wholly upon what has been said of its meaning
in other cases following the same view.
Under the more liberal view whether a particular claim arising out
of an automobile accident will be excepted from discharge depends, to
a large extent, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
the injury and the specific acts of misconduct charged against the tortfeasor.17 Only those judgments survive discharge where the record of
the proceeding in which the judgment was rendered shows a sufficient
degree of negligence to come within the meaning of "willful and
malicious injury" as defined by the courts adopting this view.18 There is
by no means complete unanimity as to what type of conduct evidences this
degree of neglect. 9 However, as to several types of conduct there is
general agreement among these courts.
In most cases involving injuries arising out of automobile accidents
20
where it appeared that the bankrupt was guilty of drunken driving,
deliberately disregarding a traffic signal, 2' driving his car on the sidewalk,22 driving on the wrong side of the road,23 or attempting to pass
17 In re Wegner, 88 F. 2d 899 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Breitowich (Tharp) v. Standard
Process Corp., 323 Ill. App. 261, 55 N. E. 2d 392 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S.
801 (1945) ; Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950) ; Ex Parte Cote,
93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519 (1918).
is Where the judgment is general in its terms, the court will ordinarily look
behind the judgment in order to ascertain whether the debt upon which it was
founded is excepted from discharge. McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N. W.
2d 153 (1949); Campbell v. Norgart, 73 N. D. 297, 14 N. W. 2d 260 (1944);
Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519 (1918). For such purpose it is proper to
consider and review the entire record of the proceedings in which the judgment
was rendered. In re Greene, 87 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Campbell v. Norgart,
73 N. D. 297, 14 N. W. 2d 260 (1944). There is also authority for the view that
the nature of a debt may be established by extrinsic evidence where the record is
not illuminating on this score. Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir.
1942) ; Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 127, 177 P. 2d 364 (1947).
Where the judgment is not general in its terms, ordinarily it must be accepted
as true for the purpose of determining whether the debt is within the exception
to discharge. In re Greene, 87 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937). Thus the verdict of
the jury or the findings of the trial court that the acts of the bankrupt on which
the judgment was based were done willfully and maliciously will in most cases
be binding. But cf. Crow v. McCullen, 235 N. C. 380, 70 S. E. 2d 198 (1952).
", Compare Bielawski v. Nicks, 290 Mich. 401, 287 N. W. 560 (1939), with
Saueressig v. Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N. W. 2d 417 (1944). See also Greenfield
v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942), and Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 265 App.
Div. 343, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 758 (1942).
"oSaueressig v. Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N. W. 2d 417 (1944) ; Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946). But see Bielawski v. Nicks, 290 Mich. 401,
405, 287 N. W. 560, 561 (1939). Contra (following the Tinker dictum): In re
Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 977 (N. D. Ga. 1936) ; In re Wilson, 269 Fed. 845 (D. Md.
1920) ; Tippett v. Sylvester, 3 N. J. M. 125, 127 Ati. 321 (1925).
2 Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129 F. 2d 854 (2nd Cir. 1942) ; Breitowich (Tharp)
v. Standard Process Corp., 323, Ill. App. 261, 55 N. E. 2d 392 (1944), cert denied,
323 U. S. 801 (1945). But cf. Wolkoff v. Minker, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 87 (1943).
Contra: In re Longdo, 45 F. 2d 246 (N. D. N. Y. 1930) (following the Tinker
dictum).
"McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N. W. 2d 153 (1949). Contra: Ii re
Gout, 88 Vt. 318, 92 At]. 646 (1914) (following the Tinker dictum).
"In re Dutkiewicz, 27 Fed. 2d 335 (W. D. N. Y. 1928) ; Ex parte Cote, 93
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another vehicle when it was impossible to see ahead, these courts have
held such injury "willful and malicious" within the meaning of the act.20
On the other hand, mere excessive speed, though willful, does not imply
malice, and there must be some other evidence of a reckless disregard
for the rights of others before speed can cause "willful and malicious"
injury.2 6 Where there is a combination of several of these factors there
is little chance that the liability will be discharged through bankruptcy
27
in a court following the liberal view.
As pointed out above, the larger number of cases, adhering to the
dictum of the Tinker case, have held that all automobile accident judgments are dischargeable in bankruptcy. But in many of these cases it
appears that the judgments were only for simple negligence which would,
of course, be dischargeable under either view.28 If these courts are
faced with a situation involving gross negligence they might well adopt
the opposite view. Further, one court which felt bound by the Supreme
Court dictum has expressed disapproval of the results which it creates. 29
In view of the conflicting theories adopted by the courts which have
faced this question, and in view of the fact that a majority of the state
courts (including North Carolina3 0 ) have not yet been presented with
this question, a decision by the Supreme Court clarifying this subject
is definitely needed.
In the absence of an authoritative decision by the Supreme Court
the courts have tended definitely away from the Tinker dictum. In the
Vt. 10, 106 At!. 519 (1918).
N. Y. S. 2d 907 (1943).
2'Margulies

But cf. Wyka v. Benedicts, 266 App. Div. 1025, 44

v. Garwood, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 946, 178 Misc. 970 (1942).

Contra:

Bielawski v. Nicks, 290 Mich. 401, 287 N. W. 560 (1939) (following the liberal
rule). Bazemore v. Stephenson, 24 Ga. App. 180, 100 S. E. 234 (1919) ; Pozanovic
v. Gilardine, 174 Minn. 89, 218 N. W. 244 (1928); Randolph v. Edmonds, 185
Tenn. 37, 202 S. W. 2d 664 (1947) ; Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P.

2d 614 (1937).
2 It has been held that a criminal conviction, based on the same facts which
gave rise to the civil liability, does not necessarily prevent the discharge of the
judgment even where the defendant has pleaded guilty. Greenfield v. Tuccillo,
(2nd 87
Cir.F.1942).
F. 2dre854
129 "Inrh
2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937).
Greene,
"Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946); Rosen v. Shingleur,
47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950); Doty v. Rodgers, 213 S. C. 361, 49 S. E. 2d 594
(1948) (intoxicated, speeding, driving on wrong side of road).
2" See, e.g., In re Vena, 46 F. 2d 81 (W. D. Wash. 1930) ; In re Roberts, 290
Fed. 257 (E. D. Mich. 1923); Ex parte Harrison, 272 Fed. 543 (D. Mass. 1921).
" "If the court were permitted to do moral justice instead of legal justice it
would refuse to discharge the bankrupt of the judgments. There are too many
accidents resulting in judgments which are wiped out in bankruptcy. . . . Instance after instance can be pointed out of the injustice that is done to the victims
of auto accidents by virtue of the Bankruptcy Law." Francine v. Babayan, 45 F.
Supp. 321 (E. D. N. Y. 1942).
" In Gray v. Griffin, 215 N. C. 182, 1 S. E. 2d 361 (1939), the only North
Carolina case dealing with this question, this point was not before the court since
the injury involved only simple negligence. The court cited opinions following

both views.
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last few years most courts have chosen to follow the opposite view.31
This position would appear to be consistent with the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act,3 2 and in line with the policy of the Supreme Court in
upholding state "financial responsibility" statutes. These statutes suspend a defendant's driver's license when a judgment obtained against
him in an automobile accident case remains unpaid, notwithstanding the
fact that the judgment debtor has obtained a discharge in bankruptcy. 33
JOSEPH F. BOWEN, JR.

Bills and Notes-Purchaser in Good Faith and Without Notice
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and the New
Uniform Commercial Code
In a recent federal court case,' the court applied to an alleged bona
fide purchaser of stolen bearer bonds a rule taken from a New York
case:2 "Even if his [holder's] actual good faith is not questioned, if
the facts known to him should have led him to inquire, and by inquiry
he would have discovered the real situation, in a commercial sense he
acted in bad faith ....
One who suspects [that there are infirmities
or defects in the instrument], or ought to suspect [italics added], is
bound to inquire and the law presumes that he knows whatever proper
inquiry would disclose." The purchaser was ruled not a holder in due
course.3 The instruments in question were four bearer bonds issued by
United States corporations. 4 They were taken from four Netherland
" See notes 5 and 9 supra.
"' To discharge "the honest debtor and not the malicious wrongdoer." Tinker
v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473 (1904).
"All but three states have some form of financial or safety responsibility
legislation. PRESIDENT's HIGHWAY SAFETY CONFERENCE, COMMITTEE LAWS AND
ORDINANcE REPORT (1949).
See, e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §§20-224 through 279
(1947). The North Carolina Act expressly provides that a discharge in bankruptcy of the judgment debtor is not to be treated as equivalent to payment of
the debt for purposes of the act. N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-244 (1947).
Thus under an act of this type the judgment creditor is either compelled to
waive the benefit accorded him by the discharge or accept the alternative of being
deprived of the privilege of operation of a motor vehicle. It was argued in the
case of Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U. S. 33 (1941), that this pressure brought about
by the financial responsibility law was repugnant to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act and hence unconstitutional. This argument was rejected by the Supreme
Court of the United States in a 5-4 decision.
1 State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 99 F. Supp. 655,
667 (S.
D. N. Y.
Rochester
and1951).
C. T. R. Co. v. Paviour, 164 N. Y. 281, 284, 58 N. E. 114, 115

(1900).

' It will be presumed throughout this note that the purchaser seeks recovery
from the drawer or maker of a negotiable instrument who has a valid defense of
fraud, ,duress, false representation, breach of warranty, etc., making it necessary
for the purchaser to prove he took the instrument in good faith and without notice
in order to be a holder in due course.
'The instruments in this case being bearer bonds, the same case arising under
the new Uniform Commercial Code would probably be decided under Article 8,
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domiciliaries during the German occupation in 1941 and later sold by
a German agent in the Paris black market. Subsequently, a Swiss firm
acquired them and sold them to the purchaser. The judgment seems
justifiable,5 but there is reason to doubt the court's use of an objective
test6 in respect to the purchaser as an application of the New York
law.7
Investment Securities, instead of Article 3, Commercial Paper. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§1-201(25), 8-102, 8-302 (1951). A purchaser of investment
paper under these sections would likely be subject to an objective standard of
care. This note is concerned with Article 3 only. See note 28 infra.
' Interpleaded defendant purchased the bonds in 1947 at a discount and was
guaranteed a 14% profit on the United States market; the bonds had back interest
coupons from 1940 and 1941; he purchased them from a firm unknown to him;
he would not allow the firm in Switzerland to mail them to him but went to
Europe and arranged the mailing himself; and he violated a federal law by failing to get authorization from the Secretary of the Treasury before his purchase of
securities outside the U. S.
' The "objective test" within the scope of this note refers to a test which, when
applied to a purchaser of a negotiable instrument, would allow a court or jury
to say that he was put on notice and therefore not a holder in due course because
of suspicious factors which were present at the time of purchase when actually
he had no suspicion.
The "actual good faith test" (or its negative aspect, the "actual bad faith
test") herein means that a court or jury will hold a purchaser to be a holder in
due course unless they believe he actually knew of an infirmity or defect in the
instrument or suspected such by other factors and wilfully shut his eyes to these
facts.
IN. Y. NEG. INST. §§91 and 95; comparable to Negotiable Instrument Law
§52 and 56 (see page 397). In the case cited as the New York rule, Rochester
and C. T. R. Co. v. Paviour, 164 N. Y. 291, 58 N. E. 114 (1900), the question
of bad faith arose concerning the payee. The check was taken for the payment
of what the court called a personal debt. There was no issue concerning a bona
fide purchaser as a potential holder in due course. The check was drawn by the
debtor as treasurer of the plaintiff company. New York did not have the N. I. L.
at the time. The New York courts have generally applied this rule where such a
fiduciary relationship was present, as in Reef v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
268 N. Y. 269, 197 N. E. 276 (1935). But applied as in the principal case to a
non-fiduciary situation: Morris v. Muir, 111 Misc. 739, 181 N. Y. Supp. 913 (N. Y.
Munic. Ct. 1920).
Generally, where the issue of good or bad faith is applied to an alleged holder
in due course, the New York courts have used an "actual good faith test." See
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. Sopowitch, 296 N. Y. 226, 229, 72 N. E.
2d 166, 168 (1947), where the court said: "The requirement of the statute is
good faith, and bad faith is not mere carelessness. It is nothing less than guilty
knowledge or wilful ignorance. . . . One who purchases commercial paper for
full value before maturity, without notice of any equities between the original
parties, or of any defect of title, is to be deemed a bona fide holder. He is
not bound at his peril to be upon the alert for circumstances which might possibly
excite the suspicions of wary vigilance. He does not owe to the party who puts
negotiable paper afloat the duty of active inquiry to avert the imputation of bad
faith. The rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty
and good faith, and not by speculations in regard to the purchaser's diligence or
negligence." Accord: Kelso and Company v. Ellis, 224 N. Y. 250, 64 N. E. 945
(1902) ; Second National Bank of Elmira v. Weston, 161 N. Y. 520, 55 N. E. 1080
(1900) (decided same year as Rochester case) ; Cheever v. Pittsburgh, S. & L. E.
Ry., 150 N. Y. 191, 25 N. E. 402 (1896); Canajoharie National Bank v. Drefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191, 25 N. E. 402 (1890); Seybel v. National Currency Bank,
54 N. Y. 288 (1873). The last two opinions review the English and American
common law on the matter. With the recent decision in the Manufacturers and
Traders Trust Co. case, supra, these cases would seem to indicate that New York
courts would follow the "actual good faith test."
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In 1824, the English court in Gill v. Cubit8 applied an objective,
prudent-man test9 in charging the jury10 in an action by a purchaser
who took a bill of exchange under suspicious circumstances. Ten years
later in a similar case,:" the English court rejected this standard and
stated: "There must be gross negligence at least .. .to deprive a party
of his right to recover on a bill of exchange." In 1836, the case of
Goodman v. Harvey12 went a step further by holding that the question
for the jury was the good faith of the purchaser and while gross negligence may be evidence of nala fides, it is not equivalent to it. The
leading American common law case on the subject, Goodman v. Simonds,13 repudiated Gill v. Cubit and approved Goodman v. Harvey.
Since the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law,' 4 the crux
of the problem is found in the application of two sections:
Section 52. A holder in due course is a holder who has taken
the instrument under the following conditions:
(3) That he took it in good faith ...

(4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no
notice of any infirmity, or defect in the title of the
person negotiating it.
Section 56. To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the
person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge
of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his
action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.
'3 B. and C. 466 (K. B. 1824).
' See note 6 supra.
The question of bad faith of the purchaser is for the jury. "As heretofore
stated, when fraud is proved [by the defendant], or there is evidence tending to
establish it, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show he is bona fide purchaser for value. . . . If, when all the facts attendant upon the transaction are
shown, there is no fair or reasonable inference to the contrary permissible, the
judge could charge the jury, if they believed the evidence to find for the plaintiff.
But the issue itself and the credibility of material evidence relevant to the inquiry
is for the jury and it constitutes reversible error for the court to decide the question and withdraw its consideration from the jury." American National Bank v.
Fountain, 148 N. C. 590, 595, 62 S. E. 738, 740 (1908). See First National Bank
of Shenandoah v. Hall, 31 Idaho 167, 169 Pac. 936 (1918) where the court cites
and discusses many cases of other jurisdictions. As to burden of proof see
Note, 57 A. L. R. 1083 (1928).
" Crook v. Jadis, 5 B. and A. 909, 910 (K. B. 1834).
12 4 A. and E. 870 (K. B. 1836).
For a thorough discussion of these and
other English cases, see Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343 (U. S.1857) ; Rightmire, Bad Faith in Negotiable Paper, 18 MicHi. L. REV. 355 (1920) ; Note, 81
U. oF PA. L. REv. 617 (1933).
1 20 How. 343, 367 (U. S.1857) : "While he is not obliged to make inquiries,
he must not willfully shut his eyes to the means of knowledge which he knows
10

are at hand. .

.

. Mere want of care and caution . . . falls below the true

standard required by law, which is knowledge of the facts and circumstances that
impeach the title. ..."

"' The N. I. L. was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1896. All states subsequently adopted it. BRANNAN,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAw 79 (7th ed. 1948).
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. There is no dispute that section 52(3) calls for the "actual good
faith test." But the question of good faith usually arises in connection
with "notice" under section 56 with respect to the purchaser's knowledge of certain facts which might or might not amount to bad faith.
Here the courts must decide whether to interpret the phrase "knowledge
of such facts ... [as] ...amounted to bad faith" merely as a negative
aspect of the "actual good faith test"'15 or whether to construe it as
1
requiring the "objective test."'
The "actual good faith test" is the majority rule under N. I. L.
section 56,'1 and would seem to be the correct one. This conclusion is
based on a gross simplification: The term "bad faith" means bad faith.
However, more than mere semantics is involved. Can a person's actions
in taking an instrument amount to "bad faith" when he has no suspicions? "Bad faith" requires dishonest action. When one is held to
have had notice although he had no suspicion of an infirmity or defect,
he is not judged so on his own "bad faith" but is regarded as having
had notice because under the same circumstances someone else-the
" See note 17 infra.
In Schintz v. American Trust and Savings Bank, 152 Il.App. 76, 78 (1900),

the court made a statement referred to as the "blundering fool doctrine": "A mere
lack of notice or knowledge is not sufficient; good faith implies honest intent. A
blundering fool may therefore be found to have acted in good faith, though under
like circumstances a shrewd business man might be deemed to have acted in bad
faith...

.

"oSuch a test was applied in Boxell v. Bright Nat. Bank of Flora, 184 Ind.
631, 112 N. E. 3 (1916). Prior to the N. I. L. in Georgia, GA. CIV. CODE §4291
(1910) explicitly stated that any notice was sufficient which would put a prudent
man upon his guard. See Bank of Commerce of Summerville v. Knowles, 32
Ga. App. 800, 124 S.E. 910 (1924). In 1924 the N. I. L. including section 56
was adopted. GA. CODE ANN. §14-506 (Cum. Supp. 1947). South Georgia Trust
Co. v. Crandall, 47 Ga. App. 328, 170 S.E. 333 (1933) indicates the rule of the
old statute still prevails.
"The proposition as stated by these courts: Merely suspicious circumstances
sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry, or even gross negligence on the part
of the purchaser at the time of acquiring the note, are not sufficient by themselves
to prevent recovery unless the jury find from the evidence that the purchaser acted
in bad faith. The jury may consider such circumstances as evidence to weigh
against the veracity of the purchaser's testimony. See Christian v. California
Bank, 30 Cal. 2d 821, 182 P. 2d 554 (1947) ; Fabrizo v. Anderson, 62 A. 2d 314
(D. C. Munic. Ct. App. 1948) ; Chicago Dist. Electric Generating Corp. v. Evans,
117 Ind. App. 280, 69 N. E. 2d 627 (1946); Gramatan Nat. Bank and Trust v,
Moody, 326 Mass. 367, 94 N. E. 2d 771 (1950); Driscoll, Governor, et. al. v.
Burlington-Bristol Bridges Co., 86 A. 2d 201 (N. J. 1952) ; Holleman v. Harnett
County Trust Co., 185 N. C. 49, 115 S. E. 825 (1923); Smothers v. Toxaway
Hotel Co., 162 N. C. 346, 78 S. E. 224 (1913); Bank of Fort Mill v. Robbins,
217 S. C. 464, 61 S.E. 2d 41 (1950); Continental Nat. Bank of Fort Worth v.
Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S. W. 2d 928 (1948). See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW §56 (7th ed. 1948); BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTEs §100 (1943);
OGDEN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS §164 (5th ed. 1947).
In favor of the "actual good faith test" and reasons therefor, see Note, 81
U. OF PA. L. REv. 617 (1933). For the objective application and reasons therefor see Comment, 9 TULANE L. REV. 128 (1934).
For minority rule see note 16 supra.
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reasonable man, a reasonably prudent business man-would have
suspected.
Regardless of the rule to be applied in respect to "notice" under
section 56, two distinct situations arise in the cases although no such
distinction is made in the act: (1) Where the fact which might be notice
to the purchaser is apparent on the instrument; (2) where the fact is
outside the instrument. As to (1), the courts have in some instances
taken a positive position by saying such a purchaser is put on notice ;18
in other instances certain factors taken alone are not enough to charge
a person with notice.10 However, when the fact is dehors the instrument, the courts rarely hold the fact equivalent to notice, but instead
say that certain individually known factors do not per se amount to
notice, but may be considered by the jury as evidence of bad faith if
there are other factors present.20 No one is put on notice by the opera"sWhere there are obvious alterations on the instrument. Mechanics National
Bank v. Helmbacker, 199 Mo. App. 173, 201 S. W. 383 (1918). Where an installment instrument shows that an installment is unpaid at the time of the purchase. Archebald Hardward Co. v. Gifford, 44 Ga. App. 837, 163 S. E. 254
(1932). Where an officer of a corporation paid a personal debt with the corporation's note. Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa. 549, 137 AUt. 113 (1927). Where
certificates of deposit'were made payable to a person as trustee. Ford v. Brown,
114 Tenn. 476, 88 S. W. 1036 (1905).
"0Knowledge of unpaid interest thereon does not amount to notice. City of
New Port Richey v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 105 F. 2d 348 (5th Cir. 1939).
Batson v. Peters, 89 S. W. 2d 46 (Mo. Sup. 1935). Note payable to maker is not
notice. Ochsenreiter v. Block, 42 S. D. 151, 173 N. W. 734 (1919). Instrument
payable to payee as agent for another is not enough to put a purchaser on notice
of rights of maker against the principal or agent. Baird v. Lorenz, 57 N. D.
804, 224 N. W. 206 (1929). But see Ford v. Brown, 114 Tenn. 476, 88 S. W.
1036 (1905) (trustee as payee). Drafts drawn by treasurer as officer of corporation payable to treasurer does not put bank on notice when deposited to his
personal account. Quanah, A. and P. Ry. Co. v. Wichita State Bank and Trust
Co., 127 Tex. 407, 93 S. W. 2d 701 (1936). Cf. Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa. 549,
137 Atl. 113 (1927). In connection with this see UNIFOR FIDUCIAlaTS Acr §§4,
5, and 6 (1922). Neither the fact that the transaction is set out on the face of the
instrument nor the fact that the endorsement is "without recourse" put a purchaser on notice. Sampson v. Hatcher, 151 N. C. 359, 66 S. E. 308 (1909).
20 (1) Purchasing an instrument for an amount much less than its face value.
Credit Adjustment Co. v. McCormick, 198 Okla. 348, 178 P. 2d 610 (1947);
Moore v. Potomac Savings Bank of Washington, 160 Va. 597, 169 S. E. 922
(1933).
(2) Knowledge by the purchaser of an executory agreement between the payee
and maker or drawer. Coral Gables v. Heirn, 120 Conn. 419, 181 A. 613 (1935) ;
Hangstler v. Huguley-Scott Cueto Co., 39 Ga. App. 287, 146 S. E. 645 (1949)
(knowledge that consideration due) ; Rubio Savings Bank v. Acme Farm Products
Co., 240 Iowa 547, 37 N. W. 2d 16 (1949) (knowledge that goods warranted) ;
White System of New Orleans v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 277 (1951) (warranty); Pricher v. Ballard, 180 N. C. 111, 104 S. E. 134 (1920) (warranty)
semble.
(3) Fact that the instrument was to be paid at purchaser's office. Eastern
Acceptance Corp. v. Henry, 62 A. 2d 309 (D. C. Munic. Ct. of App. 1948).
(4) Knowledge by purchaser that payee-vendor had been charged with crookedness in business transactions. Setzer v. Deal, 135 N. C. 428, 47 S. E. 466
(1904). -The court also said the mere fact that purchaser did business next door
to the payee had no connection in the matter.
(5) Knowledge by the purchaser that the seller of the instrument had previously been a gambler. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. Sopowitch,
296 N. Y. 226, 72 N. E. 2d 166 (1947).
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tion of lis pendens2l or record notice,2 2 but under the common law and
the N. I. L., one taking a negotiable instrument is chargeable with his
agent's knowledge of any defects in the title of such instruments.2 8
In spite of the attempt by the majority to state an "actual good
faith test" in applying N. I. L. section 56, individual courts confuse their
contradictory statements which appear to adhere to the
own rules with' 24
"objective test.
Prior to the N. I. L., the general state of the law of bills and notes
was one of complete confusion. 25 The primary reason for its adoption
was the desirability for uniformity in the law.20 But the passage of
27
this law by all the states did not produce the desired result.

This

motivated the drafting of the new Uniform Commercial Code, hereafter

28
called U. C. C.
1 Lytle v. Lansing, 147 U. S. 59 (1892).
Cf. Bank
2Foster v. Augustanna College, 92 Okla. 96, 218 Pac. 335 (1923).
of Clinton v. Goldsboro Savings and Trust Co., 199 N. C. 285, 155 S. E. 261
(1930), which was criticized in Note, 9 N. C. L. REv. 304 (1931).
2Louisa Nat. Bank v. Burr, 198 Iowa 4, 199 N. W. 359 (1924) ; Le Duc v.
Moore, 111 N. C. 516, 15 S. E. 888 (1892) (common law). Cf. Graham v. WhitePhillips Co., 296 U. S. 27 (1935). However, an exception to this is where the
agent's interest in the transaction is adverse to that of the principal. Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Duffy, 210 N. C. 598, 188 S. E. 82 (1936); Commercial Bank of Danville v. Burgwyn, 110 N. C. 267, 14 S. E. 623 (1892). First
Nat.24 Bank of Le Suevr v. Bailey, 54 N. D. 534, 210 N. W. 26 (1926).
. Walch v. Bank of Moundsville, 26 Ala. App. 602, 164 So. 391, reversed on
other grounds, 231 Ala. 194, 164 So. 394 (1935) (ordinary prudent business man) ;
Bishop v. Morrow, 12 Cal. App. 720, 55 P. 2d 1216 (1936) (notice sufficient to
put prudent person upon inquiry), [Contra: Bliss v. California Co-op Producers,
30 Cal. 240, 181 P. 2d 369 (1947)]; Clark v. Laurel Park Estates, 196 N. C.
624, 135 S. E. 626 (1930) (Court needlessly injects into case a statement that
purchaser in the exercise of the due care ought to have known), [Cf. Smathers
v. Toxaway Hotel Co., 162 N. C. 356, 78 S. E. 244 (1913)]; Cohen v. Superior
Oil Corp., 198 Okla. 348, 178 P. 2d 610 (1947) (Court spells out an "actual good
faith test" and then includes a statement concerning an honest and reasonably
prudent business man) ; Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa. 549, 137 Atl. 113 (1927) (Contradiction as to what constitutes bad faith) ; Hughes v. Belman, 239 S. W. 2d
717 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1951) (ordinary prudent man), [Contra: Continental
Nat. Bank of Fort Worth v. Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W. 2d 928 (1948)];
Chase National Bank v. Healy, 103 Vt. 495, 156 At. 396 (1931); Rosenberg v.
Gibson, 259 Wis. 434, 49 N. W. 2d 417 (1951) (uses "actual good faith test" and
then2 throws in phrase concerning actual or constructive notice.
28

BRANNAN,

72 (7th ed. 1946).
224 (1949). BRANNAN,

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

REPORT, MARYLAND BAR AssociATioN
INSTRUMENTS LAW 73 (7th ed. 1946).

NEGOTIABLE

"'Beutal, Problems of Interpretation Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,
27 NEB. L. REv. 485, 494 (1948). BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 14, 19 (1943).
28 Finally approved by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on September 15, 1951. The
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association voted approval September
20, 1951. Foreword, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (V) (Final Text Ed. 1951).
The U. C. C. has been recommended to several of the state bar associations
for their approval. See Merrill, The New Uniform Commercial Code, 22 OKLA.
B. A. J. 2022 (1951) ; Bunn, Status of the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Wis.
B. BULL 24 (Aug. 1951).

The U. C. C. is divided into eight articles codifying the following branches of
commercial law: Sales; Commercial Paper; Bank Deposits and Collections; Documentary Letters of Credit; Bulk Transfers; Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading
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The U. C. C. would replace N. I. L. section 52 and 56 (quoted
supra) with the following:
Section 1-201. General Definitions.
(19) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned.
(25) A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to
him at the time in question he has reason to
know [italics added] that it exists.
Section 3-302. Holder in Due Course.
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the
instrument
(b) in good faith including observance of the reasonable commercial standards of any business
in which the holder may be engaged; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been
dishonored or of any defense against or claim
to it on the part of any person.
The definition of "good faith" according to U. C. C. section
1-201(19) would retain the "actual good faith" aspect. Section 3-302,
however, has something new to offer-the inclusion of the "reasonable
commercial standard" of any business in which a purchaser may be
engaged. This would create a statutory objective test when applied to
business men. A possible rationale is that business men in many commercial fields would make certain inquiries even though there were no
suspicious factors present.
It is readily seen that nowhere in the above sections is the term
"bad faith" used. The drafters of the U. C. C. knew the confusion
N. I. L. section 56 was causing the courts?2 Believing that the "oband Other Documents of Title; Investment Securities; and Secured TransactionsSales of Accounts, Contract Rights and Chattel Paper. See Godfrey, Preview of

the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 ALBANY L. REv. 22 (1952); Palmer, Negotiable
Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 225. For
a critical analysis of the U. C. C. see Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code As a Problem it Codification, 16 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1951).
Hereafter where U. C. C. is used, it will be done so only with Article 3, Commercial Paper, in mind. The negotiable instruments covered by this article are
"drafts," "checks," "certificates of deposit," and "notes." UNIFORM COmmERCiAL
CoDE §3-104 (Final Text Ed. 1951). For scope of Article 3 see Re, Negotiable
Irstruments, 26 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 26, 27 (1951).
" Comment, UNIFORM COMMRCiAL CODE 162 (Commercial Paper, Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1946) :"However, the definition in terms of 'bad faith' has been
troublesome. Since good faith is required as an affirmative element, the definition
of notice in the negative form has puzzled many courts. Furthermore, good faith
is a subjective matter, while it is evident that an objective standard must be applied
to notice and that the purchaser who has notice of a defense will not be heard
to say he did in fact buy in 'good faith."'
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jective test" must be applied to "notice," they embodied such a definition into U. C. C. section 1-201(25) (c) in connection with section
3-302(1) (c). The result: "Good faith" and "notice" were entirely
separated. But as pointed out earlier, most cases arise on the question
of "notice" with regard to certain known facts and circumstances which
surround the transaction. Thus, under the U. C. C., the final determination of cases would hinge, not on "good faith," but on "notice." In
those states which adopt the U. C. C. as it now stands, there will be
no "blundering fool doctrine"3 but rather many blundering fools.
U. C. C. section 3-304, "Notice to Purchaser" (not set out above),
is also new. It states as a matter of law certain situations where a
purchaser has actual notice, situations where he has notice if he has
reasonable grounds to believe certain facts exist, and situations where
knowledge of certain facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice.
It is mainly a codification of many of the existing rules promulgated
3
by the courts. '
There is reason to doubt that the majority use of the "actual good
faith" test in respect to "notice" under N. I. L. section 56 should be
changed, at least in respect to persons not engaged in commercial affairs.
Why should a "commercially inexperienced" person who takes endorsed
paper in "good faith" in payment for debts, labor, or property, be denied the position of a holder in due course merely because there were
certain facts present which did not actually arouse his suspicions?
United States Circuit Judge Herbert F. Goodrich thinks that the
U. C. C. is "in accordance with present day tendencies in growth and
that this code is set up to read upon the business transactions of today's
32
commerce, not of 150 years ago."
It is common knowledge that the commercial world of today is far
removed from the one that existed prior to the N. I. L., yet the old
precedents are still followed in respect to business men. Business now
being conducted in a highly commercialized world, there seems to be
no reason why a person in a particular business should not be required
to live up to the reasonable standards generally practiced by his
33
competitors.
It is submitted that, conceding the separation of "good faith" and
"notice," section 1-201(25)(c) might be better if changed to read as
follows: "from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the
30

See note 15 supra.

"1Compare U. C. C. §3-304 with the cases in notes 18-23 supra.
"Foreword, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (v) (Final Test Ed. 1951).
"Comment,

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE §1-201 (18) (Proposed Final Draft,

1950) : "Reasonable commercial standards does not mean the lax standards sometimes permitted to grow up but is intended to permit the court to inquire as to
whether a particular commercial standard is in fact reasonable."
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time in question he actually suspects a defense against the instrument
or he has reason to know that it exists by the observance of the reasonable commercial standards in any business in which he may be engaged. ' 3 4 This would give the terms "good faith" and "notice" an
"actual good faith test" when applied to laymen, but an "objective test"
would be used when applied to business men. 35
Prospectively, it may be many years before all the states will adopt
the U. C. C. and the sections in point 36 One thing is certain. If it
is adopted by the states, the primary objective of developing uniformity
in the law of bills and notes will have a better chance for accomplishment in respect to purchasers of negotiable paper than under the N. I. L.
as nearly every purchaser would be held to an objective standard of
care.
CHARLES E. NICHOLS.
Constitutional Law-Deprivation of Due ProcessCaptive Audience
The Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia dismissed its investigation' concerning the use of radios in the vehicles
of Capital Transit Company,2 and petitions of appeal were denied by
the district court on the ground that no legal right of petitioning passengers had been impaired. In reversing, 3 the court of appeals held
that forced listening- to radio commercials resulted from government
action 5 and deprived a "captive audience" of liberty without due process
"The "objective test" as to business men under the U. C. C. and the submitted language above would result in a different application for each business
field. The courts would probably find trouble in determining (or in framing
questions for the jury) what activities are necessary to constitute being in business, whether a certain person is engaged in such a business, and what are the
reasonable commercial standards in this particular type business. Those drafting
the U. C. C. evidently thought the beneficial result would outweigh the difficulty.
'

See note 29 supra.

"It took some 28 years for all the states to adopt the N. I. L. The U. C. C.
was introduced in the New York Legislature in 1952 but no action was taken except to have it printed and circulated for the information of the bar and other
interested parties. The code will be introduced there again next year.
I Capital Transit Co., 81 P. U. R. (N. S.) 122 (1950).
'"If they can hear-they can hear your commercial 1" (from brochure by
Transit Radio, Inc., 1949).
'Pollak et at. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of D. C., 191 F. 2d 450 (D. C. Cir.),
cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 77 (1951).
"Forced hearing would seem to be more accurate.
'The Fifth Amendment "relates only to governmental action, federal in character, not to action by private persons." National Fed. Rwy. Workers v. National
Med. Bd., 110 F. 2d 529, 537 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 628 (1940).
"But power is never without responsibility. And when authority derives in
part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private
persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government
itself." American Communications Ass'n., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 401
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of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 6
This decision interpreted the word "liberty" to include "freedom
of
attention," which interpretation, while not entirely novel, 7 seems to be
broader than any announced previously by an important court.8 The
first of the really liberal Supreme Court proclamations in point was set
forth in Allgeyer v.. Louisiana, which declared that as mentioned in the
Fourteenth Amendment liberty "means not only the right of the citizen
to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person" but also the
privilege (among others) "to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties." More recently, it has been held in a "sound truck" case that
"the right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach
the minds of willing listeners ... ."1o [Italics supplied.] There are
numerous other cases recognizing limitations upon the warranties of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments" but especially pertinent in respect
of the conflict presented in the principal case' 2 is Valentine v. Chresten(1950).

See also Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in Steele v. L. & N. R.R.,

323 U. S. 192, 208 (1944) : "Congress, through the Railway Labor Act, has con-

ferred upon the union selected by a majority of a craft or class of railway workers the power to represent the entire craft or class in all colleotive bargaining
matters. While such a union is essentially a private organization, its power to
represent and bind all members of a class or craft is derived solely from Congress. The Act contains no language which directs the manner in which the
bargaining representaive shall perform its duties. But it cannot be assumed that
Congress meant to authorize the representative to act so as to ignore rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. Otherwise the Act would bear the stigma of
unconstitutionality under the Fifth Amedment in this respect."
6 See Shipley, Some Constitutional Aspects of Transit Radio, 11 FED. CoMMAT.

B. J. 150 (1950).

' See Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4

(1890).

HARV.

L. REv. 193

O"No occasion had arisen till now to give effect to freedom from forced
listening as a constitutional right. Short of imprisonment, the only way to compel
a man's attention for many minutes is to bombard him with sound that he cannot
ignore in a place where he must be." Pollak et al. v. Public Utilities Comm'n
of D. C., 191 F. 2d 450, 456 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
0 165 U. S. 578, 589 (1897).
See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U. S. 233, 244 (1936).
"0Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 87 (1949). "Surely there is not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to listen." Saia v. New York, 334
U. S. 558, 563 (1948) (dissenting opinion). But see N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery
Ward, 157 F. 2d 486, 499 (8th Cir. 1946) : "The First Amendment is concerned
with the freedom of thought and expression of the speaker or writer, not with
the conditions under which the auditor or listener receives the message. One
need not, as a condition precedent to his right of free speech under the First
Amendment, secure permission of his auditor. The First Amendment does not
purport to protect the right of privacy, nor does it require that the audience shall
have volunteered to listen." For examples of protection under the law of nuisance
see Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251 (1922),
247 Mass. 60, 141 N. E. 569 (1923) ; and Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann, 190 Md.
348, 59 A. 2d 656 (1948).
"E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U. S. 569 (1941) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) ; and Frohwerk
12 v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919).
I.e., the conflict between the protections afforded by the First and Fifth
Amendments. "Freedom of speech does not import the right or license to say

19521
sen,
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which held, in effect, that the guarantee of freedom to com-

14
municate information does not protect purely commercial advertising.
It is also worthy of note that Justice Jackson has refused to recognize
as a free speech issue the question of whether the use of amplifying
appliances may be regulated, contending that the right comprehends only
natural facilities for speech. 15
The Pollak opinion (principal case) states that the profits involved 1
and the interest of willing hearers17 cannot justify abrogating the constitutional rights of even a minority.' 8 This might seem to raise an
interesting problem of degree when, for example, only one passenger
insists upon his right to "freedom of attention" while thirty others
are bent upon their "right to hear" (and such a consideration was apparently the real basis for the Utilities Commission's decision to dismiss
its investigation). But it is submitted that the court's rationalization
is correct if the "captive audience"'1 was in fact captive as a result
of government action, 20 since Capital Transit was under no compulsion
to provide radios for its customers.
One collateral repercussion of the decision followed closely on its
heels. In Harnik v. Levine a municipal court, discussing the complaint

whatever one pleases, to whom he pleases, and wherever he pleases. This is because the right of free speech is ony one of many rights accorded the people and
in our scheme of government it is intended that each shall be exercised with regard to the others and that all are to be exercised under restraints imposed by
law." Francis v. Virgin Islands, 11 F. 2d 860, 865 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 273
U. S. 693 (1926).
23316 U. S.52 (1942).
" "This decision applies to 'commercials' and to 'announcements.' We are not
now called upon to decide whether occasional broadcasts of music alone would
infringe constitutional rights." Pollak, et al. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of D. C.,
191 F. 2d 450, 458 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
" "Lockport has in no way denied or restricted the free use, even in its park,
of all of the facilities for speech with which nature has endowed the appellant."
Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 568 (1948) (dissenting opinion). Justice
Frankfurter notes that "modern devices for amplifying the range and volume of
the voice, or its recording, afford easy, too easy, opportunities for aural aggression." Id. at 563 (dissenting opinion).
" There was no evidence in the principal case that profits were large enough
to have any effect on fares. A similar (abortive) attempt to "capture" the attention of Grand Central Station's daily throngs provoked several perceptive editorial
attacks. Of the argument that revenues provided by the sale of commercial time
helped defray station clean-up expenses, one editor said, in view of the fact that
Beech-Nut Gum was an advertiser: "In other words, the Voice of Grand Central
is urging five hundred thousand people a day to buy chewing gum so that the
management will have enough money to sweep up gum wrappers." 25 New
Yorker 11 (Dec. 31, 1949).
' 'Withdrawing this particular entertainment will no more deprive willing
hearers of liberty than excluding a man from a particular place imprisons him."
Pollak et al. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of D. C., 191 F. 2d 450, 457 n. 14 (D. C.
Cir. 1951).
""They suffer not only the discomfort of hearing what they dislike but a
sense of outrage at being compelled to hear whatever Transit and Radio choose."
Id. at 457.
" The transmitting station advertised it as a "guaranteed audience." THE
1949 RADIO ANNUAL, p. 363.
"' See note 5 supra.
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of an autoist "imprisoned" by double-parking, stated that "questions of
law, however new, strange, or unusual, are matters for judicial determination. Embattled passengers of a transit company in our nation's
capital recently became tired of listening to commercial radio broadcasts
while traveling in public conveyances; the [court] did not hesitate to
uphold the right of the public to be free from bombardment of sound
which could not be ignored.... If a 'captive audience' has a right to
complain of its plight and to pray for relief, so also may a 'captive
motorist.' "21 Such an observation would appear to ignore the requisite
22
of government action, either state or federal.
The problem analogous to the one in the principal case was presented
in Murdock v. Pennsylvania.23 In that case the conviction of eight
Jehovah's Witnesses under an ordinance requiring licenses for persons
soliciting orders was reversed, and the ordinance declared violative of
freedom of press, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion-which
freedom were said to be in a "preferred position." 24 Justice Jackson
dissented vigorously, however, and cited the nature of the "Watch
Tower Campaign" which had been instituted in the city concerned and
which in certain respects resembled the Pollak situation. 25 He reasoned
that "for a stranger to corner a man in his home, summon him to the
door and put him in the position either of arguing his religion or of
ordering one of unknown disposition to leave is a questionable use of
religious freedom. '12 6 And a similar case 27 arising in 1951 found only
a minority adhering to the "preferred position philosophy" while the
majority adopted the views of the former dissenters. Thus one more
nail has been driven in the coffin of constitutional absolutism, as applied
to the First Amendment.
Interesting analogies are also afforded in the areas of labor relations, 28 wiretapping,20 and undesired publicity. 30 In the latter two re-' 106 N. Y. S. 2d 460, 462 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1951). The decision was not
on this
basis.Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution are designed
" "The
to protect the individual from invasion of his rights, privileges and immunities
by the federal and the State governments respectively." Schatte v. International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators, 70 F.
Supp. 1008, 1010 (S.D. Cal. 1947), aff'd mer., 165 F. 2d 216 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 812 (1948).
2

319 U. S. 105 (1943).

"Id.at 115.
2 "God's faithful servants go from house to house to bring the message of
the kingdom to those who reside there, omitting none. . . . They do not loot
nor break into the houses, but they set up their phonographs before the doors and
windows and send the message of the kingdom right into the houses into the
ears of those who might wish to hear; and while those desiring to hear are hearing, some of the 'sourpusses' are compelled to hear," Id. at 172 (dissenting
opinion,
quoting from J. F. Rutherford's RELIGION).
28

1d at 181 (dissenting opinion).
SBreard v. Alexandria, La., 341 U. S.622 (1951).
28 See Note, 25 N. C. L. Rv. 216 (1947).
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liance is usually placed upon the so-called "right of privacy" 3' 1 or "right
32
to be let alone."
The conflict is not a new one. Heraclitus of Ephesus wrote, in 500
B.C.: "The major problem of human society is to combine that degree
of liberty without which law is tyranny with that degree of law without
which liberty becomes license."3 3 The Pollak case demonstrates once
more the interpretive pliability of our Constitution in dealing with that
problem-whatever the setting. The Bill of Rights "can keep up with
anything an advertising man or an electronics engineer can think of."3 4
L. K. FuRGusON, JR.
Criminal Law-Pleas and Defenses-Nolo Contendere
Answers to a recent inquiry directed to many of the solicitors and
judges of North Carolina reveal an astonishing variety of opinions as
to the significance of the plea of nolo contendere. 1 There are almost

"See Zeni, Wiretapping-The Right of Privacy versusr the Public Interest,
40 J.
Calm. L. 476 (1949).
"See
Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U. S. 711 (1940) ; and Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, Is S. W. 2d 972
(1929).

",The "right of privacy" has been defined as "the right to live one's life in
seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity. In
short, it is the right to be left alone." Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 228, 37
S. W. 2d 46, 47 (1931).
" Justice Jackson uses this phrase in his dissent in the Murdock case, supra
at 166.
" Quoted by Palmer in Liberty and Order: Conflict and Reconciliation, 32
A. B. A. J.731, 732 (1946).
"'Pollak et al. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of D. C., 191 F. 2d 450, 456 (D. C.
Cir. 1951). In "determining whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a
new subject matter, it is of little significance that it is one with which the
framers were not familiar. For in setting up an enduring framework of government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which the
instrument itself discloses." United States v. Classic, 313 U. S.299, 316 (1941).
"In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution
we are expounding." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (U. S.1819).
Addendum: The supreme court opinion reversing the court of appeals in the
Pollak case was handed down after this note went to press. 20 L. W. 4343, May
26, 1952.
1 In November, 1952, the editor of this REvIEw wrote fifty-five judges and
solicitors of the recorder's and superior courts and requested that they send the
REviEw a statement setting forth their opinion (without any research) as to the
significance, essential requirements, and effects of the plea nolo contendere as
used in North Carolina. We wish to express our appreciation to the twenty judges
and solicitors who replied to this request for their contribution to this note.
In these twenty replies, some fifty-nine or sixty different points of view were
expressed. The differences between some of the views are only shaded, but the
opinions on some points are diametrically opposed to the law as laid down by
the supreme court.
Some of the views which do not seem to have judicial sanction are as follows:
"I have never looked into the law but have depended upon a general impression";
"I am not guilty but cannot contend with the State"; the defendant "is. therefore.
admitting that the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction, although he is
rather weakly saying that he is not admitting he is guilty"; "the defendant says
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as many impressions as there are individuals. Some said the plea is an
admission of the facts and charges; others said the plea is an admission
of nothing. Some said that the same punishment would result from a
plea of nolo contendere as would result from a plea of guilty; others
said there are many advantages to the plea. Still others said the plea
is equivalent to a plea of guilty, while others said the State must prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt once the plea of nolo contendere is
entered. 2
This variety of impressions was not altogether unexpected in view
of the limited and sometimes indefinite treatment of the plea nolo contendere by the supreme court.3 This discrepancy in concepts by the trial
courts necessarily results in a mutifarious application of the law.
in effect that in his own mind there is justification for his acts or omissions, of
which the State complains, but he does not wish to contend with the Solicitor";
"a 'gentleman's plea of guilty'"; "defendants who avail themselves of the plea . . .
enter such plea as a 'face saver.' They consider this plea as more respectable";
"defense lawyers sometimes believe that it sounds better to their clients or that
the psychological effect is better"; "a plea of this type somewhat negatives the
sting of a plea of guilty, and leaves the public with a little better impression";
the defendant is "asking for the presentation of the evidence with the purpose and
thought in mind of showing mitigation"; "this technical plea lets the Judge hear
the facts and pass upon the merits of the case"; "I consider it to be a plea of
guilty conditioned upon the evidence for the State being legally sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty"; "I have always required the State to prove its case after
a plea of nolo contendere"; the plea "carries the requirement that the state make
out its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant
is adjudged guilty"; "when the facts produced by the State are not legally sufficient to support a verdict of guilty, I find the defendant not guilty upon the plea";
"at the conclusion of State's evidence if I felt that the State has failed to prove
its case I enter a verdict of not guilty"; "too many trial judges . . . seem to
accept such a plea as a plea of guilty. I have always required the State to prove
its case after a plea of nolo contendere"; "solicitors uniformly accept the plea
when tendered"; "I have almost always accepted pleas of nolo contendere when
offered; and I have never noticed that the form of the plea has made any difference in the punishment or otherwise"; "the major effect of an attorney entering
a plea of nolo contendere would be to protect the defendant's right in a trial when
counsel is unable to produce a legitimate defense and where there is a possibility
that a defense may be developed either factually or technically from the State's
evidence"; "The plea of Nolo Contendere is often used, without sanction of law,
as a time saving device in criminal procedure"; "Where the facts in a criminal
case are not in dispute, or, if in dispute, the State's case is weak or frivolous,
and defendant is willing to accept the Court's version of the law or reaction to
the facts, the defendant will sometimes enter his plea of Nolo Contendere and
abide the judgment of the Court-hoping that the Court will exercise his discretion to permit the plea to be withdrawn, and further hoping that upon intimation of the Court the Solicitor will take a Nolle Prosequi or suffer a directed
verdict of Not Guilty. This device of course saves time and is generally looked
upon by the Court with favor"; and "This plea is quite frequently used when
both the Solicitor and defendant's counsel are willing for the Court to hear the
facts without the intervention of a jury. In such instance an agreement will be
reached that the defendant will enter a plea of nolo contendere and let the Judge
hear the facts. If the Judge is of the opinion that the facts are sufficient to indicate that the defendant is guilty the plea will stand as entered. If the Judge is
of a contrary opinion the plea will be stricken out and a no pros will be taken.
This2 use of the plea quite often expedites the work of the Court."

Ibid.

' See

cases cited in footnotes 44 through 55 infra.
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At early common law the formal plea non vidt, or nolo contendere,
was referred to as an implied confession.' While English authority is
somewhat scant, such as is seems consistently to agree that the plea of
nolo contendere amounted to an implied confession of guilt. 5 There
was also agreement that the plea was permissible only in cases where
the indictment was for an offense less than capital ;6 that it could be
" LAMBARD, EiRENARCHA: OR OF The Office of the Justices of Peace 511 (4th
revised, 1599) (This manual published in London 353 years ago cites Year Book
entries relative to the plea in both the ninth and eleventh year of the reign of
Henry IV (1407 and 1409). The section pertinent to this note reads as follows:
"The party being thus brought in (or otherwise yeelding himself) to answere:

Justice requireth, that hee be heard to speake, and therefore he may (as his case
will serve) either confesse, or deny, the offence wherewith he is burdened.
"And this Confession is of two sorts, Free, or Forced: and that former is of
two kindes also, absolute or after a manner.
"In the free and open (or absolute) confession hee taketh the fault upon
him, and yeeldeth himselfe simply to such paine as [the] court wil inflict for it.
"And this free confession is of great force in the law: for if it be upon an
enditement of Batterie, and (after such confession had for the Queene) the partie
beaten will also bring his Action of Trespasse for his owne damage: then shall
the defendant be concluded by his former confession upon the enditement, so that
he shal not be received to say the contrary. 9.H.4.8 & 11.H.4.65.
"But the other (which I call confession after a maner) is only a not denying,
in which the partie doth cunningly, and (after a sort) take the fault upon him,
without plainly confessing himselfe guiltie thereof: as where hee putteth himselfe
in Gratiam Regina, & petit admiittiper finem, without any more, or sometime (by
Protestation that he is not guilty) pledth his pardon: and such a confession (if
I may so call it) doth not so c6clude him, but that he may afterward plead Not
guiltie in any Action brought against him, 9.H.6.60 Cur. & 11.H.4.65. And yet
M.20.R 2 (as D Statham reporteth) the case is generally set down, that if he
once mak a fine, he that be estopped by it. Neverthelesse I thinke, that the distinction (which I have layed) will reconcile the variance.").

'1

BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARRISH OFFICER

345 (1766)

("An

implied confession is, where a defendant in a case not capital, doth not directly
own himself guilty, but in a manner admits it by yielding to the king's mercy,
and desiring to submit to a small fine; which submission the court may accept of
if they think fit, without putting him to a direct confession."); 1 Cnnry, THE
CRIMINAL LAW *431 ("An implied coxfession. is where, in a case not capital, a
defendant does not directly own himself to be guilty, but tacitly admits it by
throwing himself on the king's mercy, and desiring to submit to a small fine,
which the court may either accept or decline, as they think proper. If they grant
the request, an entry is made to this effect, that the defendant 'non vult contendere
cum domina regina et posuit se in gratiam curiae,' without compelling him to a
more direct confession. The difference in effect between an implied, and an
express confession is, that after the latter, not guilty cannot be pleaded to an
action of trespass for the same injury; whereas it may at any time be done after
the former. But no confession, however large and explicit, will prevent the defendant from taking exception in arrest of judgment to faults apparent in the
record; for the judges must ex officio take notice of them, and any one, as amicus
curiae, may point out the exceptions."); 4 COMYNS, DIGEST OF THE LAws OF
ENGLAND 404 (4th ed. 1793)
("So a man may ponere se it gratiam regis, and

pray that he be admitted by fine.") ; 2

HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN

466 (8th

ed. 1824) ("An implied confession is where a defendant, in a case not capital,
doth not directly own himself guilty, but in a manner admits it by yielding to the
king's mercy, and desiring to submit to a small fine: in which case, if the court
think fit to accept of such submission, and make an entry that the defendant
posuit se in gratiam regis, without putting him to a direct confession, or plea
(which in such cases seems to be left to discretion), the defendant shall not be
estopped to plead not guilty to an action for the same fact, as he shall be where
the entry is quod cognovit indictamentum.") ; LAMBARD, op. cit. supra note 4.
'1 BURN, op. cit. supra note 5; 1 CHITTY, op. cit. supra note 5; 2 HAWKINS,
op. cit. supra note 5.
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accepted or rejected at the discretion of the court;7 and that once
accepted an entry was so made in the record8 without compelling a
more direct confession or plea.0 The only real advantage of the implied
confession over an express confession was that the defendant, by submitting to the court in the criminal action, was not estopped to deny
his guilt in a subsequent civil action for trespass based on the same
facts,10 whereas he would be estopped had he made an express confession to the indictment."
But no confession, express or implied,
could deny the defendant his right to make exceptions in arrest of
2
judgment to defects apparent in the record.'
In America, nolo contendere is not always considered a plea in the
strict sense of the word.' 3 It has been referred to as a compromise
between the state and the defendant.' 4 There are several jurisdictions
in which the plea is not recognized or allowed,' 5 while in the federal
courts, and at least one state, statutory provisions have been made for
the plea.' 6
A majority of the jurisdictions seem to agree that the plea amounts
to an implied confession of guiltY' One federal district court has said

" 1 BURN, op. cit. supra note 5; 1 CHITrTY, op. cit. supra note 5; 4 ComyNs,
op. cit. supra note 5 ("But where the confession proceeds from fear or ignorance,
the judge may refuse the confession.") ; 2 HAWKINS, op. cit. supra note 5.
' Queen v. Templeman, 1 Salk. 55, 91 Eng. Rep. 54 (1702) (". . . for the
entry upon a confession [The North Carolina supreme court interpreted this
phrase in State v. Oxendine, 19 N. C. 435, 437 (1837) as follows: ". . . that is to
say, an implied confession by submission."] is only non ' ndlt
contendere curn domina
Regina & pon. se in gratiam Curiae."); 1 CnrTry, op. cit. supra note 5; 2
HAWKINS, op. cit. supra note 5.
'Rex v. Williams, Comb. 19, 90 Eng. Rep. 317 (1686) ("He pleaded the common plea, quod no; vult contendere cuin domino Rege, and was fined.") ; 1 BURN,
op. cit. supra note 5; 1 CHrIY, op. cit. supra note 5; 2 HAWKINS, op. cit. supra
note 5.
"0Queen v. Templeman, 1 Salk. 55, 91 Eng. Rep. 54 (1702) ("Upon a motion
to submit to a small fine, after a confession of the indictment which was for
assault, Holt Chief Justice took a difference where a man confesses an indictment, and where he is found guilty; in the first case a man may produce affidavits to prove son assault upon the prosecutor in mitigation of the fine; otherwise
where the defendant is found guilty") ; 1 CHIrr, op. cit. supra note 5; 4 COmYNS,
op. cit. supra note 5 at p. 404 ("And such confession does not conclude him.")
2 HAWKINS, op. cit. supra note 5.
" Queen v. Templeman, 1 Salk. 55, 91 Eng. Rep. 54 (1702) ; 1 CHrrIT, op. cit.
supra note 5; 2 HAWKINS, op. cit. supra note 5; 4 LAMBARD, op. cit. supra note 4.
" 1 CHITTY, op. cit. sipra note 5.
" Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451, 455 (1926).
"Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 210 Fed. 735, 738 (6th Cir. 1914);
State v. LaRose, 71 N. H. 435, 438, 52 AtI. 943, 945 (1902).
" People v. Miller, 264 Ill. 148, 106 N. E. 191 (1914) ; Mahoney v. State, 197
Ind. 335, 149 N. E. 444 (1925); State v. Kiewel, 166 Minn. 302, 207 N. W. 646
(1926) ; People v. Daiboch, 265 N. Y. 125, 128, 191 N. E. 859, 860 (1934).
0
' FED. R. CRIm,. P. 11; GA. CODE ANN. §27-1408 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
'¢ United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 (1930) ; People ex. rel. Attorney General v. Edison, 100 Colo. 574, 69 P. 2d 246 (1937) ; Commonwealth v. Marion, 254
Mass. 533, 150 N. E. 841 (1926) ; Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 S. W. 2d 502
(1944) ; State v. Court of Special Sessions of Essex County, 132 N. J. L. 44,
38 A. 2d 577 (1944); Ferguson v. Reinhart, 125 Pa. Super. 154, 190 At. 153
(1937) ; State v. McElroy, 71 R. I. 379, 46 A. 2d 397 (1946) ; Schad v. McNinch,
103 W. Va. 44, 136 S. E. 865 (1927).
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by way of dictum that the plea does not technically admit the allegations,
"but merely says that the defendant does not choose to defend .... 18
It has been held that the plea in one respect is similar to a demurrer
in that it admits all the facts well pleaded ;-,9 thus, where the indictment
alleged that the defendant was a second offender, the court held the plea
to be an admission of that allegation and imposed a more severe penalty
applicable to second offenders. 20 Substantive defects in the indictment,
however, are not cured by entry of the plea,21 i.e., the plea does not
waive any right which the defendant would have had under a plea of
22
guilty.
Originally the plea seems only to have been accepted where the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor. 23 In Tucker v. U. S.24 the
court held that the plea could be used only where the punishment may
be by fine alone, i.e., if the criminal statute made imprisonment mandatory the plea could not be entered. But some jurisdictions hold that
upon acceptance of the plea the court is not restricted to the imposition
of a small fine and that "putting oneself on the mercy of the court"
is merely an appeal for mercy-not a plea-but a petition. 25 There
seems to be general agreement that the plea will not be permitted when
26
the indictment is for a capital offense.
In Hudson v. United States27 the Court rejected the concept laid
'8

United States v. Wierton Steel Co., 62 F. Supp. 961, 962 (N. D. W. Va.

1945).
'
State v. O'Brien, 18 R. I. 105, 25 At. 910 (1892) ; Brozosky v. State, 197
Wis. 446, 222 N. W. 311 (1928).
20 Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N. W. 311 (1928).
2 Commonwealth v. Bienkowski, 137 Pa. Super. 474, 9 A. 2d 169 (1939).
" Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 210 Fed. 735 (6th Cir. 1914).
" Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260 (7th Cir. 1912); Shapiro v. United
States, 196 Fed. 268 (7th Cir. 1912); Blum v. United States, 196 Fed. 269 (7th
Cir. 1912).
24 196 Fed. 260 (7th Cir. 1912).
25 Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (1926) ; Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis.
446, 222 N. W. 311 (1928).
2' Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260 (7th Cir. 1912); Conmmonwealth v.
Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 250, 107 Ati. 729, 730 (1919) (The court here said, "The law
is scrupulous to a degree in such cases to throw about the accused every reasonable
protection, and requires that before conviction his guilt must be established by
evidence which excludes all reasonable doubt." An implied confession cannot rise
to the required degree of certainty.); Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 162
S. E. 50 (1932).
" 272 U. S. 451-457 (1926) (Here the question before the court was "whether
a United States court, after accepting a plea of nolo contendere, may impose a
prison sentence." The petitioners contended the plea was conditioned on a lighter
penalty; "that therefore the court may not accept the plea to an indictment charging a crime punishable by imprisonment only, and if accepted, where the crime
is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both, it may not accept the plea and
ignore the condition by imposing a prison sentence." The court said, "VWe think
it clear, therefore that the contention now pressed upon us not only fails of support in judicial decisions . . . , but its historical background is too meager and
inconclusive to be persuasive in leading us to adopt the limitation as one recognized by the common law.").
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down in Tucker v. United States2 8 that the plea could not be accepted
where punishment must be by imprisonment with or without a fine. But
Justice Stone said in dictum that, "Undoubtedly a court may, in its discretion, mitigate the punishment on a plea of nolo contendere and feel
constrained to do so whenever the plea is accepted with the understand29
ing that only a fine is to be imposed."
The acceptance or rejection of the plea lies wholly within the discretion of the court ,3 the plea is not available as a matter of right ;31
and the acceptance must be unqualified. 3 2 An acceptance requires an
entry in the record specifically stating that the plea has been accepted. 33
Upon acceptance, "It is not the province of the judge to adjudge
the defendant guilty or not."' 34 Evidence may be heard by the court
only for the purpose of determining the degree of punishment to be
imposed.35 If after hearing the evidence so as to determine the sentence, the court is convinced that the defendant is not guilty, the court
should advise the defendant to withdraw his plea and stand a jury
trial.3 6 Generally, however, a judgment of conviction follows the plea
37
the same as it does the plea of guilty.
Once the plea is accepted, it is within the discretion of the presiding
28196 Fed. 260 (7th Cir. 1912).
"' Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451, 457 (1926).
30 Singleton v. Clemmer, 166 F. 2d 963 (D. C. Cir. 1948); Twin Ports Oil Co.
v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939); State v. LaRose, 71 N. H.
435, 52 Atl. 943 (1902).
"1Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260 (7th Cir. 1912) ; Caminetti v. Imperial
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 476, 139 P. 2d 681 (1943) ; Commonwealth v.
Ingersoll, 145 Mass. 381, 14 N. E. 449 (1888) ; State v. Martin, 92 N. J. L. 436,
106 Ati. 385 (1919) ; Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 264, 107 At!. 729 (1919) ;
Orabona v. Linscott, 49 R. I. 443, 144 At!. 52 (1928) ; Schad v. McNinch, 103 W.
Va. 44, 136 S. E. 865 (1927); State v. Suick, 195 Wis. 175, 217 N. W. 743
(1928).
" Commonwealth v. Rousch, 113 Pa. Super. 182, 172 At!. 484 (1934).
" Commonwealth v. Ingersoll, 145 Mass. 381, 14 N. E. 449 (1888) (Here the
police court failed to make such an entry in the record. Held on appeal, error not
to let the defendant plead anew.) ; (When the record is not clear as to whether
or not the plea was accepted, future litigation may result, for example: In Ferguson v. Reinhart, 125 Pa. Super, 154, - , 190 Atl. 153, 154 (1937), there was an
action for malicious prosecution in which plaintiff wanted to introduce the indictment and judgment in the criminal action and at the same time exclude his plea of
nolo contendere on grounds that the court did not accept his plea. The court said
the plea was either accepted or declined-if declined, then the criminal proceedings
had not been concluded and the present action 'would not lie; if accepted, then
plaintiff could not have been found not guilty.).
172 Atl. 484, 485 (1934).
" Commonwealth v. Rousch, 113 Pa. Super. 182, -,
" Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260 (7th Cir. 1912) ; Contra, State v. Hopkins, 4 Boyce (27 Del.) 306, 307, 88 AtI. 473, 474 (1913) ("He pleads non vult;
that is, he throws himself upon this court to say whether or not he is guilty of an
infraction of this law.").
"8Commonwealth v. Rousch, 113 Pa. Super. 182, 172 Atl. 484 (1934).
" United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 (1930) ; People v. Daiboch, 265 N. Y.
125, 191 N. E. 859 (1934) ; Commonwealth ex. rel. Hice v. Ashe, 166 Pa. Super. 35,
70 A. 2d 479 (1950) ; Schad. v. McNinch, 103 W. Va. 44, 136 S. E. 865 (1927);
Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N. W. 311 (1928).
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judge to determine whether the defendant may withdraw his plea,38
and it was held no abuse of discretion to refuse to allow a withdrawal
where the decision to enter the plea had been determined by "the flip
'3 9
of a coin."
The only advantage to the defendant by entering the plea nolo contendere is that generally the judgment in a criminal action, after the
plea, will not be admitted in a subsequent civil action as an admission
of the crime for which he was previously tried.40 But a majority of
states will permit the introduction of the former judgment to show a
41
conviction as, distinguished from an admission.
" Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 97 F. 2d 255 (5th Cir. 1938) ; United States v. Anthracite Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 1018 (M. D. Pa. 1934); State v. Siddall, 103 Me. 144,
68 Ati. 634 (1907); Commonwealth v. Ingersoll, 145 Mass. 381, 14 N. E. 449
(1888) ; In re Lanni, 47 R. I. 158, 131 Atl. 52 (1925) ; Contra, Wright v. State, 75
Ga. App. 764, 44 S. E. 2d 569 (1947) (By statutory construction the plea may
be withdrawn in Georgia at anytime before the pronouncement of a judgment.).
" Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F. 2d 375 (5th Cir. 1940).
"oHudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (1926) ; Caminetti v. Imperial Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 476, 139 P. 2d 681 (1943) ; Krowka v. Colt Patent
Fire Arm Mfg. Co., 125 Conn. 705, 8 A. 2d- 5 (1939) ; Esarey v. Buhner Fertilizer
Co., 117 Ind. App. 291, 69 N. E. 2d 755 (1946) ; White v. Creamer, 175 Mass. 567,
56 N. E. 832 (1900) ; Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 S. W. 2d 502 (1944) ;
Teslovich v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 110 Pa. Super. 245, 168 Ad. 354 (1933) ;
Schad v. McNinch, 103 W. Va. 44, 136 S. E. 865 (1927); cf. Honaker v. Howe,
19 Grant. (Va.) 50, 54 (1869) (Here the plaintiff was not allowed to introduce
evidence to show that the defendant was fined only a nominal sum in the criminal
action so as to enhance the damages in the civil action.).
' United States ex. rel. Bruno v. Reimer, 98 F. 2d 92 (2d Cir. 1938) (A former
sentence under a plea of non vult was held to be a sentence and conviction within
the meaning of the deportation statute.) ; United States v. Dasher, 51 F. Supp. 805
(E. D. Pa. 1943) (A prior conviction after a plea of nolo contendere admitted in
evidence where defendant is charged with a second violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.); State v. Lang, 63 Me. 215, 220 (1874) ("As an admission, it
[the plea nolo contendere] would be prima facie proof only, as between the respondent and third persons; but, between the respondent and the State, it would be
conclusive.") ; Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 398, 177 S. W. 2d 502, 504 (1944)
("A person who has been convicted may be, by statute, disqualified from voting,
from serving as a juror, from holding office, from testifying as a witness, from
practicing a profession, and so on.
"'Convicted' is generally used in its broad and comprehensive sense meaning
that a judgment of final condemnation has been pronounced against the accused...
a judgment of conviction follows a plea of nolo contendere as a matter of course.") ;
State v. Fagin, 64 N. H. 431, 432, 14 At. 727, 728 (1888) (Defendant pleaded nolo
contendere and was sentenced, and in a subsequent criminal action the court said
"... the decisive thing is not the former plea, but the former judgment.") ; Commonwealth ex. rel. District Attorney v. Jackson, 248 Pa. 530, 535, 94 At. 233, 235
(1916) ("If this were a civil action based on the facts charged in the indictment,
the fact of conviction would not conclude defendants. But this action is merely
one to enforce a statutory provision of the school code, which says that forfeiture
of office shall follow a conviction for stated offenses.") ; State v. Estes, 130 Tex.
425, 432, 109 S. W. 2d 167, 171 (1937) (In a disbarment proceeding it was held,
"The term 'conviction' referred to in the statute is not restricted to a conviction
procured upon entry of a particular plea.

. .

.") ; State v. Moss, 108 W. Va. 692,

152 S. E. 749 (1930) (Prior conviction after plea of nolo contendere admitted in
subsequent action for moonshining.); Contra, People ex rel. Attorney General v.
Edison, 100 Colo. 574, 69 P. 2d 246 (1937) (In disbarment proceeding, defendant
who pleaded nolo contendere to perjury charges in the federal court is not precluded from denying guilt) ; In re Smith, 365 Ill. 11, 5 N. E. 2d 227 (1936) (In
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In North Carolina, so much of the common law as has not been abrogated or repealed by statute, is in full force and effect ;42 therefore, the
implied confession, or plea nolo contendere, is still used extensively
throughout the state. 43
The first case of record in North Carolina involving a submission
to the court by the accused was decided by the supreme court in 1837. 44
At that time a statute existed which provided for the hiring out to
anyone who would pay the fine of any free Negro convicted and sentenced to pay a fine which he was unable to pay. One X, a free Negro,
was indicted and "appeared and submitted" to the court. He was fined
$15.00 which he was unable to pay. The court ordered that he be hired
out by the sheriff. X appealed, alleging that the act under which he
was hired out was unconstitutional. The supreme court refused to rule
on the constitutionality of the act and instead held it did not extend
to anyone who submitted to the court; that a conviction at common law
could take place only in two ways: "upon confession, or verdict, or
where the trial was by battle, upon recreancy. .

. By confession is

meant express confession" of the crime with which he is charged, and
since X had submitted to the court, there was no conviction. 45 Thus
it seems that the North Carolina court at an early date adopted the
common law relative to an implied confession.
Subsequently the court has held that "a plea of nolo contendere
does not amount to a 'conviction or 6onfession in open court' of a
felony" ;46 that the plea is equivalent to a plea of guilty in so far as
it gives the court power to punish;47 that when accepted, sentence is
imposed as upon a plea of guilty ;48 that the only advantage is that the
disbarment proceeding, the former conviction under plea of nolo contendere was
not admissible as an admission (there was no statutory provision involved here).) ;
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Connolly, 206 La. 883, 20 So. 2d 168 (1944) (Prior
conviction not allowed in a disbarment proceeding.) ; Schireson v. State Board of
Medical Examiners, 130 N. J. L. 570, 575, 33 A. 2d 911, 914 (1943) (". . . the record of the judgment and commitment ... following his plea of nolo contendere to
the charges of the indictment, do not amount to a conviction" such as would warrant the revocation of a license to practice medicine where the statute authorized
revocation for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.) ; In re Stiers, 204
N. C. 48, 50, 167 S. E. 382, 383 (1932) (In disbarment proceeding, held: ". . . a
plea of noto contendere does not amount to a 'conviction or confession in open
court' of a felony." The proceeding was brought in this case under the provisions
of chapter 64 of the Public Laws of 1929 which provided, that "After conviction
of a felony showing him to be unfit to be trusted . . . he must be disbarred by
the court. . . .") ; see 12 N. C. L. REV. 369.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §4-1.
'
See note 1 supra.
"State v. Oxendine, 19 N. C. 435 (1837).
' The court then continues quoting extensively from 2 HAWKINs c. 31 §§1 and
2, op. cit. supra note 5.
In re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 50, 167 S. E. 382, 383 (1932).
State v. Jamieson, 232 N. C. 731, 62 S. E. 2d 52 (1950) ; State v. Ayers, 226
N. C. 579, 39 S. E. 2d 607 (1946) ; State v. Parker, 220 N. C. 416, 17 S. E. 2d 475
(1941) ; State v. Burnett, 174 N. C. 796, 93 S. E. 473 (1917)..
"8State v. Parker, 220 N. C. 416, 17 S. E. 2d 475 (1941) ; State v. Burnett,
174 N. C. 796, 93 S. E. 473 (1917).
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defendant is not estopped to deny his guilt in a civil action based on
the same facts ;49 that within the limits of the statute the court may, in its
discretion, fix the punishment ;5o that when the court asks the solicitor to
offer evidence so that it may know the nature of the offense in order
to fix the punishment, the guilt of the accused is not at issue and the
solicitor does not have to make out a case ;51 that the plea constitutes
a formal declaration that the defendant will not contend with the
solicitor ;52 that it is tantamount to a plea of guilty for the purposes of
the particular action ;3 that "the court acquired full power to pronounce
judgment against the accused for the crime charged in the indictment
. . . when it permitted the State to accept the plea tendered by" the
defendant ;54 and that the law does not sanction a conditional plea of
nolo contendere wherein the court passes upon the guilt or innocence of
the defendant. 55
North Carolina, as well as other jurisdictions, has followed the early
common law by allowing the plea in cases less than capital. This practice continues although many crimes now classified as less than capital
were considered capital crimes at the time the doctrine originated, and
at which time the plea would not have been accepted as it is today.
At one time the courts seem to have been concerned about the policy
of accepting the plea,r 6 weighing the character and reputation of the
accused against the risk of losing rights of citizenship in case of a plea
of guilty. If it were decided that the ends of justice could be best
served by allowing the plea, an entry of its acceptance was then made
in the record.5 7 But today the plea seems to be accepted in most of
our trial courts as a matter of course, 58 and apparently the entry of
acceptance of the plea by the state or by the court is omitted from the
record as often as it is included. 59
" In re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 50, 167 S. E. 382, 383 (1932) ("a disbarment pro-

ceeding is of a civil nature!') ; State v. Burnett, 174 N. C. 796, 93 S. E. 473 (1917).

"' State v. Parker, 220 N. C. 416, 17 S. E. 2d 475 (1941).
"' State v. Beasley, 226 N. C. 580, 39 S. E. 2d 607 (1946).
" State v. Stansbury, 230 N. C. 589, 55 S. E. 2d 185 (1949).
53 Ibid.
" Id. at 590, 55 S. E. 2d at 187.
"State v. Home, 234 N. C. 115, 66 S. E. 2d 665 (1951) ; Chapter 23, Public
Laws 1933, as amended by chapter 469, provided for the waiver of a jury in certain criminal actions by the entry of a conditional plea of guilty, or nolo contendere.
This act was held unconstitutional as a violation of the N. C. CoNsT. Art. 1, sec.
13, e.g., State v. Camby, 209 N. C. 50, 182 S. E. 715 (1935).
58 Op. cit. supra notes 30, 31, and 32.
', Op. cit. supra notes 8 and 33.
"Op. cit. supra note 1.
"' Transcript of Record, p. 7, State v. Ayers, 226 N. C. 579 (1946) (plea
accepted by the State) ; Transcript of Record, p. 8, State v. Jamieson, 232 N. C.
731 (1950) (plea accepted by the court) ; Transcript of Record, p. 5, State v.
Parker, 220 N. C. 416 (1941) (plea accepted by the court) ; There does not seem
to have been any record of acceptance by either the State or the court in the following cases: State v. Home, 234 N. C. 115 (1951) ; State v. Shepherd, 230 N. C.
605 (1949) ; State v. Stansbury, 230 N. C. 589 (1949) ; State v. Beasley, 226 N. C.
580 (1946).
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While the only real advantage at the common law was that the defendant was not estopped to deny his guilt in a subsequent action for
trespass,60 today he can deny, in subsequent actions unheard of at the
early common law, not only his guilt, but also the fact that judgment
of conviction was rendered against him.0 1
In most states, when a defendant being tried in a court of limited
jurisdiction62 enters a plea of either guilty or nolo contendere, he will
be thereafter bound by such entry upon an appeal to a court of general
jurisdiction, but North Carolina abrogated this doctrine by statute in
1947.63

It may be said in conclusion that the only benefit derived by the
State in allowing the plea of nolo contendere seems to be the expedition
of trial, while the defendant has everything to gain 64 and very little to
lose.6 5 The constitutional provision which prevents former criminals
from voting,60 or from holding office, 67 and similar statutory provisions
which prevent such persons from serving as jurors, 8 can be rendered
ineffective where the trial courts act as perfunctorily in allowing the
plea as they seem to in North Carolina.69 Also statutes which require
the revocation of certain licenses upon conviction of certain crimes 0
would seem to be nullified by the entry of the plea in the criminal
71
action.
A plea for embodying some of the concepts usually attributed to nolo
contendere, however, has a definite place in our legal system so as to
'0 Op. cit. spra note 10.
SOp. cit. supra note 41.
J2 p. courts, police courts, municipal courts, recorder's courts, etc.
J.
13 N. C. GEN. STrA. (1951 Supp.) §15-177.1.
8" Op. cit. supra notes 10, 40, 41, 46 and 49.
Cf. Honaker v. Howe, 19 Gratt. (Va.) 50, 56 (1869) (In an action for
assault and battery, a defendant cannot show that he has already been punished
criminally, for the same act, after a plea of nolo contendere, so as to mitigate
damages.).
"IN. C. CoNsT. Art. VI, §2 ("No person who has been convicted, . . . of
any crime the punishment of which now is, or may hereafter be, imprisonment in
the State's Prison, shall be permitted to vote... ").
" . C. CONsT. Art. VI, §8 ("The following classes of persons shall be disqualified for office: . . . all persons who shall have been convicted or confessed
their guilt . . . of any treason or felony, or of any other crime for which the
punishment may be imprisonment in the penitentiary. .. ").
"N. C. GEN. STAT. (1951 Supp.) §9-1 ("There shall be excluded from said
[jury] lists all those persons who have been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude... ").
O' cit. supra note 1.
Op.

7oN. C. GEN. STAT. (1951 Supp.) §20-16 (gives the Department of Motor
Vehicles power to revoke licenses of certain operators) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1951
Supp.) §20-17 ("The department shall forthwith revoke the license of any operator
or chauffeur upon receiving a record of such operator's or chauffeur's conviction
[emphasis ours] for any of the following offenses ... :").
" The court held in State v. Oxendine, 19 N. C. 435 (1837) that a conviction
At common law could take place only in two ways: upon confession, or verdict;
and in It re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1932) the court held that "a
plea of nolo contendere does not amount to a 'conviction or confession in open
court' of a felony."
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protect, in certain cases, the respectable citizen who may sometimes
become technically guilty of a violation of a criminal law, but who should
not be subjected to certain penalities intended to apply only to those
who wilfully or maliciously violate the law. At least one state has
recognized the need for such a plea and has provided for the same by
72

statute.

In view of the prevailing inconsistency in the administration of the
law in the trial courts of North Carolina under the plea nolo contendere 78 it would seem wise for the General Assembly to specifically
state when and under what conditions the plea nolo contendere may be
entered, and when it will not be permissible. Or, it may be better to
abolish the plea altogether, and in its stead provide for a plea of guilty
with a prayer for relief. Should the court grant the relief, the defendant would not be denied certain prerogatives which he may otherwise
lose. Thus the desirable benefits of the plea would be preserved without leaving the way open for undeserving convicts to profit by the
inadvertence of the trial courts.
WILLIAm L. MILLS, JR.*

Domestic Relations-Father's Duty to Support Minor ChildrenTermination of Duty Upon Death of Father
The question whether the obligation of the father to provide necessary support for his minor children terminates at his death or extends
to his estate was first presented in North Carolina in the case of Elliott
v. Elliott.' Deceased father had been twice married, and at the time
of his death was residing with his second wife and children born of
that marriage, plaintiffs in this action. 2 Deceased was solvent and left
a will devising the bulk of his realty' to the adult children of the first
marriage. To the six minor children of his second marriage, including
one who was then in ventre sa mere, deceased bequeathed the total
"IGA. CODE ANN. §27-1408 (Cum. Supp. 1951) (The Georgia Appellate court
interpreted the purpose for this statute in Wright v. State, 75 Ga. App. 764, 765, 44
S. E. 2d 569, 570 (1947), saying, "The General Assembly, no doubt, had in mind
that these penalties (loss of prerogatives], in addition to the punishment provided
for by law as to the respective offenses charged, would often be too drastic in
specific instances; that oft times the degree of wrong surrounding the circumstances of one defendant would be so much less than that surrounding another,
and yet the facts be such that no valid defense to the crime could be interposed...
the General Assembly doubtless regarded a plea of guilty as too harsh, as applied
to a person of good moral character and standing in his community, he being
technically guilty of a crime, without a valid defense... ").
O cit. supra note 1.
0P.
• LL.B., February, 1952. School of Law, University of North Carolina.
1235 N. C. 153, 69 S.E. 2d 224 (1952).
'Deceased's second wife was a party plaintiff only in the capacity of next
friend to her minor children. She sought nothing for her own support.
I A 78 acre farm of which deceased was seized in fee.
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sum of ten dollars.4 Plaintiffs sought from the defendant executor such
sums as would be reasonable and necessary for their support until they
attained their majority. Defendant's demurrer was sustained by the
trial court, and this was affirmed on appeal.
It has been almost universally held that there rests upon the parents,
primarily the father, the obligation to support, maintain, and educate
their minor children, in so far as they are of ability to do so.8 This
obligation exists as a natural and moral duty arising by virtue of the
act of procreation, 6 as a principle of the common law,7 or as a duty
founded upon statutory enactment.8 North Carolina has held0 that it
is the public policy of this state that the husband shall provide support
for himself and family, and that "this duty he may not shirk, contract
away, or transfer to another." Enforcement of this duty is provided for
by penal statute. 10 Absolute divorce of the parents with an award of the
children's custody to the mother does not terminate the duty resting on
the father ;1 neither does the fact that a minor child lives separate and
apart from his parents with their consent,12 or has been wrongfully
driven from the home by reason of parental misconduct or abuse.1'
Furthermore, North Carolina has extended the father's duty of support
to minor children who themselves own property, 14 and to illegitimates.'r
Except in cases of necessity, the obligation is terminated when the
'Deceased's personal property, i.e., bank account, postal savings and other miscellaneous items totalled approximately $5,400.
'Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936); Ii re Ten Hoopen,
202 N. C. 223, 162 S. E. 619 (1932) ; In re Means, 176 N. C. 307, 97 S. E. 39
(1918) ; Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N. C. 319, 83 S. E. 490 (1914) ; Howell v. Solomon, 167 N. C. 588, 83 S. E. 609 (1914) ; In re Turner, 151 N. C. 474, 66 S. E.
431 (1909); Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N. C. 15, 56 S. E. 509 (1907) ; Burton v.
Belvin, 142 N. C. 153, 55 S. E. 71 (1906) ; Latham v. Ellis, 116 N. C. 30, 20 S. E.
1012 (1895); Burke v. Turner, 85 N. C. 500 (1881); Haglar v. McCombs, 66
N. C. 345 (1872) ; Walker v. Crowder, 37 N. C. 478 (1843) ; Addy v. Addy, 240
Iowa 255, 36 N. W. 2d 352 (1949); Kopak v. Polzer, 5 N. J. Super. 114, 68 A.
484, aff'd, 4 N. J. 327, 72 A. 2d 869 (1950) ; Barker v. Barker, 75 N. D. 253, 27
N. W. 2d 576 (1947); Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S. C. 67, 20 S. E. 2d 237
(1942); Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations §110 (1931); 39 Am. Jun.,
Parent and Child, §35 (1942) ; 67 C. J. S., Parent and Child, §15 (1950).
61 B1. Comm. 446.
'Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340 (1903); Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614,
44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947) ; 39 Am. JuR., Parent and Child, §35 (1942).
8
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933) ; Funeral Home v. Julian,
176 Tenn. 534, 144 S. W. 2d 755 (1940); 39 Am. JuR., Parent and Child, §35
(1942).
'Ritchie v. White, 225 N. C. 450, 35 S. E. 2d 414 (1945).
"0N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-322 (Supp. 1951) ". . . or if any father or mother
shall willfully abandon his or her child or children, whether natural or adopted,
without providing adequate support for such child or children, he or she shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. . ."
'1 Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936).
1 3Hunycutt v. Thompson, 159 N. C. 30, 74 S. E. 628 (1912).
Hunycutt v. Thompson, 159 N. C. 30, 74 S. E. 628 (1912).
Haglar v. McCombs, 66 N. C. 345 (1872).
1 Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936) ; Burton v. Belvin, 142
N. C. 153, 55 S. E. 71 (1906) ; Kimborough v. Davis, 16 N. C. 72 (1827).
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child attains his majority, which date was arbitrarily set at the completion of the twenty-first year by common law, a rule now adhered to

by a majority of the states.'0 Physical or mental affliction rendering
one unable to provide support for himself will constitute such necessity,
and will extend the parental obligation beyond the age of the child's
majority for so long as the necessity continues. 17

There being no statutory provision covering the problem in the
Elliott case, resort was had to the common law, for so much of the
latter as has not been "abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete" is in
full force and effect in this state.' 8 In resolving the issue in favor of
the defendant, the court relied principally upon four decisions from
other jurisdictions as evincing the common law rule that the obligation
of the father to support his minor children terminates at his death.' 9
20
Although at slight variance with the North Carolina case factually,
1' Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947).
(Note, however, that
N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-322 (Supp. 1951) requires support only until the eighteenth
year, and that the relief sought in the Elliott case was such sum as would be
reasonable for the support of the children until they reached their eighteenth birthday.) ; Jones v. Jones, 72 F. 2d 829 (D. C. Cir. 1934) ; Scott v. Scott, 304 Ill. 267,
136 N. E. 659 (1922); Banco De Sonora v. Casualty Co., 124 Iowa 576, 100 N. W.
532 (1904) ; Sternlieb v. Securities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N. E. 726 (1934);
Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 229 Pac. 14 (1924). All the cases recognize that the rule was one of convenience and necessity rather than a substantive
rule of law.
" Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947) (The duty resting on
parents, and primarily on the father, to support their offspring arises by virtue
of the inability of children to care for themselves; if the children are physically
or mentally defective the inability remains even after they attain their majority,
as does the duty of the parents to support them.) Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 202
(1948) ; Zakrocki v. Zakrocki, 115 Ind. App. 518, 60 N. E. 2d 157 (1945) ; Prosser
v. Prosser, 159 Kan. 651, 157 P. 2d 544 (1945) ; Breuer v. Dowden, 207 Ky. 12,
268 S. W. 541 (1925); It re Mangan's Will, Misc. , 83 N. Y. S. 2d
393 (1948); Rowell v. Town of Vershire, 62 Vt. 405, 19 Atl. 990 (1890); Van
Tinker v. Van Tinker, 38 Wash. 2d 390, 229 P. 2d 333 (1951) ; Schultz v. Tractor
Co., 111 Wash. 351, 190 Pac. 1007 (1920); 39 Am. JUR., Parent and Child, §69
(1942).
18
N. C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943); e.g., Finance Corp. v. Quinn, 232 N. C.
407, 61 S. E. 2d 192 (1950) ; Ionic Lodge v. Masons, 232 N. C. 648, 62 S. E. 2d
73 (1950) ; Henson v. Thomas, 231 N. C. 173, 56 S. E. 2d 432 (1949) ; Scholtens
v. Scholtens, 230 N. C. 149, 52 S. E. 2d 350 (1949) ; State v. Sullivan, 229 N. C.
251, 49 S. E. 2d 458 (1948); Moche v. Leno, 227 N. C. 159, 41 S. E. 2d 369
(1947).
1" Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 At. 841 (1927); Rice v. Andrews, 127
Misc. 826, 217 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1926); Silberman v. Brown, 34 Ohio Ops. 295,
72 N. E. 2d 267 (1946); Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 160, 50 S. E. 2d
455 (1948), noted in 62 HARV. L. Rav. 1079 (1949), 24 NoTE DAmE LAW. 563
(1949). See also, Taylor v. George, 34 Cal. 552, 212 P. 2d 505 (1949) ; Guinta v.
Lo Re, 159 Fla. 448, 31 So. 2d 704 (1947), noted in 19 Miss. L. J. 249 (1948) ;
Oetter v. Sandlin's Adm'x., 262 Ky. 355, 90 S. W. 2d 350 (1936) ; Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S. W. 2d 731 (1950) ; Carey v. Carey, 163 Tenn. 486, 43 S.
W. 2d 498 (1931); Cissna v. Beaton, 2 Wash. 2d 491, 98 P. 2d 651 (1940) ; In re
Skorczyrski's Will, 256 Wis. 300, 41 N. W. 2d 301 (1950); Madden, Persons and
Domestic
Relations, §115 (1931).
' 0 Each of the four cases involved a minor child or children of divorced parents; in the instant case the parents were married and living together at the time
of the father's death.
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the cases are in essence the same, each deciding the identical issue presented by the Elliott case. The rationale of the decisions is that no child
has a vested right in the estate of his father, and that under the laws
regarding testamentary disposition a father may expressly disinherit
his child by will, whether the latter be a minor or not ;21 that the obligation of the father is a personal one and does not constitute a debt of
the parent, and that upon death the father loses his correlative right
to the companionship and services of his child. 22 The result reached
by these decisions has been severely criticized;2 other states, largely
on the basis of court order or contract, have held otherwise.2 4 Nevertheless, in view of the almost absolute right of testamentary disposition
given the owner of property by the legislature, 21 it would appear that
the result is consonant with the soundest principles of logic. It would
seem illogical indeed to undermine the right of testamentary disposition
by holding that the obligation of the father to support his minor children
extends beyond his death, or that, in effect, a father cannot disinherit
his child.
In view of the sharp conflict on the issue in other jurisdictions, it
is well that the North Carolina Supreme Court has had occasion to
declare the law applicable in this state. On the basis of the common
law rule which still prevails, and irrespective of desirability, or lack of
same, the decision seems well grounded.
HAL W. BROADFOOT.

2'Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 135 At. 841 (1927); Robinson v. Robinson,
131 W. Va. 160, 50 S. E. 2d 455 (1948).
2Rice
v. Andrews, 127 Misc. 826, 217 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1926).
22Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 160, 50 S. E. 2d 455 (1948) (dissenting
opinion); Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations, §115 (1931), wherein the
author says, in referring to laws of testamentary disposition 'which allow a father
to disinherit a child and leave the latter to become a public charge, "That is carrying the testamentary capacity to absurd lengths, and statutes should make it
impossible."
24 In re Van Arsdale's Will, 190 Misc. 968, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 487 (1947)
(contract for support independent of divorce decree) ; It re Stoner's Estate, 358 Pa.
252, 56 A. 2d 250 (1948) (valid claims for support have the same effect as other
debts of decedent, and as such shall be ascertained and recovered in the same
manner) ; Stone v. Bagley, 75 Wash. 184, 130 Pac. 820 (1913) (property settlement
between divorced parents providing for the support of a minor child survives the
death of the father and continues in force throughout the child's minority) ; Edelman v. Edelman, 65 Wyo. 271, 203 P. 2d 952 (1949) (father's estate is liable for
payments ordered by divorce decree to be paid for support of minor children).
2Pullen
v. Commissioners, 66 N. C. 361 (1872) (the right to inherit real
property and the right to devise same is a positive creation of law and not a natural
right). At least one jurisdiction takes the opposite view. Nunnemacher v. State,
129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627 (1906). As to limitations on the right see N. C.
GEN. STAT. §§30-1 (dissent from will by widow) ; 30-2 (effect of such dissent)
and 30-15 (widow's year's allowance) (1943).
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Evidence-Search of Motor Vehicles for Intoxicating
Liquors Without Search Warrant
The 1951 amendment to G. S. 15-271 provides that

"...

no facts

discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search warrant in the
course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance of
a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any
action." As a result of this enactment, some confusion has arisen at
the law enforcement level as to the right of officers to search a motor
vehicle without a warrant, and at the trial court level as to the admissibility of evidence so obtained. The language of the amendment
indicates that its purpose is to change the law of evidence in North
Carolina,2 and not the substantive law as to what constitutes legal or
illegal search. Therefore a search that was legal without a warrant
before the amendment became effective is still legal, and evidence so
obtained still competent.
Under the common law, lawful search without a warrant may be
made as an incident to arrest,3 or when the person in charge of the
premises consents thereto. 4 In addition, by statute in North Carolina5
an officer may search a motor vehicle without a warrant if he has absolute personal knowledge that the vehicle contains intoxicating liquor.6
A search of a motor vehicle made under other conditions requires a
valid search warrant to be legal. 7 But heretofore evidence secured by
an illegal search without a warrant when a warrant was required has
nevertheless been admissible.8 It is this evidence which the 1951 amendment renders incompetent.
A requirement that officers obtain a search warrant before lawfully stopping and searching moving vehicles would make adequate
enforcement of the liquor laws impossible. For this reason moving
vehicles have been held to occupy an exceptional place under the law
of search and seizure in many states and in the federal courts. In
dealing with this question, the United States Supreme Court, rather
than relaxing the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence, chose in-

'N. C. SEss.
2

LAws (1951),c. 644.
See A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolinain 1951, 29 N. C. L.

REv. 396 (1951).

3State v. Fowler, 172 N. C. 905, 90 S. E. 408 (1916); State v. Graham, 74
N. C. 646 (1876).
'State
v. Fowler, 172 N. C. 905, 90 S.E. 408 (1916).
5
N. C. GEN. STAT. §18-6 (1943).
I In State v. Godette, 188 N. C. 497, 503, 125 S. E. 24, 28 (1924), the court
stated that absolute personal knowledge could be acquired through the sense of
seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or touching.
'Another possible exception to the rule requiring a search warrant is the
examination of an abandoned vehicle. But no cases have been found which touch
on this point.
8 State v. Vanhoy, 230 N. C. 162, 52 S.E. 2d 278 (1949) ; State v. McGee, 214
N. C. 184, 198 S.E. 616 (1938) ; State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646 (1876).
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stead to change the definition of an "illegal search." Carroll v. United
States0 held that if a search and seizure without warrant are made by
federal officers upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that a vehicle contains that which by law
is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. 10
Thus such officers may stop and search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that it is being used to transport intoxicating
liquor.1
The North Carolina and federal laws are now virtually the same in
holding evidence incompetent if obtained by a search made illegal because no warrant was used. But as to what constitutes a legal search
267 U. S. 132 (1925).
"0The idea did not originate in the Carroll case. The First Congress, which
incidentally proposed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, in an act regulating duties in 1789 allowed "collectors, naval officers and surveyors" to stop and search any ship or vessel in
which they shall have "reason to suspect" is carrying concealed goods subject to
a duty. L. STAT. 29, 43 (1789).
"' A corollary question is, when may an officer stop a moving vehicle in enforcement of the general law. Since the earliest common law days, constables in
England have been permitted to stop and investigate suspicious persons. 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN c. 13, §§5-6 (6th ed. 1787).

The few state cases found

which have directly commented on the question have unanimously held that officers may stop and make reasonable inquiry of persons suspected of criminal conduct. No distinction has been made between misdemeanors and felonies, or
151,
between persons riding or walking. See, e.g., People v. Henneman, 367 Ill.
10 S.E. 2d 649 (1937); State v. Broas, 240 Mich. 490, 215 N. W. 420 (1927)
(defendant suspected of transporting liquor gave not only consent but an invitation to search by handing officer keys to car) ; Hargus v. State, 58 Okla. Cr. 301,
54 P. 2d 211 (1935) ; Johnson v. State, 118 Tex. Cr. 293, 42 S.W. 2d 421 (1931) ;
Pena v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. 218 S. W. 2d 1015 (1928) ; State v. Zupan, 155 Wash.
80, 283 P. 671 (1929). The federal courts have indicated their position in holding
that if probable cause is acquired after stopping and questioning, but before the
actual search begins, the search is legal. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S.160
(1949) ; Morgan v. United States, 159 F. 2d 85 (10th Cir. 1947).
Nearly all states have statutes similar to N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-183 (1943)
allowin& officers to stop motor vehicles for the purpose of examining the driver s
license without suspicion or reason to believe the driver is violating the driver's
license law. Therefore, it is believed that these statutes supplement the common
law right of officers to stop and question where he does have reason to suspect that
some other crime is, has been, or is about to be committed. There is an interesting line of Tennessee cases, however, which in effect hold that the driver's license
inspection law has abrogated the common law right of officers to stop on suspicion
of other crime. Consequently, if an officer stops an automobile on suspicion of its
hauling liquor, examines the driver's license, and sees liquor in the car without
actually searching, the evidence is incompetent under the exclusionary rule on the
ground that the officer had no right to stop the car except to examine the driver's
license. Robertson et al. v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W. 2d 633 (1947) ; Smith
v. State, 182 Tenn. 158, 184 S.W. 2d 390 (1945) ; Cox v. State, 181 Tenn. 344,
181 S.W. 2d 338 (1944). In a later case, however, the Tennessee court seems to
recognize the common law right of officers to stop an automobile and investigate
on suspicion of criminal conduct other than motor vehicle violations. High v. State,
188 Tenn. 166, 217 S.W. 2d 774 (1949).
The courts seem to take for granted that officers have the right as a necessary
police measure to stop and make reasonable inquiry of persons suspected of criminal conduct. This probably explains the small number of cases in which the courts
have directly commented on the question.
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of a vehicle without a warrant, the laws differ greatly in the two jurisdictions,' 2 one having the "absolute personal knowledge" requirement,
while in the other only "probable cause" is required.
Of course, the purpose of the rule excluding illegally obtained
evidence which North Carolina has adopted 3 is to protect persons
from unreasonable searches and seizures.14 But there is an equal public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law. The statutory
requirement of "absolute personal knowledge," together with the "exclusionary rule" embodied in the amendment to G. S. 15-27, seems
to make adequate enforcement of the liquor laws impossible. Should
the "exclusionary rule" be continued, a substitution of the "probable
cause" federal test of legal search for the present requirement of "absolute personal knowledge" might better serve all interests concerned.' 5
JACK WATTS WORSHAM.

Federal Jurisdiction-Three-Jufdge Court-Meaning of
"State Statute"
Congress has made provisions in certain types of situations where
an overriding public importance is involved for a special three-judge
district court to supplant the ordinary single-judge court, Such situations include equity actions by the United States under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, actions to restrain the
enforcement of any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
actions to restrain the enforcement of an act of Congress on the grounds
of its repugnance to the Constitution. An additional situation is where
an interlocutory or permanent injunction is sought in Federal district
"'Except search incident to arrest,
with consent.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §15-27 (1943) or
made incompetent any evidence obtained by
a search that was illegal because the warrant was defective under the statute. It
was held in State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 196 S. E. 616 (1938) that it did
not exclude evidence obtained by an illegal search where no warrant at all was
used. The 1951 amendment to the statute corrects this anomalous situation.
"The rule was first suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Boyd
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1885). But it remained for Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. S.383 (1914) to clearly establish the rule and its reason. Wigmore
severely criticizes the rule. 8 WiemoRE, EVIDENCE §§2183-2184 (3d ed. 1940).
See Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19 ILL. L. REV.
303 (1925) ; Waite, Evidence-Police Regulations by Rile of Evidence, 42 MICH.
L. REv. 697 (1944). But see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
H av. L. REV. 361 (1921); Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search
and Seizure, 13 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1928). The rule is not in effect in thirty-one
states, England, Canada, Scotland, and Australia. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.
25, 38, 39 (1949).
"No cases have been found which indicate what standard North Carolina requires for making a lawful search without a warrant for contraband other than
intoxicating liquor. It is believed that the standard of absolute personal knowledge would be applied. See MACHEN, THE LAw OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 61

(1950).

' MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.

S. JUDICIAL CODE

125 (1949).
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court against the enforcement, operation or execution of a state statute
or an order of an administrative board or commission by restraining a
state officer in the enforcement or execution of the statute or order,
on the ground that such statute or order is invalid under the Federal
Constitution. In such case, section 2281 of the Judicial Code 2 requires
that it be heard by a district court composed of three judges, one of
whom must be a circuit judge.
Section 2281 is a strict procedural device and was not intended to
extend federal jurisdiction.3 The purposes behind the enactment of
the statute indicate that it was intended as a limitation on the power

of federal district courts to interfere with the enforcement of state
laws.4 A substantial claim of unconstitutionality must be made,5 and
in the absence of such a claim, diversity of citizenship plus the jurisdictional amount will not confer jurisdiction on the three-judge court.,

Since this is a proceeding in equity, the federal court must have a
cause of action in equity before it. 7 A single district judge may deter' "An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of
such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under such State statutes, shall
not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title." 62 STAT.
968, 28 U. S. C. §2281 (1948). The original statute creating the three-judge cotirt
was enacted in 1910 as part of the Mann-Elkins Act, 36 STAT. 539, 557 (1910) ;
incorporated into the Judicial Code as §266 in 1911, 36 STAT. 1162 (1911) ; was
extended to include orders of state administrative boards and commissions in 1913,
37 STAT. 1013 (1913) ; and in 1925 the section was amended to extend the jurisdiction of the three judges to the final hearing for the injunction, 43 STAT. 936
(1925).
' "The history of §266 [28 U. S. C. §2281], the narrowness of its original
scope, the piece-meal explicit amendments which were made to it, the close construction given the section in obedience to Congressional policy, combine to reveal
§266 not as a measure of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality,
but as an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as
such." Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 250 (1941). See Chandler v.
Neff, 298 Fed. 515 (W. D. Tex. 1924); Pogue, State Determination of State Law,
41 HARv. L. REv. 623 (1927); Comment, The Three Judge Rule, 38 YALE L. J.
955 (1928).
""It is a matter of history that this procedural device was a means of protecting the increasing body of state legislation regulating economic enterprise from
invalidation by a conventional suit in equity.... Congress thus sought to assure
more weight and greater deliberation by not leaving the fate of such litigation to
a single judge. . .

."

Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 250 (1941).

' California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U. S. 252 (1938);
Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 282 U. S. 10 (1930) ; In re Buder, 271
U. S.461 (1926); Butler v. Simpson, 184 F. 2d 526 (4th Cir. 1950); Wylie v.
State Board of Equalization of California, 21 F. Supp. 604 (S. D. Cal. 1937);
United States Building & Loan Ass'n v. McClelland, 6 F. Supp. 299 (D. Cola.
1934); Cannonball Transportation Co. v. American Stages, Inc., 52 F. 2d 1050
(S. D. Ohio 1931); United Drug Co. v. Graves, 34 F. 2d 808 (M. D. Ala. 1929).
Wylie v. State Board of Equalization of California, 21 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.
Cal. 1937).
""But even though a district court has authority to hear and decide the case
on the merits, it should not invoke its powers unless those who seek its aid have
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mine the question of jurisdiction of the statutory court, but he has no
authority to dismiss on the merits if the case is one within that jurisdiction, and this determination is made on the basis of the allegations
in the complaint.8 Where the case calls for a three-judge court, the
parties may not waive it since it is a jurisdictional requirement,0 and a
single judge can only issue a restraining order that is good until the
hearing for the interlocutory or permanent injunction. 10 Where there
is a proper case before the statutory court, it may determine all questions, local as well as federal." Even if a three-judge court hears a
case not within its jurisdiction, the decision has the character of a
decision by a single judge and is not void, but an appeal will only lie
to the court of appeals, 12 and where a three-judge court should have
been convened but was not, the United States Supreme Court on application will issue a writ of mandamus to the district judge, directing
8
him to call two other judges for the statutory court.'
The statutory court is also available where a state officer is sought
to be restrained in the enforcement of any order made by an administrative board or commission pursuant to a state statute on the ground
that the order is unconstitutional. 14 In such a case, it is only necessary to attack the order as unconstitutional, and the statute creating the
board or commission need not be attacked.' 5 As a limitation on the
#a cause of action in equity. . . . Where a federal court of equity is asked to
interfere with the enforcement of state laws, it should do so only to prevent
irreparable injury which is clear and imminent." American Fed. of Labor v.
Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 593 (1946) ; Chandler v. Neff, 298 Fed. 515 (W. D. Tex.
1924). The federal courts will not restrain state officers in the enforcement of
criminal statutes, regardless of their unconstitutionality, except in extraordinary
circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.
The accused should first rely on his defense in the state courts, and then appeal
the constitutionality to federal courts. Speilman Motor Sales v. Dodge, 295 U. S.
89 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240 (1926) ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U. S. 197 (1923) ; Trent v. Hunt, 39 F. Supp. 373 (S.D. Ind. 1941) ; Watchtower
Bible & Tract Society v. City of Bristol, 24 F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. 1938).
'Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30 (1933); New Jersey Chiropractic Ass'n v.
State Board of Medical Examiners of New Jersey, 79 F. Supp. 327 (D. N. J.
1948). At least one case has held the district court need not grant jurisdiction
if there is an "insuperable impediment" to the relief desired. Pullen v. Patton,
19 F. Supp. 340 (N. D. Tex. 1937).
"Riss & Co. v. Hoch, 99 F. 2d 553 (10th Cir. 1938).
10 Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 282 U. S. 10 (1930);
Ex Parte
Metropolitan Water Co. of West Virginia, 220 U. S. 539 (1911).
" Louisville & N. R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 (1913); Fisher v. Brucker,
41 F. 2d 774 (E. D. Mich. 1930).
" Public Service Commission of Missouri v. Brashear Freight Lines, 312 U. S.
621 (1941) ; O'Malley v. United States, 128 F. 2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942).
1
Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 282 U. S. 10 (1930).
1 See note 2 supra.
A single individual, such as the state prohibition commissioner, may constitute a state administrative board or commission within the
meaning of the act. McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 52 F. 2d 934 (4th Cir. 1931).
A notice by the state industrial board to attend a workmen's compensation hearing,
may be an "order" within the meaning of section 2281. Albee Godfrey Whale
Creek
Co. v. Perkins, 6 F. Supp. 409 (S.D. N. Y. 1933).
"8 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290 (1923) Southern R.R.
v. Query, 21 F. 2d 333 (E. D. S. C. 1927).
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right to attack the order and in accord with equitable principles, the
state provisions for review of the order must be followed and exhausted

prior to coming into federal court.' 6

An additional prerequisite to obtaining a three-judge court is that

the action must seek to restrain a "state officer."' 7 This does not in-

dude municipal or county officers,' 8 even though the local officer may
be enforcing a state law.' 0 There is an exception to this rule: In case
the local officer, although locally elected and having authority only in
one political subdivision, acts in the interest of the state, he is to be

regarded as a state officer as to the performance of those functions in

which the state has an interest. 20 This is particularly true of prosecuting attorneys who are charged with the enforcement of state law. 2'
Where it appears that the primary relief demanded is other than the

restraint of state officers, the statutory court has no jurisdiction. 22

It

must also appear that the state officer is actually attempting to enforce

the state statute and not merely carrying out functions incidental to
the enforcement of the statute.2
2'lbm
Public Service Commission v. Southern R.R., 341 U. S. 341 (1951)
Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U. S. 104 (1939). The Johnson Act,
28 U. S. C. §1342 (1948), has application in this area: "The district courts shall

not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order
affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State administrative
agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where: (1) jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the order to the
Federal Constitution; and, (2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and, (3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing;
and, (4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State."
"7See note 2 supra.
" Ex parte Collins, 277 U. S. 565 (1928); Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F. 2d 384
(5th Cir. 1951); Pleasant v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 66 F. 2d 842 (10th
Cir. 1933) ; Henrietta Mills Co. v. Rutherford County, 26 F. 2d 799 (W. D. N. C.

1928).

" City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U. S. 329 (1945) ; Petition of Public
National Bank of New York, 278 U. S. 101 (1928).
2 "Where a statute embodies a policy of state-wide concern, an officer, although
chosen in a political subdivision and acting within that limited territory, may be
charged with the duty of enforcing the statute in the interest of the state and not
simply in the interest of the locality where he serves. This is especially true in
the case of a prosecuting officer who acts for the entire state, as a part of its
machinery of enforcement, in proceedings against violators of the state statute....
In that enforcement, he is acting in a true sense as an officer of the state. Appellant sought to restrain his action in that respect and hence we think that the
case . . . was properly heard by three judges." Spielman Motor Sales v. Dodge,
295 U. S. 89 (1935).
21 Ibid.
2 Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U. S. 386
(1934).
2 Wilentz v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 306 U. S. 573 (1939).
Where statute
set up maximum rates to be charged for telephone and telegraph service, with a
provision that anyone overcharged could collect a penalty, and that the Railroad
Commission was to publish a list of rates, a bill to restrain such publication is not
a bill to restrain the statute, since the Railroad Commission is not attempting to
enforce the statute. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Railroad Commission of South Carolina, 280 Fed. 901 (E. D. S. C. 1922).
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Although section 2281 is applicable to both state statutes and orders
of administrative boards and commissions, perhaps the most difficult
question concerning this section is: What is a "state statute" within
the purview of this act? By judicial decision, "state statute" does not
25
include a municipal ordinance, 24 a city charter, a departmental regu26
lation or a statute passed by a state legislature but which has only
local application. 27 Neither does it include a law passed by local
2s
authorities pursuant to a state enabling act, but it does encompass
29
The allegation of unconstitutionprovisions of a state constitution.
ality, based not on the statute, but on the construction placed on the
statute by the highest state court is insufficient to obain a three-judge
court.80 The conflict asserted must be one between the statute and the
Federal Constitution,3 1 and the fact that the statute is in conflict with
federal legislation which by virtue of the Supremacy Clause has pre"John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U. S. 100 (1928);
City of Baton Rouge v. Baton Rouge Waterworks Co., 30 F. 2d 895 (5th Cir.
1929); City of Dallas v. Dallas Telephone Co., 272 Fed. 410 (5th Cir. 1921);
City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Gas Co., 264 Fed. 506 (8th Cir. 1920) ; Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. City of Tacoma, 190 Fed. 682 (C. C. W. D. Wash. 1911);
Ward Baking Co. v. City of Fernandina, 29 F. 2d 789 (S. D. Fla. 1928) ; Calhoun

v. City of Seattle, 215 Fed. 226 (W. D. Wash. 1914); Birmingham Waterworks
v. City of Birmingham, 211 Fed. 497 (N. D. Ala. 1913). Neither does §2281
apply to a county ordinance. Borges v. Loftis, 87 F. 2d 734 (9th Cir. 1937);
Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F. Supp. 598 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
" Uihlein v. City of St. Paul, 32 F. 2d 748 (8th Cir. 1929).
"Sweeny v. State Board of Public Assistance, 36 F. Supp. 171 (M. D. Pa.
1940). As to the assessment, levy or collection of state taxes, the Tax Injunction
Act of 1937, 28 U. S. C. §1341 (1948), provides: "The district courts shall not
enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State." A three-judge court may be obtained where the taxing statute itself
is attacked as unconstitutional. Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486 (1942).
"' Rorick v. Board of Commissioners of Everglades Drainage District, 307
U. S. 208 (1939) (statute had only local application in one drainage district);
Public National Bank of New York v. Keating, 29 F. 2d 621 (S. D. N. Y. 1928)
(state taxing statute, but the state interest was very small compared to that of
the city for whose chief benefit the tax was collected). Section 2281 has been
held not to apply to statutes passed by the legislatures of Hawaii, Stainback v. Mo
Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U. S. 368 (1949) ; or Puerto Rico, Benedicto v. West India
& Panama Telegraph Co., 256 Fed. 417 (1st Cir. 1919).
" Ex parte Collins, 277 U. S. 565 (1928) ; Teeval v. City of New York, 88
F. Supp. 652 (S. D. N. Y. 1950).
20 "It would .. . be somewhat incongruous to hold that a single judge, while
prohibited from enjoining action under an act of the state legislature, would be
free to act if the state constitution alone were involved. The policy underlying
§266 [28 U. S. C. §2281] admits no distinction between state action to enforce a
constitutional provision and state action to enforce an act of the legislature. There
is no suggestion in the history of §266 that Congress was willing to give the federal courts a freer hand when state constitutional provisions were involved. In
our view the word 'statute' in §266 is a compendious summary of various enactments, by whatever method they may be adopted, to which a state gives her sanction and is at least sufficiently inclusive to embrace constitutional provisions."
(1946).
Amer. Fed. of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582
0 Steinbach v. Metzger, 63 F. 2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1933).
1
parte Williams, 277 U. S. 267 (1928); United Drug Co. v. Graves, 34
F. 2d 808 (M. D. Ala. 1929).
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empted the field, is not an allegation of unconstitutionality within the
meaning of section 2281.32

Neither is this requirement satisfied by an

assertion that the state officer is acting outside the scope of his statutory authority.Phillipsv. United States34 attempted to clarify the meaning of "state
statute" within the purview of section 2281 by the following language:
"To bring this procedural device into play-to dislocate the
normal operations of the system of lower federal courts and thereafter to come directly to this Court-requires a suit which seeks
to interpose the Constitution against enforcement of a state policy,
whether such policy is defined in a state constitution or in an
ordinary statute or through the delegated legislation of an 'administrative board or commission.' -a3
In this case, the defendant, governor of Oklahoma, sought to justify his
actions on the basis of state statutes and constitutional provisions which
gave him the power to declare martial law in order to enforce the laws
of the state, but the court held that this was not enough to warrant
the convening of a three-judge court, for the existence of the power
to declare martial law as a general proposition was not claimed to be
unconstitutional, only the particular acts in this one instance were
assailed as constitutionally invalid. Cases prior to the Phillips case had
held that the fact that the state officer claimed to be acting under statutory authority was enough to require a three-judge court,"0 but those
cases now seem to be overruled by implication. Subsequent decisions
seem to indicate that where a substantial charge is made that a state
statute is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, a three-judge court
has jurisdiction,3 and the fact that the statute may be perfectly valid
"Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 62 (1946); In re Bransford, 310 U. S. 354
(1940); In re Buder, 271 U. S. 461 (1926); Board of Trade v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 156 F. 2d 33 (7th Cir. 1046); Farmers' Gin Co. v. Hayes,
54 F. Supp. 47 (W. D. Okla. 1943); D. A. Beard Trucking Line Co. v. Smith,
12 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Tex. 1935) ; Hume v. Mahon, 1 F. Supp. 142 (E. D. Ky.
1932).
13 Council of Defense of State of New Mexico v. International Magazine Co.,
267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920). At least one case has held that where the governor
and other state officials were merely acting under "color" of the state statute, a
single district judge had the right and duty to enjoin their unconstitutional actions
taken pursuant to such statute. Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512 (W. D.
Tenn. 1939).
1'312 U. S.246 (1941).
Id. at 252.
3 "It is apparent that the complainant is seeking to enjoin the defendants, as
officers of the State of Indiana, from doing the things which they believe to be
their duty under the Constitution and laws of the State of Indiana." Cox v.
McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355, 356 (S.D. Ind. 1935). "Since it appears that the plaintiffs seek to enjoin the defendants, who are officers of the state, from doing what
they claim they are authorized and required to do by the Constitution and laws of
the state, the causes are properly to be determined by a statutory court ..
Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 866 (D. Minn. 1934).
"'Here a substantial charge has been made that a state statute as applied
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as applied to other situations within its purview does not seem to dislodge the jurisdiciton. of the three-judge court.38 The distinction seems
to be made between an attack on a statute as applied, as being unconstitutional (where a three-judge court is available), and an attack merely
on the end-result of the statute's application as being unconstitutional
(where a three-judge court is not available).39
This distinction seems'to have been confirmed in at least two recent
instances where a three-judge court was sought. In Briggs v. Elliott40
a statutory court was. granted to plaintiffs, Negro school children in
South Carolina. The court stated:
"This is a suit for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in which it is alleged that the schools and educational facilities
provided for Negro children in School District No. 22 in Clarendon County, South Carolina, are inferior to those provided for
white children in that district and that this amounts to a denial of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and further that
the segregation of Negro and white children in the public schools,
required by Article 11, section 7 of the Constitution of South
Carolinaand section 5377 of the Code of Laws of that state, is
of itself violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 41 [Italics added.]
In the Briggs case, the constitutional provisions and state statute were
directly attacked as unconstitutional, and the federal courts have previously held that section 2281 does not apply unless the statute is directly
involved.4 Gray v. Board of Trustees of University of Tennessee'3
was an action seeking to enjoin the defendants from denying plaintiffs
admission to graduate school and college of law as students because
to the complainants violates the Constitution. Under such circumstances we have
held that relief in the form of an injunction can be afforded only by a threejudge court.. .. " Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486, 490 (1942).

" In Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486 (1942), the statute involved was
a state license tax for the privilege of retailing certain articles. Obviously, this
tax would be valid in some situations, but not where the tax was imposed upon
U. S. Army Post Exchanges as -wvas attempted to be done in the Query case.

""It is necessary to distinguish between a petition for injunction on the ground
of the unconstitutionality of a statute as applied, which requires a three-judge
court, and a petition which seeks an injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the result obtained by the use of a statute which is not attacked as unconstitutional. The latter petition does not require a three-judge court. In such a
case, the attack is aimed at an allegedly erroneous administrative action. Until
the complainant in the district court attacks the constitutionality of the statute,
the case does not require the convening of a three-judge court, any more than if
the complaint did not seek an interlocutory injunction." Ex parte Bransford, 310

U. S.354, 361 (1940).

"198 F. Supp. 529 (E. D. S. C. 1951), remanded for other reasons, 72 s.Ct.
327 (1952).
"Id. at 530.
• Grigsby v. Harris, 27 F. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1928).
"100 F. Supp. 113 (E. D. Tenn. 1951), dismissed on appeal, 72 S.Ct. 432

(1952).
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they were members of the Negro race. The Constitution and Statutes
of the state required segregation between the races in educational institutions. In answer to a request for a three-judge court, the court
stated:
"We are of the opinion that the case is not one for decision
by a three-judge court. Title 28 U. S. Code, §2281, requires the
action of a three-judge court only when an injunction is issued
restraining the action of any officer of the State upon the ground
of the unconstitutionality of such statute. We are of the opinion that the case presents a question of alleged discrimination
on the part of the defendants againstthe plaintiffs under the equal
protection clause of the 14th Amendment rather than the unconstitutionality of the statutory law of Tennessee requiring segregation in education. As such, it is one for decision by the Distnct
Judge instead of by a three-judge court."
[Italics added.]
Here the court construed the complaint not to attack the statute as unconstitutional, but merely to allege discrimination on the part of the
defendants, and the relief demanded could be granted without holding
the segregation law invalid.4 5 It is readily seen that whether the threejudge court has jurisdiction is largely in the control of the plaintiff in
drawing his complaint,46 for if the complaint makes a substantial charge
of unconstitutionality of a state statute, then the statutory court is forthcoming. 47 But the defendant may not raise the constitutional issue by
48
answer in order to obtain the three-judge court.
It is by no means clear whether the Briggs and Gray cases represent
the view that the Supreme Court will ultimately take on this particular
question, for in neither case did that court decide this question on
appeal. 49 These cases do represent an extension of the Supreme Court's
views taken in the Phillips case, and serve to indicate the complexity
of the problem involved.
WILLIAM C. MORRIS, JR.
"Id. at 114.
"'In such a situation, the plaintiff would be primarily alleging that the separate
schools resulted in discrimination against him because of his race and color, and
not that the segregation law per se was unconstitutional. Here the court could
grant the relief demanded by forcing the state officers to make the separate schools
equal.
'6Hobbs v. Pollock, 280 U. S. 168 (1929).
" Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 282 U. S.10 (1930). The U. S.
Supreme Court held that it was insufficient reason for failure of district judge to
immediately call two other judges to his aid that the question was likely to become moot. Er parte Atlantic Coast R.R., 279 U. S.822 (1928).
"Hobbs v. Pollock, 280 U. S.168 (1929).
"'The Briggs case was remanded by the U. S. Supreme Court, 72 S.Ct. 327
(1952), to allow the district court to consider the report made by the State of
South Carolina on the progress made in carrying out the mandate of the district
court to make the schools equal. The Gray case was dismissed on appeal, 72 S.
Ct. 432 (1952), because the plaintiff had been admitted to the University of
Tennessee.
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Fire Insurance-Application of the "Hostile Fire-Friendly
Fire" Rule
A valuable sapphire ring was inadvertently thrown into a trash
burner where it was damaged by fire to the extent of $900. The fire
had been intentionally lighted in the trash burner and was confined
at all times to that receptacle where it was supposed to be. Action was
brought to recover for the damage to the ring under a policy of standard
form covering "all direct loss or damage by fire." The lower court
rendered a judgment for plaintiff; defendant appealed and the Kansas
Supreme Court reversed, with two judges dissenting, holding that the
fire in question was a "friendly fire" and loss therefrom was not covered by the policy.'
In determining the liability of the insurer against damage by fire
within the meaning of standard insuring clauses, the courts have almost
universally adopted a rather subtle distinction between fires that are
hostile and those that are friendly, notwithstanding that such distinc2
tion is not made in the language of the policy itself. A hostile fire is
defined as being a fire unexpected, in a place not intended for it to
be and where fire is not ordinarily maintained, or as one which has
3
Once the existence of a
escaped from its usual or intended place.
hostile fire is proved, the liability of the insurer extends beyond the
immediate consequences of ignition and covers any loss proximately
caused by fire.4 A friendly fire is one which is intentionally lighted
I Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472 (Kan. 1951).
- Lavitt v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 Atl. 572
(1927); Mode, Limited v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 62 Idaho 270, 110 P. 2d 840
(1941) and cases cited therein; Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass.
67, 43 N. E. 1032 (1896); Progress Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Reciprocal Exchange, 109 S. W. 2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Austin v. Drewe, 4 Camp. 360,
171 Eng. Rep. 115 (1815), subsequent proceedings, 6 Taunt. 436, 128 Eng. Rep.
1104 (1816) ; 5 AiPLEm"A, IN SURANCE LAW AND PRAcncE §3082 (1941) ; VANCE
ON INSURANCE: 869, 870 (3rd ed. 1951); 45 C. J. S., Insurance, §809. Contrc:
Louisiana. "Whatever may be said of 'friendly' or 'unfriendly' fires, there is no
such distinction recognized in the policy." Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co.,
161 So. 340, 342 (La. App. 1935). No North Carolina case has been found in
which the distinction between "friendly" and "hostile" fires was at issue.
'Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. C. C. Anderson Co., 47 F. Supp. 90 (D. Idaho 1942);
Cannon v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 Ga. 563, 35 S. E. 775 (1900) ; Youse v. Employers
Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472 (Kan. 1951) ; Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins.
Co., 218 Mo. App. 31, 260 S. W. 490 (1924); Coryell v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 118
Neb. 312, 229 N. W. 326 (1930), setting aside, 118 Neb. 303, 224 N. W. 684
(1929); 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAmccE §3082 (1941); 26 C. I.,
Fire Insurance'§429.
'Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Nelson, 90 Colo. 524, 10 P. 2d 943 (1932)
(damage from smoke and soot where fire escaped from range and burned floor
and walls) ; Queen Ins. Co. v. Patterson Drug Co., 73 Fla. 665, 74 So. 807 (1917)
(loss by theft of goods removed because of fire); Nash v. American Ins. Co.,
188 Iowa 127, 174 N. W. 378 (1920) (damage caused by fire set in a silo for
thawing ensilage Which accidentally blazed up to the top of the silo) ; Way v.
Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N. E. 1032 (1896) (damage by
smoke and soot from fire caused by ignition of soot in chimney) ; Lynn G. & E. Co.
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and confined within its usual limits, such as a blaze produced by lighting
a match, or a gas jet or lamp, or a stove, furnace, or incinerator, and
is employed for lighting, heating, cooking, manufacturing, or other
common and usual everyday purposes.5 A friendly fire is not a fire
within the usual terms of a policy and recovery cannot be had for smoke,
soot, or heat damage (short of ignition) arising from such fire.0
The Kansas case under consideration 'adopts the above distinction
in denying recovery under a fire insurance policy for the loss of an
article accidentally or negligently thrown into a fire which was intentionally set and burning in its intended place. The majority of the
courts in the United States in which the point has been raised have
v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 33 N. E. 690 (1893) (damage to machinery in a part of the building not reached by the fire from short circuiting of
'electric current caused by the fire) ; Russell v. German Fire Ins. Co., 100 Minn.
528, 111 N. W. 400 (1907) (damage caused by fall of wall of adjacent building
due to its burning); Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App.
31, 260 S. W. 490 (1924) (damage caused by smoke and soot given off from
explosion of hot water furnace where coals were blown out on earthen floor of
basement) ; Coryell v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 118 Neb. 312, 229 N. W. 326 (1930),
setting aside, 118 Neb. 303, 224 N. W. 684 (1929) (damage from fire, smoke and
soot caused by flames shooting from open furnace door of oil burner) ; Firemen's
Ins. Co. v. Houle, 96 N. H. 30, 69 A. 2d 696 (1949) (damage by water) ; Whitehurst v. Ins. Co., 51 N. C. 352 (1859) (damage caused by water in extinguishing
fire and losses by theft consequent on removal of goods) ; Collins v. Delaware Ins.
Co., 9 Pa. Super Ct. 576 (1899) (damage caused by smoke and soot from a coal
oil stove where fire extended to the tank in which the oil was kept) ; Watson v.
American Colony Ins. Co., 179 S. C. 149, 183 S. E. 692 (1936) (damage resulting
from removal of article because of fire) ; Progress Laundry & Cleaning Co. v.
Reciprocal Exchange, 109 S. W. 2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (damage to boiler
by fire entering and burning in compartments intended for water) ; City of New
York Ins. Co. v. Gugenheim, 7 S. W. 2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928 (damage by
smoke and soot from fire escaping into furnace compartment intended for air
space) ; Pappadakis v. Netherlands Fire & Life Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 430, 242 Pac.
641 (1926) (water damage caused by heat and flame escaping from a crack in the
top of an oven and releasing a sprinkler valve); O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co.,
140 Wis. 388, 122 N. W. 1038 (1909) (damage by smoke, soot and heat from
excessive fire in furnace caused by highly inflammable materials not intended for
such purpose).
' See note 3 supra.
'Lavitt v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 Atl. 572

(1927) (damage by smoke and soot from a fire confined to and never outside of

the furnace); Cannon v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 Ga. 563, 35 S. E. 775 (1900)

(loss by smoke, soot and heat from a defective stovepipe); Gibbons v. German

Ins. Co., 30 Ill. App. 263 (1889) (heat caused by steam escaping from a broken
steam pipe); Hansen v. Lemars Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 193 Iowa 1, 186 N. W. 468
(1922) (smoke and soot escaping from an oil stove) ; McGraw v. Home Ins. Co.,
93 Kan. 482, 144 Pac. 821 (1914) (damage to steam boiler from excessive heat
and insufficient water) ; American Towing Co. v. German Fire Ins. Co., 74 Md.
25, 21 Atl. 553 (1891) (injury to boiler from heat) ; Wasserman v. CaledonianAmerican Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 518, 95 N. E. 2d 547 (1950) (damage to heating
system because of lack of water. in boiler); Consoli v. Commonwealth Ins. Co.,
84 A. 2d 926 (N. H. 1951) (damage to cans of fruit on shelf near stove from
excessive heat of stove; Davis v. Law Union & Rock Ins. Co., 166 Misc. 75, 1

N. Y. S. 2d 344 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1937) (smoke and soot escaping from a
furnace) ; Fitzgerald v. German-American Ins. Co., 30 Misc. 72, 62 N. Y. Supp.
824 (County Ct. 1899) (damage caused by smoke from a lamp) ; Austin v. Drewe,
4 Camp. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115 (1815), subsequent proceedings, 6 Taunt. 436, 128
Eng. Rep. 1104 (1816) (smoke and excessive heat from stove and flue).

19521

NOTES AND COMMENTS

denied recovery for loss or damage to jewelry in such cases.7 Louisiana
alone seems to permit recovery, refusing to make a distinction between
an accidental loss resulting from a friendly fire and an accidental loss
resulting from a hostile fire.8 Only two cases have been found which
are in agreement with the Louisiana case: a French decision, Countess
Fitz-Jamws v. Union Fire Ins. Co.,° and a recent English case, Harris
v. Poland. °
This distinction between hostile and friendly fires had its beginnning
in the early English case of Austin v. Drewe." It has been criticized
and restricted by some authorities and courts,' 2 but yet recognized and
followed in the United States in all cases since except for the decision
in Louisiana.' 3 There would seem to be doubt as to the correctness of
Mode, Limited v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 62 Idaho 270, 110 P. 2d 840
(1941); Harter v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 257 Mich. 163, 241 N. W. 196 (1932);
Weiner v. St. Paul F. &M. Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 153, 207 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dep't
1924) ; aff'd without opinion, 214 App. Div. 784, 210 N. Y. Supp. 935 (1st Dep't
1925); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Naman, 118 Tex. 21, 6 S. W. 2d 743 (1928). The

argument is that where property is destroyed by being inadvertently deposited in
a fire which was intentionally set and which at no time escaped from its usual
and intended limits and which was at all times under control, it is destroyed by a
"friendly fire," not a "hostile fire," and the loss or damage 'sustained is not "direct
loss or damage by fire" within the meaning of fire policies. The point is also
made that in common parlance and everyday usage a person has not "had a fire"
so long as it has only burned in its intended place and where fire is ordinarily
maintained.
' Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 340 (La. App. 1935) (recovery
allowed for destruction of bracelet inadvertently thrown into trash burner). See
also Watson v. American Colony Ins. Co., 179 S. C. 149, 183 S. E. 692 (1936)
(where the insured was allowed to recover for the destruction of a ring inadvently thrown into a friendly fire in an attempt to put out a hostile fire).
'23 IRsH LAw TIMES & SOLCITOR'S J. 169, March 30, 1889 (recovery allowed
for the destruction of a pearl earring accidentally knocked into a fire burning in
a grate).
10 [1941] 1 K. B. 462, 164 L. T. 283 (K. B.) (recovery allowed for damage
to jewelry caused by a fire inadvertently lit in a grate in which the jewelry had
been placed for safekeeping.
4 Camp. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115 (1815), subsequent proceedings, 6 Taunt.
436, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104 (1816). The insured suffered damage from excessive
heat and smoke to sugar in the process of refining from the failure of an employee
to open a register at the top of the flue. The insurance company was held not
to be liable as there was no fire within the meaning of' the policy, since the fire
never was excessive and was always confined within its proper limits; nothing
was consumed by fire and the loss was due only to heat and smoke arising from
the negligent management of the machinery. Said the court, the company might
as well be sued for damage done to furniture by a smoky chimney; had the fire
been brought out of the flue and anything had been burnt, the insurer would have
been liable. Whereupon, states the reporter, the jury "with great reluctance, found
a verdict for the defendant." See Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass.
67, 43 N. E. 1032 (1896) where the terms "friendly" and "hostile" first seem to
have been applied to fires in this connection.
"Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N. E. 1032 (1896);
Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 31, 260 S. W. 490
(1924); Coryell v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 118 Neb. 312, 229 N. W. 326 (1930),

setting aside, 118 Neb. 303, 224 N. W. 684 (1929) ; Pappadakis v. Netherlands F.
& L. Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 430, 242 Pac. 641 (1926) ; O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co.;
of America, 140 Wis. 388, 122 N. W. 1038 (1909) ; 2 MAY ON INSURANCE §402
(3d ed. 1891) ; Vance, Friendly Fires, 1 CoNN. B. J. 284 (1927).
1" It must be remembered that the decision of the Louisiana court is based upon
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the basic fact presumption in the doctrine, i.e., that both insured and
insurer contracted with the understanding that the term "loss by fire"
means loss by a "hostile fire" as the majority of courts have defined
"hostile" in the past. Words used in insurance contracts are to be
interpreted according to their plain and ordinary sense so as to give
effect to the intention of the parties. 14 The test is not what the insurer
intended the words to mean but the meaning that would be given to
them by a reasonable person in the position of the insured. 1 A reasonable person might interpret the words "loss by fire" according to the
distinction of hostile or friendly fires in the case of a smoky chimney
or furnace but not where there has been an actual burning of the
insured article.
The rule of construction so established is not at all in harmony with
the general policy of American courts in construing insurance policies
of whatever type to resolve every doubt as to the meaning of the words
employed in favor of the insured claiming indemnity for an honest
loss. 6 There can be, of course, no question but that the damage suffered by the plaintiff in the above case was caused by "fire," or that it
falls within the literal meaning of the words, "loss or damage by fire."
All of the cases decided in the United States on this point, other
than a New York case decided earlier,'1 7 rely very heavily on the opinion
a fact situation in which an actual burning of the insured article occurs as a result
of the fire, and hence may be distinguished from Austin v. Drewe. It is possible
that Louisiana would recognize the distinction between hostile and friendly fires
in case of damage short of burning (smoke, soot, heat-cracking), from a fire intentionally lit and confined at all times within its accustomed limits, although
language in the case is sufficiently broad to argue that the court did not intend
that the distinction should be applied to any situation. Salmon v. Concordia Fire
Ins. Co., 161 So. 340, 342 (La. App. 1935).
" Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452 (1894); Standard
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. McNulty, 157 Fed. 224 (8th Cir. 1907) ; Jones v. Hawkeye
Commercial Men's Ass'n, 184 Iowa 1299, 168 N. W. 305 (1918); Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472 (Kan. 1951) ; Spence v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 154 Kan. 379, 118 P. 2d 514 (1941) ; Ashley v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co.,
241 Mich. 441, 217 N. W. 27 (1928) ; Birss v. United Commercial Travelers, 109
Neb. 226, 190 N. W. 486 (1922) ; and cases collected in 26 C. J., Fire Insurance
§69, n. 96.
" Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472 (Kan. 1951); Braly v.
Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 170 Kan. 531, 227 P. 2d 571 (1951). 'As otherwise stated, words of an insurance policy should be adjudged in the light of the
speech and understanding of the comman man." VANCE ON IN SURANCE 809 (3d
ed. 1951).
"The liability of an insurance company is ordinarily measured by the terms
of the policy, but in the event of ambiguity it will be strictly construed against
the insurer and liberally construed in favor of the insured. VANCE ON INSURANCE
808-810 (3d ed. 1951); 29 Am. JuR., Insurance §166, n. 16; 26 C. J., 'Fire Insurance §70, n. 19.
"7Weiner v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 153, 207 N. Y. Supp. 279
(1st Dep't 1924), aff'd without opinion, 214 App. Diiv. 784, 210 N. Y. Supp. 935
(1st Dep't 1925) (recovery denied where jewelry placed in stove for safekeeping
and damaged when fire was later built).
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of the Texas court in Reliance Insurance Co. v. Nanan. In that opinion it is said: "The contract of insurance contemplates that the insurer
will pay the insured the damages for all direct loss proximately caused
by fire within the meaning of the policy. A friendly fire is not within
the undertaking of the insurance company at all. If it were, the company would be liable, as in a case of unfriendly fire, for all direct loss
or damage, irrespective of destruction or of actual ignition, and the fact
that in this case there was an actual consumption of the insured property is of no importance in determining the liability of the insurance
company. If the fire in the furnace was such a fire as the company
insured against, then it would be liable for any direct loss or damage
therefrom, and it would follow the insured could recover his damage
for loss occasioned by the cracking of plaster in the furnace basement
from the heat of the furnace, for the cracking of the paper on the
walls from the heat of the grate, and for damage to the decoration
and draperies through smoke and soot from the furnace or chimney
place, and even for the replacement of furnace, grate, and range oven
when burned out, for those clearly would be losses directly due to the
respective fires. Those are not extreme illustrations, but liability in
each instance would follow if the fire in this case be held to be within
the policy."'19 The Texas court seems to have overlooked the fact that
the friendly fire doctrine can be restricted without eliminating it altogether. In any situation short of an actual burning of the insured
article, recovery could be denied; but with the burning of the insured
article there has really come into being a hostile fire, and recovery
might be allowed without any danger that the situations feared by the
Texas court would follow. The statement of the court that the actual
consumption of the insured property in this case is of no importance
in determining the liability of the insurance company is clearly erroneous,
for this is one of the essential criteria in determining whether or not
recovery should be allowed for damage resulting from a fire friendly
in its origin.20 The losses in the illustrations mentioned by the court,
" 118 Tex. 21, 6 S. W. 2d 743 (1928) (recovery denied where jewelry accidentally thrown into furnace). See City of New York Ins. Co. v. Gugenheim,
7 S. W. 2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), where recovery was allowed for damage
by smoke and soot from fire escaping into furnace compartment intended for air
space. The Texas courts certainly draw a very technical and unrealistic distinction when allowing recovery in one instance for damage due to smoke and
soot from a fire escaping into an area not intendeld, although still within the
furnace; and in another case not allowing recovery for damage due to actual
burning of the insured article where the fire does not escape.
19 Id. at 27, 6 S. W. 2d at 745.
"Nothing was consumed by fire.... Had the fire been brought out of the
Austin
flue, and anything had been burnt, the company would have been liable."
v. Drewe, 4 Camp. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115 (1815), subsequent proceedings, 6
Taunt. 436, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104 (1816). "I think that there is loss or damage
caused by fire when there has been ignition of insured property which was not
intended to be ignited, or when insured property has been damaged otherwise than
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except for the damage to the furnace, grate, and range, are all losses
short of burning from a friendly fire and so would not be included under
the protection of the policy. In the case of the burning out of the
furnace, grate, and range, the probable intention of the parties would
prevent recovery, as it would be reasonably understood that they did
21
not intend recovery for such gradual wear and tear by fire.

It is not suggested that the distinction between friendly and hostile
fires be entirely discarded, as it probably serves a useful purpose in
prohibiting recovery for damages short of burning arising from a
friendly fire. But the distinction should be limited to its original conception as devised in Austin v. Drewe and further clarified by Harris
v. Poland,22 and used as a rule of construction determining the probable
intention of the parties rather than as a rule of law limiting the insurer's liability. As defined in Austin v. Drewe, a friendly fire would be
one which is intentionally kindled, is always confined to the place where
it was intended to be, is not at all excessive, and does not burn or consume anything not intended to be consumed. Therefore, as applied to
the facts of the principal Kansas case, recovery should have been
allowed because there was in truth a hostile fire-there was a burning
of the insured article,23 and it does not matter that the burning resulted
from the article being thrown into the fire rather than the fire coming
to it. As succinctly stated in the Harrisv. Poland case:
".. . the risks against which the plaintiff is insured include the
risk of insured property coming unintentionally in contact with
fire and being thereby destroyed or damaged, and it matters not
whether that fire comes to'24the insured property or the insured
property comes to the fire."
by ignition as a direct consequence of the ignition of other property not intended to
be ignited." Harris v. Poland [1941] 1 K. B. 462, 473. For some reason this
portion of the case as reported in 164 L. T. 283, 287 (K. B. 1941) is worded
differently from that quoted here, though in substance containing the same thought.
- The fear of the Texas court on this point seems to be clearly without basis
as no cases'have been found in which there has been an attempt to recover for
the replacement of furnace, grate, and range when burned out from normal use
and ordinary deterioration.
2' In an exhaustive analysis of Austin v. Drewe, the English court discards the
argument of the insurer that that case stands for the proposition that the policy
covers only damage done to the insured property in a place where no fire was
intended to be; rather said the English court its basis is that there must be a consuming by fire of something not intended to be consumed, and the primary ground
of the decision in Austin v. Drewe was the absence of any burning of any of the
insured property.
" As stated by the dissenting judge in Harter v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 257 Mich.
163, 241 N. W. 196 (1932): "The loss involved [damage to rings accidentally
thrown into furnace] was occasioned by direct action of the fire. It was not like
the scorched sugar case of Austin v. Drewe where there was no ignition of
the sugar. That case is analogous to seeking to hold an insurance company liable
for damage to beans while baking in an oven, and has no application to the facts
here involved."
' [1941] 1 K. B. 462, 468, 164 L. T. 283, 285 (K. B.),
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The point raised in some of the cases, including Austin v. Drewe,
that the loss was due only to the negligence of the insured or his servants is of no weight whatever in denying recovery under the insurance
policy. It is well settled that mere carelessness and negligence of the
insured or his servants, not amounting to fraud, though the direct cause
of the fire, are covered by the policy unless specifically excepted.2 5 In
fire risks it is one of the objects 26of insuring to secure indemnity against
the consequences of negligence.
The one possible objection against the viewpoint urged here is that
fraudulent destruction of property in order to collect insurance might
be made easier. But this danger exists in any kind of insurance and
might be adequately guarded against by requiring convincing proof
that the loss did not result from the intentional act of the insured.
It is submitted that the American courts should restrict the friendly
fire doctrine to its original limitations as set forth in Austin v. Drewe.
Recovery should be permitted where there is an actual burning 27 of the
insured article, for in such case there is indeed, from a realistic point of
view, a hostile fire.
HARRY E. FAGGART, JR.
Insurance-Suspension and Revival of Policy After
Breach of Condition
Plaintiff trucking corporation sought recovery in a federal district
court in North Carolina from defendant insurance company for the loss
of a quantity of cigarettes by theft from one of its trucks. Insured's
driver parked the truck containing the cigarettes and went across the
street to a cafe. He failed to turn on the alarm system on the truck which
would sound a siren if the truck were moved.' The driver returned to
" Federal Ins. Co. v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 117 F. 2d 794 (5th Cir. 1941);
Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 340 (La. App. 1935); Harter v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 257 Mich. 163, 241 N. W. 196 (1932) (dissenting opinion);
Weiner v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 153, 207 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st
Dep't 1924), aff'd without opinion, 214 App. Div. 784, 210 N. Y. Supp. 935 (1st
Dep't 1925); 5 "APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTcE §3114 (1941); 2
MAY ON INSURANCE §408 (3d ed. 1891).
20 This was recognized by the Kansas court: "Negligence or inadvertence of
an insured or of one of his employees of course ordinarily would not bar recovery. ... " Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 238 P. 2d 472, 477 (Kan. 1951).
By "burning" it is meant that injury or destructive change is produced by
direct contact with the flame or by actual ignition. Depending on the physical
characteristics of the insured article, it might or might not be consumed or reduced
to ashes.
"The trailer was equipped With the theft protection device, described in the
policy and known as the Senior Babaco Alarm, consisting of two parts, the 'Sealed
Load' alarm and the 'Parker alarm.'" ". . . the 'Parker' alarm is designed to
prevent the unauthorized movement of the trailer. When the 'Parker' switch is
'on,' it is impossible to move the vehicle without sounding the siren alarm."
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 193 F. 2d
812 at 814 (4th Cir. 1951).
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the truck, and upon opening the door of the cab, was confronted by an
armed man who forced him to get into the truck and drive it away.
Ultimately the cigarettes were removed from the truck by the thieves.
The policy on which this suit was brought provided that the alarm "on
each trailer will be in the 'on' position when such vehicles are parked
unatten-ded. . . " (emphasis added). Further, the policy provided that
the failure of the insured to comply with "any of the foregoing conditions precedent in any instance shall render [the] policy null and void
as respects theft coverage for vehicles" (emphasis added) .2 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in applying the law
of North Carolina, reversed the district court's judgment for plaintiff.3
Recovery was denied on the grounds that there was an admitted breach
of the condition; that the driver never came back into "attendance"
so as to end the breach and thus revive the policy before the loss; and
that there could have been no revival of the policy since the insured
risk was increased during the breach of the condition.
The legal effect of a breach of a promissory warranty4 or condition
in a contract of insurance should ordinarily depend on the intent of
the parties as expressed by the terms of the contract.6 The policy may
provide that a breach of a condition or warranty contained therein will
merely suspend the operation of the policy during the breach.0 On the
other hand, the policy may provide that if there is a breach of a condition or warranty, the policy will become null and void.7 Clearly if
loss or damage occurs during the breach, there is no liability on the
insurer under either type of provision. 8 But where there is a breach
I Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 193 F.
2d 812 (4th Cir. 1951).
'Pilot Freight Carriers v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 329
(M. D. N. C. 1951).
' "...
most of the so-called warranties in insurance policies are not even promises in form, but are conditions. The use of the word 'warranty,' therefore, in
insurance law is a misnomer. It means a condition inserted on the face of the
policy or a statement of fact, on the exact truth or performance of which, unless
excused, the duty of immediate performance of the insurer's promise depends.
Warranties, as thus used to designate conditions in insurance policies, are divided
into two classes, affirmative and promissory warranties. Affirmative warranties
are statements of supposedly existing facts, on the truth of which the insurer's
duty depends; promissory warranties are agreements that the insurer's duty shall
be conditional on the future existence or happening of certain facts." 3 WiLLis oN,
CONTRACTS §673 (Rev. ed. 1936 and 1951 cum. supp.).
r44 C. J.S. Insurance §290 (1945).
' National Reserve Ins. Co. v. Scudder, 71 F. 2d 884 (9th Cir. 1934) ; United
States Fire Ins. Co., 118 N. J. Law 423, 193 Atl. 180 (1937); Hunt v. Dollar,
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 App. Div. 136, 229 N. Y. Supp. 682 (4th
Dep't 1928).
'8 See cases cited in notes 10 and 12 infra.
Wallace v. Virginia Surety Co., 80 Ga. App. 50, 55 S. E. 2d 259 (1949);
Traders' Ins. Co. v. Catlin, 163 Ill. 256, 45 N. E. 255 (1896); Schaefer v. Home
Ins. Co., 194 S. W. 2d 718 (Kan. City Ct. of Appeals 1946) ; Procacci v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 188 N. J. Law 423, 193 Atl. 180 (1937); Hunt v. Dollar,
224 Wis. 48, 271 N. W. 405 (1937).
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of a condition and this breach ceases before any loss occurs, the legal
effect of such breach in the light of the contract provisions may give
rise to a difficult problem.
Where the parties have provided for "suspension" during a breach
of condition, the courts follow the expressed intention and allow recovery
if the breach has terminated and in no way contributed to the loss.0
However, where the policy provides that it is "void" if there is a breach
of condition, the courts differ on the question of loss after the breach
has terminated. Some construe the language literally, and even though
the loss is in no way attributable to the terminated breach, these courts
hold the policy completely void'0 unless the breach is waived by the
insurer." The reasoning behind this view is that the parties are free
to contract as they wish, and any construction other than forfeiture
would contravene the unambiguous terms of the policy. A larger number of courts take a more liberal view and hold that the policy is merely
suspended during the breach and that it revives to full force and effect
after cessation of the breach provided that at the time of loss there is
no increase in the risk of loss arising from or because of the prior
breach.' 2 Statutes control the legal effect of a breach of condition or
o See cases cited in note 6 supra.
Morgan v.
0 Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos Co., 151 U. S. 452 (1894);
Germania Fire Ins. Co., 104 Kan. 383, 179 Pac. 330 (1919) ; Dolliver v. Granite
State Fire Ins. Co., 111 Me. 275, 89 Atl. 8 (1913) ; Kyte v. Commercial Union
Assurance Co., 149 Mass. 116, 21 N. E. 361 (1889).
"The insurer may waive a breach of a condition in a policy of insurance by
the insured so as to prevent a forfeiture under the strict "void" rule. "A waiver
arises from acts, words, or conduct on the part of the insurer, done or spoken
with knowledge of a breach of condition, which amount to a recognition of the
policy as a valid, existing and continuing contract, or which are inconsistent with
an intent to claim a forfeiture, or which are such as reasonably to imply a purpose not to insist on a forfeiture." 45 C. J. S. Insurance §704 (1946) ; Washington County Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Reed, 218 Ark. 522, 237 S. W. 2d
888 (1951) ; Johnson v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 52 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1951) ; Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Gray, 240 S. W. 2d 825 (Ky. 1951) ; Green v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 196 N. C. 335, 145 S. E. 616 (1928); Horton v. Life Ins. Co.
of Virginia, 122 N. C. 498, 29 S. E. 944 (1898).
12Henjes
v. Aetna Ins. Co., 132 F. 2d 715 (2d Cir.), certiorari denied, 319
U. S. 760 (1943) ; Globe & Rutgers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Pruitt, 188 Ark. 92, 64 S. W.
2d 91 (1933) ; Steil v. Sun Ins. Office, 171 Cal. 795, 155 Pac. 72 (1916) ; Public
Fire Ins. Co. v. Crumpton, 110 Fla. 151, 148 So. 537 (1933) ; Athens Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Toney, 1 Ga. App. 492, 57 S. E. 1013 (1907) ; Traders' Ins. Co. v. Catlin,
163 Ill. 256, 45 N. E. 255 (1896); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 213 Ind. 44, 10
N. E. 2d 601 (1937) ; Born v. Home Ins. Co., 110 Iowa 379, 81 N. W. 676 (1900) ;
Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Turley, 167 Ky. 57, 179 S. W. 1059 (1915); Home
Ins. Co. v. Northington, 198 Miss. 650, 23 So. 2d 537 (1945) ; Schaefer v. Home
Ins. Co., 194 S. W. 2d 718 (Kans. City Ct. of Appeals 1946); German Mutual
Fire Ins. Co. v. Fox, 4 Neb. 833, 96 N. W. 652 (1903); Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co.
v. Burget, 65 Ohio St. 119, 61 N. E. 712 (1901); McClure v. Mutual Fire Ins.
Co., 242 Pa. 59, 88 Atl. 921 (1913) ; Graham v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 119 S. C.
218, 112 S. E. 88 (1922); Mittet v. Home Ins. Co., 49 S. D. 319, 207 N. W. 49
(1926); Carolina Ins. Co. v. St. Charles, 20 Tenn. App. 342, 98 S. W. 2d 1088
(1937); Beecher v. Vermont Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 90 Vt. 347, 98 Atl. 917 (1916).
Generally these cases apply the reasoning that forfeitures are not favored in the
law. Some say that this rule accords with the real purpose of the provisions in
the policy. See German Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Fox, 4 Neb. 833, 96 N. W. 652
(1903) ; Beecher v. Vermont Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 90 Vt. 347, 98 Atl. 917 (1916).
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warranty in some states. For example, such statutes may provide that
the breach of warranty or condition must contribute to the loss for the
insurer to escape liability,13 or that the insurer is liable unless such
breach exists at the time of the loss and contributes to the loss, 14 or

that any increase in the insured risk'by use or change in the property
will void the policy.15
The more liberal view as to the effect of a breach of a condition
which "voids" the policy prevails in North Carolina.1" In the instant
case, there was an admitted breach of the condition requiring the use
of the alarm when the truck was "unattended." In construing this
word in the policy, the court defined "attendance" as involving "not
merely physical presence but freedom to perform the duties of an attendant." The court then held that as a matter of law there was no
revival of the policy because the driver did not come back into attendance before the loss (thereby not terminating the breach) as he was
deprived of his freedom of action when he entered the cab of the
truck by an armed bandit already in forcible possession of the truck.
Since the driver had freedom to perform his duties as an attendant up
to the time of his entrance into the cab, it would seem that the court,
in effect, held that the "physical presence" required by its definition is
that of being in the cab of the truck. Except where the policy defines
"attendance," 17 the few cases found construing this word or the word
"presence" seem to require only that a driver be in such proximity to
the truck as to be able to observe a theft of the contents.18 In view
13
TEX. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 4930 (1925).

"'NEB. REv. STAT. §44-358 (1943). VA. CODE ANN. §38-8 (1950) provides
that a breach of a condition in a policy of insurance concerning property in

Virginia will not void the policy unless such breach exists at the time of loss or
damage.
15 GA. CODE ANN. §56-823 (1933) (The effect of this statute is to write a condition into the policy and provide for its consequences.)
"8Barefoot v. Home Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 301, 168 S. E. 206 (1933) ; Landreth
v. American Equitable Assurance Co., 199 N. C. 181, 154 S. E. 9 (1930) ; Crowell
v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 169 N. C. 35, 85 S. E. 37 (1915); Cottingham
v. Maryland*Motor Car Ins. Co., 168 N. C. 259, 84 S. E. 274 (1915).
1? Greenberg v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 188 Misc. 23, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 457 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
"8 In Kinscherf Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 234 App. Div. 385 at
386, 254 N. Y. Supp. 382 at 383 (2d Dep't 1931), "attendance" was held to mean
that if a driver of a vehicle is not actually "within or on the automobile, or so
near thereto as to be able to observe a theft of the contents, he shall not be deemed
to be in attendance at the time the loss occurs." A similar -holding was made in
Dreblatt v. Taylor, 188 Misc. 199, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 378 at 379 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
Where a policy protected against theft "committed in the presence of such custodian.., and of which [he] may be actually cognizant at the time . . ." (emphasis added), a theft was held to be in the presence of a custodian when he was
inside a tavern within partial vision of his truck and saw the thieves drive it
away. London v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 Minn. 581, 299 N. W. 193 (1941).
Under a similar provision, "presence" was held to be "physical proximity to and
within the uninterrupted range of vision of the custodian." The court did not
define "physical presence" but held that the theft of the truck involved was not,
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of the purpose of the alarm in the instant case to give a warning in the
event of any movement of the truck, the court could reasonably have
taken a similar view of the word "attendance" and defined it as "proximity by the driver sufficient to allow him to see and report any unauthorized movement of the truck," i.e., such proximity by the driver as to
be able to perform the same function as the alarm. The instant view
which apparently requires either physical presence in the cab by the
driver, or the alarm in the "on"' position seems overly strict and not
in line with the generally recognized principle that ambiguity in a contract of insurance is to be construed in favor of the insured. 19
In addition, the court stated that even if it be assumed that the
driver was in attendance before the crime was complete, there was not
a revival of the policy because "such a revival should not and cannot
take place unless nothing has happened in the meanwhile to increase the
insurer's risk of loss.' ' 20

21
and
The decisions from North Carolina

22

other jurisdictions which recognize the liberal rule indicate that not
any increase in the insured risk which arises during the breach and
which carries over after its termination to the time of loss will bar
revival. Rather, these courts bar revival where there is an increased
risk after the breach which extends to the time of loss and which arose
from and was caused by the breach itself. Certainly there was, in the
instant case, an increase in the risk which arose during the breach of
the condition, but it did not arise from or because of the breach. The
employment of the alarm would have in no way prevented the thief
from climbing into the cab since the alarm would have sounded only
if the truck had been rolled or moved.
The liberal "suspension and revival" rule seems most equitable. It
in the presence of the driver who had entered a building from which the truck

was not visible and when he noticed the theft, the truck Was being driven away

and already 125 feet from him.

Grimes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 Ill. App.

62, 20 N. E. 2d 982 (1939).
20 Jolly v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 199 N. C. 269, 154 S. E. 400
(1930); Crowell v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 169 N. C. 35, 85 S. E. 37
(1915); 44 C. J.S.Insurance §297 (1945).
20 193 F. 2d at 817 (emphasis added).
" Crowell v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 169 N. C. 35 at 38, 85 S. E. 37
at 39 (1915) The court, in holding that a policy had revived after the termina-

tion of a breach of condition, said, "The increase of risk by the wrongful use, if

there2 was such, had entirely ceased and determined." (emphasis added)
Henjes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 132 F. 2d 715 at 720 (2d Cir. 1943) : "The insured
may not by breach of warranty increase the risk and put that added burden upon
the insurer." (emphasis added), Traders' Ins. Co. v. Catlin, 163 Ill. 256 at 258,
45 N. E. 255 at 257 (1896): "If a former increase of hazard has ceased to exist,
and that increase in hazard at that former time in no way has affected the risk
when the loss occurs, no reason exists why a forfeiture should result from a cause
which occasions no damage." (emphasis added); Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Turley, 167 Ky. 57 at 61, 179 S. W. 1059, at 1062 (1915) : The court stated that a
policy may suspend and revive after the breach terminates if "the increased hazard
caused by such prohibited use in no way continues to affect the risk at the time
of loss." (emphasis added)
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fully protects the insurer since it fails to allow recovery if the terminated breach in any way affects the loss, and it recognizes the right of
the insurer to declare a forfeiture at the time of the breach if he so
desires.2 3 A just and equitable rule may be entirely abrogated by
unsympathetic or strict application, and the instant case seems to
represent a rather strict application.
WALKER Y. WORTH, JR.

Liens-Priority of Federal Tax Claims Over Inchoate LiensDifference in Equity Receivership and Bankruptcy
A corporation was adjudged insolvent and a receiver appointed to
liquidate the assets. On the question of priority of payment between
federal tax claims under Section 3466 of the United States Revised
Statutes' and the employees' liens for wages under G. S. 55-136,2 the
North Carolina Supreme Court held the federal claim was to be given

priority.3
Section 3466 of the United States Revised Statutes, providing for
priority of payment of debts due the United States, applies when the
insolvent has been divested of ownership of his property. 4 The divest2Globe & Rutgers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Pruitt, 188 Ark. 92, 64 S. W. 2d 91
(1933) ; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 213 Ind. 44, 10 N. E. 2d 601 (1937).
131 U. S. C. §191 (1946) : "Whenever any person indebted to the United
States is insolvent or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor in the hands of
the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the dbts due from the
deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority
established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor not having sufficient
property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which
the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor, are attached
by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed."
2 . C. GEN. STAT. §55-136 (1943) : "In case of the insolvency of a corporation, partnership, or individual, all persons doing labor or service of whatever
character in its regular employment have a lien upon the assets thereof for the
amount of wages due to them for all labor, work, and services rendered within two
months next preceding the date when proceedings in insolvency were actually
instituted and begun ....
which lien is prior to all other liens that can be acquired
against
such
assets."
3
Leggett v. Southeastern People's College, Inc., 234 N. C. 595, 68 S. E. 2d
263 (1951).
"Before the priority under Section 3466 attaches, the insolvency must be manifested in one of the modes specified under the section. In addition, "Under this
act these rules have been clearly established: First, no lien is created; second,
the priority established can never attach while the debtor continues the owner and
in possession of the property, though he may be unable to pay all his debts; third,
no evidence can be received of the insolvency of the debtor until he has been
divested of his property in one of the modes stated; and fourth, whenever the
debtor is thus divested of his property, the person who thus becomes invested with
the title is thereby made a trustee for the United States. . .

."

Beaston v. Farm-

ers' Bank 12 Pet. 102, 133 (U. S. 1838) ; Bramwell v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 269 U. S. 483 (1926) ; United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S. 253 (1923) ;
Bishop v. Black, 233 N. C. 333, 64 S. E. 2d 167 (1951). The priority attaches
at the date of the appointment of a receiver. Bramwell v. U. S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., supra.
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ing of the property of the insolvent such as will call into play the priority
of the United States under Section 3466 is commonly obtained in an
equity receivership, since distribution of the estate in bankruptcy is
controlled by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.5
The North Carolina decision is in accord with the interpretation of
this section by the federal courts, which gives debts due the United
States superiority over all liens which are not specific and perfected
regardless of the time when such liens arise." The federal courts have
been reluctant to qualify liens competing with federal claims as specific
and perfected 7 and will do so only where the lien is definite in respect
to the identity of the lienor s the amount of the lien,0 and the property
to which the lien attaches, 0 and where all the steps necessary to complete the lien have been taken. 1 In the instant case, the court found
that the lien of the employees for wages under G. S. 55-136 did not
attach to specific property and in effect created only a priority of payment which must be subordinated to the federal priority granted by
section 3466.12
'A consent receivership amounts to a voluntary assignment which calls section
3466 into play. United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 269 U. S. 504 (1926) ;
Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492 (1926). Section 3466 is not applicable to
give the government priority in bankruptcy. Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Title
Guaranty Co., 224 U. S. 152 (1912).
'United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47 (1950);
Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362 (1946); United States v. Waddill, 323 U. S.
352 (1945); United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480 (1941); United States v.
Knott, 298 U. S. 544 (1936); New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290 (1933);
Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80 (1921); Thelluson v. Smith, 2
Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817). See Bishop v. Black, 233 N. C. 333, 64 S. E. 2d 167
(1951). Federal priority under section 3466 does not override a prior mortgage,
United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73 (U. S. 1805); nor a prior judgment plus
execution and levy, Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 442-44 (U. S.
1828); Thelluson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396, 496 (U. S. 1817).
"See Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the United States in Bankruptcy and in Equity Receiverships, 43 HARv. L. REv. 251 (1929) ; Note, 29 N. C.
L. REv. 293 (1951); Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1258 (1947).
"United States v. Knott, 298 U. S. 544, 550 (1936) (creditors to benefit from
deposit of securities with state official not ascertained).
'United States v. Waddill, 323 U. S. 353 (1945) (amount of landlord's lien
for future rent uncertain) ; United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480, 485-86 (1941)
(amount of state gasoline taxes unsettled).
" Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362 (1946); United States v. Waddill, 323
U. S. 352 (1945) ; Thelluson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817) (general judgment on land). Section 3466 priority is superior to the lien of a docketed judgment unless levy of execution on the judgment has proceeded far enough to take
specific land or othei property out of the possession of the debtor. Conard v.
Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 442-444 (U. S. 1828); Thelluson v. Smith, 2
Wheat. 396 (U. S. 1817); United States v. Sullivan, 19 F. Supp. 695 (W. D.
N. Y. 1937). See In re Gruner, 295 N. Y. 510, 68 N. E. 2d 514 (1946) ; Spokane
Merchant's Assn. v. State, 15 Wash. 2d 186, 130 P. 2d 373 (1942); cf. In re
Meyer's Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 48 A. 2d 210 (1946).
"United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47 (1950);
United States v. Waddill, 323 U. S. 352 (1945); County of Spokane v. United
States, 279 U. S. 80 (1929) ; Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 386 (U. S.
1828). See Bishop v. Black, 233 N. C. 333, 64 S.E. 2d 167 (1951).
"Accord: United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423 (1941); Lerman v. Lincoln
Novelty Co., 130 N. J. Eq. 144, 21 A. 2d 827 (1941).
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. In contrast to the subordination of the lien for wages in receivership, where the debtor is carried into bankruptcy, claims for wages
earned within three months of the proceedings prevail over tax claims
,of the federal government by express provision of the Bankruptcy
Act.13 This variance between the rights of the wage-earner in receivership and bankruptcy is illustrative of the general standing of claims in
the two proceedings. Where there are competing non-lien federal
claims, 14 it is as a rule beneficial to creditors to have property of an
insolvent debtor distributed in bankruptcy rather than in equity receiver1
ship.'
Except as expressly stated in the Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy proceedings do not discharge liens upon the property of the debtor. The
trustee takes control of the property of the debtor, but, by virtue of
section 67 of the Act, the property remains subject to liens existing
at the time of the petition. 16 The priority granted to federal tax claims
by section 64 of the Act is limited to the property remaining for dis-7
tribution among general creditors after payment of all valid liens.'
" Section 64(b) of the Bankruptcy Act places wages up to $600 due employees
which were earned within three months of bankruptcy in clause (2) in the order
of priority, whereas taxes are placed in clause (4). 11 U. S. C. §104(a) (1946).
" Section 3466 does not create a lien for the government. See note 4 supra.
1 See Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of
Federal Taxes, 95 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 739 (1947) ; Rogge, The Differences it the
Priority of the United States in Bankruptcy and in Equity Receiverships, 43 HARv.
L. REv. 251 (1929) ; Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1258 (1947). The acts which call section
3466 into play will often justify an involuntary petition in bankruptcy. The
applicable act of bankruptcy consists in having made a general assignment for
the benefit of creditors, or, while insolvent, having suffered appointment of a
receiver or trustee put in charge of the debtor's property. 11 U. S. C. §21 (a) (4, 5)
(1946). See 11 U. S. C. §95 (1946) for the provisions as to which creditors may
file petition for bankruptcy. In North Carolina, the power of a court of equity
to appoint a receiver is inherent and not limited by the specific statutory provisions. Receivership is used most commonly (1) to preserve specific property
which is the subject of litigation; (2) to tide a person over a temporary period
of financial embarrassment; and (3) to prevent preferences and to assure the
equitable distribution of the assets of an insolvent. Sinclair v. Moore Central R.R.,
228 N. C. 389, 49 S. E. 2d 555 (1947). See also: Kelly v. McLamb, 182 N. C.
158, 108 S. E. 435 (1921) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-502, 55-147 (1943).
City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S.
1' 11 U. S. C. §107 and §110 (1946).
174 (1919); Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty Co., 224 U. S. 152
(1912) ; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905) ; United States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946); In re Dunavant, 96 Fed. 542 (W. D. N. C.
1899); Sample v. Jackson, 225 N. C. 380, 35 S. E. 2d 236 (1945); 4 CownUM
The trustee in bankruptcy is vested with all
BANKRUPTCY §67.02 (14th ed. 1942).
the rights of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings. 11
U. S. C. §110(c) (1946). The competing lien must meet the requirements of the
state law such as will give it priority over the lien of the trustee. For example,
and unrecorded mortgage will not prevail against the lien of the trustee. M. & J.
Finance Co. v. Hodges, 230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d 201 (1949).
' City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174, 177 (1919); Lott v. Salsbury, 237
Fed. 191 (4th Cir. 1916) ; In re Tresslar, 20 F. 2d 663 (M. D. Ala 1927) ; In re
Rowe & Bros., 18 F. 2d 658 (W. D. Pa. 1927); In re Caswell Construction Co.,
13 F. 2d 667 (N. D. N. Y. 1926); In re Hosmer, 233 Fed. 318 (S. D. Iowa
1916).
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Furthermore, in contrast to the requirement of a specific and perfected
lien for priority against federal claims in receivership, inchoate general
liens are specifically protected and validated in bankruptcy. Section
67(b) of the Bankruptcy Act allows a statutory lien to prevail against
the trustee in bankruptcy, even though it is not perfected at the time
of the filing of the petition, so long as it is perfected within the period
permitted by applicable lien law.' 8 Such a lien would as a result also
be satisfied before the priority of distribution set up for federal taxes
by section 64. Thus, liens inchoate at the time of the filing of the
petition but subsequently perfected have been allowed payment before
the order of distribution set up by section 64 in the cases of a mechanic's or materialman's lien, 19 subcontractor's lien,2 0 and a lien for state
taxes. 2' Liens for a liability still contingent 22 or for an amount still
unascertained at the time of the filing of the petition2 have been allowed
validity against the trustee in bankruptcy. In addition, liens obtained
by judicial proceedings, such as garnishment, attachment, and judgment
liens, are allowed unless invalidated by section 67(a) for being obtained
within four months of the petition while the debtor is insolvent.24
Where the federal claim for taxes has been perfected into a lien,
the situation once again changes. After the proper steps to create a
federal tax lien have been taken, the tax lien itself prevails against the
trustee in bankruptcy and against unsecured creditors. 25 Where another
2811 U. S. C. §107(b) (1946): "Statutory liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, landlords, or other classes of persons, and statutory liens
for taxes and debts owing to the United States or any State, may be valid against
the trustee, even though arising or perfected while the debtor is insolvent and
within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy... [or if the
liens] arise but are not perfected before bankruptcy, they may nevertheless be
valid, if perfected within the time permitted by and in accordance with the requirements of the laws creating them." This section has no application to nonstatutory liens. It furnishes no authority for perfection of contractual liens after
bankruptcy proceedings, which is governed by 11 U. S. C. §96 (1950) concerning

preferences. A transfer made for a present consideration within four months of

bankruptcy is not deemed a preference where perfecting (if required) follows
within 21 days or a lesser statutory period (if any).
" In re Taylorcraft Aircraft Corp., 168 F. 2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); American
Coal Burner Corp. v. Merritt, 129 F. 2d 314 (6th Cir. 1942) ; New York-Brooklyn
Fuel Corp. v. Fuller, 11 F. 2d 802 (2d Cir. 1926) ; In re Grisslar, 136 Fed. 754
(2d Cir. 1905) ; In re Etherton, 88 F. Supp. 874 (S. D. Cal. 1950) ; In re Caswell
Construction Co., 13 F. 2d 667 (N. D. N. Y. 1926); In re McAllister-Newgard
Co., 193 Fed. 265 (D. Minn. 1912); It re Lillington Lumber Co., 132 Fed. 886

(E. D. N. C. 1904).

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Kinney, 291 II. 84, 125 N. E. 730 (1919).
" Delaney v. City and County of Denver, 185 F. 2d 246 (10th Cir. 1950).
" Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U. S. 149 (1928).
"In re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F. 2d 979 (9th Cir. 1939).
2Section 67(a), Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. §107(a) 1946); 4 CoLLrER,
BAKRUPrTCY §67.07-67.12 (14th ed. 1942).
Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforce2z 11 U. S. C. §107(b) (1946).
ment of California, 336 U. S. 118 (1948) (tax lien superior to wage claim) ; In re
Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F. 2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v.
Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946); Dial v. Chatman, 70 F. 2d 21 (4th Cir.
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competing lien is in the picture, the question of priority between the
liens becomes an ordinary contest under applicable lien law independent
of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, since both liens are superior
to the right of the trustee.2 6 In respect to the four classes protected
against the federal tax lien by recordation-purchasers, judgment creditors, mortgagees, and pledgees-the federal lien ranks in accordance with
the general rule, "first in time, first in right," on the basis of recordation.27 But in respect to all other liens, recent cases indicate that the
tax lien will be given priority over inchoate liens which have not become
specific and perfected, by analogy to the requirement under section 3466
28
in receivership proceedings.
If the analogy of liens under section 3466 in receiverships is to be
carried over in its full vigor to a contest of competing liens outside
receivership, a creditor will gain little from having the debtor carried
into bankruptcy where the federal tax claim has been perfected into a
liefi. Where there is no tax lien in the picture, however, substantial
advantage may result for holders of inchoate liens by going into the
bankruptcy court. Creditors faced with a competing federal tax claim
might well investigate the benefits to be gained from having the estate
of an insolvent debtor liquidated in bankruptcy rather than receivership
proceedings. The instant case appears to have been a situation in point.
DicKsoN MCLEAN, JR.
1934).

Section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. §3670 (1946),

provides for a lien for federal taxes (other than estate and gift taxes) upon all

property of the taxpayer after demand has been made. The liens become effective
as against subsequent purchasers, judgment creditors, mortgagees, and pledgees
from the date of recordation of the lien by virtue of Section 3672. As against all
other parties the federal tax lien is effective from the time the assessment list
is received by the collector. United States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th GCr.
1946) ; In re MacKinnon Mfg. Co., 24 F. 2d 156 (7th Cir. 1928) ; United States
v. Record Publishing Co., 60 F. Supp. 194 (N. D. Cal. 1945). The lien for
estate and gift taxes becomes effective against all parties from the date of the
receipt of the assessment list. 26 U. S. C. §§827(a), 1009 (1946) ; Detroit Bank
v. United
States, 317 U. S. 329 (1943).
2
In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F. 2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); United
States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Seymour v. Wildgen, 137 F.
2d 160 (10th Cir. 1943) ; Dial v. Chatman, 70 F. 2d 21 (4th Cir. 1934) ; Lerner
Stores Corp. v. Electric Maid Bake Shops, 24 F. 2d 780 (5th Cir. 1928).
2 United States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Dial v. Chatman,
70 F. 2d 21 (4th Cir. 1934) ; Ormsbee v. United States, 23 F. 2d 926 (S. D. Fla.
1926).
2United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47 (1950);
United States v. Reese, 131 F. 2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942); In re Capital Foundry
Corp., 64 F. Supp. 885 (E. D. N. Y. 1946); Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 293 (1951).
But cf. United States v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 274 (1941).
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Negligence-Highways-Liability for Dangerous
Conditions Thereon
In a recent Kansas case' an action was brought to recover damages
for an alleged wrongful death resulting from an automobile collision
which occurred when the car in which the deceased was riding suddenly
went out of control and skidded into the lane of another automobile
coming from the opposite direction., The skidding and collision were
alleged to have resulted from a large accumulation of mud and slime
which was carried onto and, without warning the traveling public,
allowed to remain, upon a black-top highway by large, heavily loaded
trucks operated by defendant. Held: defendants' demurrer and motion
for a directed verdict were properly overruled. Whether the acts of
defendants in bringing the mud and slime onto the highway and leaving
it there without posting any warning signs constituted actionable negligence was a proper question for submission to the jury.
Although statutory liability may be imposed upon a state2 or its
political subdivisions 3 for injuries sustained by persons traveling upon
In sub1 Cuddy et al. v. Tyrrell et al., 171 Kan. 232, 232 P. 2d 607 (1951).
stance the evidence in the case was as follows:
Defendant truckers had been employed to remove a torn down oil rig from
a field located about one mile from the main highway to another field five miles
away. Due to previous rains and snow the ground was soggy and muddy. As
the trucks entered onto and turned down the main highway large quantities of
mud and slime dropped off into the highway lane for a distance of about 300 feet.
None of the mud and slime was removed and neither were any warning signs
posted.
About four hours later the car in which deceased was riding approached the
point where the defendants' trucks had entered the highway and suddenly swerved
out of control and crashed into an oncoming car as a result of the mud film on
the highway. Several witnesses testified that they found the highway dangerously
slippery prior to the collision due to the mud film which defendants had deposited
on the highway, but that the highway was not slippery elsewhere.
The case was sent to the jury by the trial judge and resulted in a hung jury.
Thereupon the defendants appealed the action of the trial judge in overruling their
demurrer and motion for a directed verdict.
'A state is not, in the absence of a constitutional or statutory waiver of its
immunity from suit, liable for damage resulting from defects or other dangerous
conditions in its highways, but it may assume such liability or it may modify or
withdraw such assumption. Taylor v. Westerfield, 233 Ky. 619, 26 S. W. 2d
557 (1930) ; Engle v. Mayor of Cumberland, 180 Md. 465, 25 A. 2d 446 (1942) ;
Seelye v. State, 178 Misc. 278, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 205 (Ct. Cl. 1942); Pickett v.
Carolina & N. W. Ry. Co., 200 N. C. 750 S. E. 398 (1931). See Note, 69 A. L. R.
42 (1930).
In North Carolina liability is assumed on the part of the state by a statute
which confers a right of action against the State Highway Commission for any
damages sustained by reason of any defect in the highways. However, the Commission is liable only for wanton and corrupt negligence with regard to highways
which it has taken over. N. C. GEr. STAT. §§136-97 (1943). See Wilkens v.
Burton, 220 N. C. 13, 15 S. E. 2d 406 (1941).
It is generally held that minor political subdivisions of the state such as
counties and municipalities are not liable for injuries resulting from defects or
other dangerous conditions in the street and highways unless liability is imposed
by statute. Stone v. Horn, 151 Ala. 240, 37 So. 2d 111 (1948); Williams v.
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the public highways as a result of obstructions, defects, or other dangerous conditions in or upon the public way, this note is primarily directed
toward the nature and extent of the liability of individuals and private
corporations. As a general rule, liability cannot be imposed upon one
who owed no duty to the person injured. While using a public highway, an individual does, however, owe a duty of care to others traveling thereon. 4 He must exercise that degree of care and caution that
the ordinarily careful and prudent person, acting in the same or similar
circumstances, would exercise for the safety of himself and others
traveling upon the highway.5 Furthermore, it is generally established
that one who causes an obstruction, defect, Or other dangerous condition in a highway, and who fails to remove the same, or to post a
warning thereof, within a reasonable time is liable for injuries resulting
therefrom. 6 This is true notwithstanding the fact that a governmental
7
agency may also be liable.
Granted that individuals and private corporations may be held liable
Wessington, 70 S. D. 75, 14 N. W. 2d 493 (1944); Ellis v. Cannon, 113 Vt. 511,
37 A. 2d 377 (1944).

However, some courts impose liability upon political subdivisions without stat-

utory authority. North Carolina holds that a political subdivision may be held
liable for injuries sustained as a result of defects or other dangerous conditions
in its highways without the necessity of statute. Liability is imposed on the
theory that the political subdivision is immune, in the absence of statute, from
liability for injuries inflicted in the performance of governmental functions, but
liable if the function is proprietary. Accordingly, since the maintenance and
operation of highways are considered proprietary functions, a political subdivision
may be held liable for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions thereon. Gunter v. Town of Sanford, 186 N. C. 452, 120 S. E. 41 (1923); Pickett v. Carolina

& N. W. Ry., 200 N. C. 750, 158 S. E. 398 (1931).

' Trotter v. U. S., 95 F. Supp. 645 (W. D. La., 1941); McGough Bakeries
Corp. v. Reynolds, 250 Ala. 592, 35 So. 2d 332 (1948) ; Krauth v. Billar, 71 Ariz.
298, 226 P. 2d 1012 (1951) ; Elliot v. Swift & Co., 151 Neb. 787, 39 N. W. 2d 617
(1949) ; Marshall v. Southern Ry., 233 N. C. 38, 62 S. E. 2d 489 (1950).
5
Whieher v. Phinney, 124 F. 2d 929 (1st Cir., 1942) ; Sills v. Forbes, 33 Cal.
2d 219, 91 P. 2d 246 (1939) ; Wilhem v. Jackson, Inc., 106 Colo. 140, 102 P. 2d
731 (1940); Webb v. Smith, 176 Va. 235, 10 S. E. 2d 503 (1940).
'Ross v. O'Keefe, 135 N. J. 287, 51 A. 2d 23 (1947) ; Swinford v. Finch, 139
Neb. 886, 299 N. W. 227 (1941); Wilkens v. Burton, 220 N. C. 13, 15 S. E. 2d
406 (1941) ; Trigg v. Fergerson Co., 30 Tenn. App. 672, 209 S. W. 2d 525 (1948);
McCall v. Alphine Telephone Corp., 143 Tex. 335, 181 S. W. 2d 830 (1943);
Moore
v. Virginia Transit Co., 188 Va. 493, 50 S. E. 2d 268 (1948).
7
Juliano v. State, 190 Misc. 180,71 N. Y. S. 2d 474 (Ct. Cl. 1946), aff'd 273 App.
Div. 936, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 826 (1947); Williams v. Wessington, 70 S. D. 75, 14
N. W. 2d 493 (1944).
As a general rule neither state, political subdivision thereof, nor highway officials having charge of the maintenance of the highway are liable for injuries to
travelers caused by defects or other dangerous conditions in the highway unless
they have actual or constructive notice thereof. Nicholson v. Postal Telegraph
See notes, 2 and 3 vtpra.
Co., 162 Wash. 603, 299 Pac. 397 (1931).
Consequently, in dealing with the principal case it is assumed that the state
could not be held liable since it did not have actual notice of the condition nor can
it be said that four hours is sufficient time from which to imply constructive notice
thereof. See: Falkowski v. McDonald, 116 Conn. 241, 164 Atl. 650 (1933);
Williams v. Kansas State Highway Commission, 134 Kan. 810, 8 P. 2d 946 (1932);
Dirane v. City of N. Y., 240 App. Div. 368, 270 N. Y. Supp. 128 (1934).
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for damages to travelers resulting from obstructions, defects, and other
dangerous conditions which they have created in the highways, their
liability to a great extent depends upon the character of the conditions
created. The decision in the principal case may be best evaluated by
analyzing the various instances in which persons have or have not beeh
held accountable for injuries sustained by travelers as a result of various
conditions created on highways.
In the first instance, the courts have uniformly held that one who
unlawfully creates or maintains in or upon a highway a condition which
endangers the safety of travelers does so at his own peril and is liable
for injuries proximately resulting therefrom. 8 Liability is generally
predicated upon the theory that the dangerous condition constitutes
a nuisance, without regard as to whether or not there was negligence. 9
Accordingly, persons who, without right or authority, obstruct a highway by erecting and maintaining thereupon fences,' gates," low
overhanging wires,' 2 excavations,' 3 or other permanent structures' 4
which interfere with travel thereon have been held liable for resulting
injuries. In these instances, once it is established that the obstruction' 5
'Washington

Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316 (1896);

Tenn. Tel. Co. v. Parsons, 154 Ky. 801, 159 S. W. 584 (1913) ; Hines v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 358 Mo. 742, 217 S. W. 2d 482 (1949) ; McGraw v. Thompson,
353 Mo. 856, 184 S. W. 2d 994 (1945); Conway v. Kinston, 169 N. C. 577, 86
S. E. 524 (1916); Brobston v. Darby, 290 Pa. 331, 138 Atl. 849 (1927). See
notes, 109 A. L. R. 949 (1938) ; 20 A. L. R. 1440 (1922).
'Evansville R. Co. v. Crist, 116 Ind. 446, 19 N. E. 310 (1889); Rockport v.
Rockport Granite Co., 177 Mass. 246, 58 N. E. 1017 (1901) ; Osborn v. Nashville,
182 Tenn. 197, 185 S. W. 2d 510 (1946) ; Appalachian Power Co. v. Wilson, 142

Va. 468, 129 S. E. 277 (1925).
10

See note, 51 A. L. R. 717 (1901).

Rief v. Mountain States Telegraph Co., 63 Idaho 418, 120 P. 2d 823 (1941);

King v. Esteppe, 228 S. W. 2d 391 (Mo. 1950) ; State v. Godwin, 145 N. C. 461,
59 S.E. 132 (1908).
11 Scruggs v. Beason, 226 Ala. 405, 20 So. 2d 774 (1945) ; State v. Hunter, 27
N. C. 369 (1845).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-94 (1943) makes it unlawful to construct a gate in such
a manner that it will obstruct a highway when opened.
11 Mississippi Power Co. v. Sellers, 160 Miss. 512, 133 So. 594 (1931).
"Bailey v. Columbia Grocery Co., 73 Ind. 503, 124 N. E. 794 (1919); Milstrey v. City of Hackensack, 6 N. J. 400, 79 A. 2d 37 (1951) ; Salt Lake City v.
Sehubach, 108 Utah 266, 159 P. 2d 149 (1945).
1, State ex rel. King v. Friar, 165 Okla. 145, 25 P. 2d 620 (1933) (corner of
filling station constructed partially in highway) ; Commonwealth v. Hall, 305 Ky.
95, 203 S. W. 2d 975 (1947) (stump projecting above surface of road) ; Harrel v.
City of Wilmington, 214 N. C. 608, 200 S. E. 367 (1939) (low ;vall at end of
highway); Yeaw v. Williams, 15 R. I. 20, 23 Atl. 33 (1885) (pole erected in
highway).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-90 (1943) makes it unlawful to "wilfully alter, change
or obstruct any highway .

.

. leading to or from any .

.

. place of public worship

...or hinder or in any manner interfere with the making of any road."
N. C. GEN. STAT. §136-91 (1943) makes it unlawful for any person to "throw,
place or deposit any glass or other sharp or cutting substance in or upon any of
the public highways of this state."
15 An Alabama court has defined an obstruction as anything which renders the
highway less convenient for the use of the public. Sandlin v. Blanchard, 33 So.
2d 472 (Ala. 1948).
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constitutes a nuisance, liability attaches.
There are many instances, however, in which individuals and private
corporations have been held liable for injuries to travelers resulting
from conditions created upon the highways which were not considered
as amounting to nuisances.' 7 The cases are not harmonious in their
holdings as to what conditions created in a highway do or do not constitute nuisances. An analysis of the cases reveals that: (1) if the
condition was unlawfully created and was of a permanent character
amounting to an obstruction it is usually held to constitute a nuisance,' 8
and liability attaches without regard to the question of his negligence ;19
(2) if, on the other hand, the condition was involuntarily or negligently
created and was of a temporary character not amounting to an obstruction it is generally held not to constitute a nuisance, 20 and liability
depends largely upon whether or not the person creating it was
21
negligent.
Consequently, where travelers were injured by pipes, 22 logs,M
doors, 24 and other objects28 which defendants allowed to project beyond
their vehicles upon the highway, it has generally been held that whether
the defendants were negligent in creating such hazard was a proper
question for the jury. Also, where travelers were injured by colliding
with boards, 26 tanks 2 7 cables, 28 or other objects20 placed or dropped
In Milstrey v. City of Hackensack, 6 N. J. 400, 79 A. 2d 37 (1951) a nuisance
to a highway was said to donsist either in obstrucing it or rendering it dangerous.
17 In Rief v. Mountain States Tel. Co., 63 Idaho 418, 120 P. 2d 823 (1941)
the court said, "It is not every obstruction in a street or highway that constitutes
a nuisance ....
Anything which does not amount to a substantial obstruction of
a street or an inherent interference wtih the free and comfortable enjoyment .
does not amount to a nuisance per se."
"Walls et al. v. Smith & Co., 167 Ala. 138, 52 So. 320 (1910); Bailey v.
Columbia Grocery Co., 73 Ind. 58, 124 N. E. 784 (1919); King v. Esteppe, 228
S. W. 2d 391 (Mo. 1950) ; Milstrey v. City of Hackensack, 6 N. J. 400, 79 A.
2d 37 (1951) ; Harrel v. City of Wilmington, 214 N. C. 608, 200 S. E. 367 (1939);
State ex rel. King v. Friar, 165 Okla. 145, 25 P. 2d 620 (1933).
"0See note 9 supra.
2
Hobbs-Western Co. v. Carmical, 192 Ark. 59, 91 S. W. 2d 605 (1936);
Simonsen v. Thorin, 120 Neb. 684, 234 N. W. 628 (1931) ; Francis v. Gaffey, 211
N. Y. 47, 105 N. E. 96 (1914); Wood v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 228 N. C.
605, 46 S. E. 2d 717 (1948). See notes, 3 A. L. R. 2d 1 (1948) ; 81 A. L. R. 1000
(1931).

See notes 22-25 infra.

v. Kelly Pipe Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 577, 173 P. 2d 685 (1945) ; Ice v.
Gardner, 183 Okla. 496, 83 P. 2d 378 (1938).
"' Brewer v. Moye, 200 N. C. 589, 157 S. E. 871 (1931).
- Robinson v. White Fuel Corp., 326 Mass. 636, 96 N. E. 2d 144 (1950).
2" Hobbs-Western Co. v. Carmical, 192 Ark. 59, 91 S. W. 2d 605 (1936)
(crossties).
" Mair v. Whittmore Co., 289 Mass. 261, 194 N. E. 92 (1935) ; Bray v. Boston
Lumber Co., 161 Va. 686, 172 S. E. 296 (1934).
2 Batts v. Newman, 3 N. J. 503, 71 A. 2d 121 (1949).
28 Colonial Trust Co. v. Brewer, 363 Pa. 101, 69 A. 2d 126 (1949).
2
Pittman v. Sather, 68 Idaho 29, 188 P. 2d 600 (1947) (rocks) ; H.-F. Const.
Co. v. Jordan, 250 Ky. 455, 63 S. W. 2d 501 (1933) (rocks) ; Braughn v. Platt.
123 Tex. 486, 72 S. W. 580 (1934) (piece of ice).
2O'Neal
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upon the highways by defendants, whether the defendants were negligent in placing or dropping such objects thereon has usually been held
to be a question for the jury. For instance, in a situation somewhat
analogous to the one involved in the principal case, a Missouri case
reached the same result:2 0 There the collision occurred'when the plaintiff's car struck some coal which the defendant had dropped on the
highway, thereby deflecting plaintiff's car into the lane of an oncoming
car. The court held that whether defendant was negligent in placifig
the coal upon the highway was a proper question for the jury and that
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly overruled.
The ground for liability of such persons was explained in a leading
Nebraska case 3 ' which held that "When one engaged in the lawful
use of a highway causes an obstruction or other hazardous condition to
be placed upon it in such a manner as to be dangerous to traffic, he
must use ordinary care to prevent injury to others where he knows
that said hazard is calculated to do injury to travelers upon the highway."
Furthermore, where travelers were injured as a result of ice,32 oil,as

and other slippery substances3 4 placed upon the highways by individuals
and private corporations, whether the latter were negligent in placing
such substances thereon has usually been held a proper question for
the jury. For instance, in a Missouri case, 35 plaintiff's car skidded into
and collided with an oncoming car. The skidding was alleged to have
been caused by an accumulation of mud which the defendant had permitted to wash down upon the highway from a lane which he was
grading adjacent to and above the highway. In accord with the principal case, it was held that whether defendant was negligent in permit"o Maher v. Donk Bros. Coal Co., 323 Mo. 799, 20 S. W. 2d 888 (1929).
" Simonsen v. Thorin, 120 Neb. 684, 685, 234 N. W. 628, 629 (1931)
("Whoever places an obstruction in a public highway even by an involuntary act and
without negligence, is under an obligation to remove the same or is required to
use ordinary care to warn the traffic on said highway of the dangers incident to
said hazardous condition."). Accord: Kuska v. Nichols Const. Co., 154 Neb. 58,
48 N. W. 2d 682 (1951); Granthum v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 142 Neb. 362,
6. N. W. 2d 373 (1942).
In Wood v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 228 N. C. 605, 608, 46 S. E. 2d 7;17,
720 (1948) the court, in referring to objects permitted to fall upon a highway
said, "the maintenance of an object in a public way constitutes negligence when it
renders the way unsafe for the purpose to which that portion of the street is
devoted."
"Massey v. Worth, 9 Del. 211, 213, 197 Atl. 673, 675 (1938) ("An artificial
discharge of water upon a public way at a time when it would naturally freeze
and make such way slippery and dangerous for public travel may render the
person so discharging it liable for injuries caused thereby.").
" In Delgado v. Billerica, 323 Mass. 483, 82 N. E. 2d 591 (1907) plaintiff
passenger was injured when her taxi skidded as a result of tar which had been
spread over the entire width of the highway without warning thereof. Held: The
evidence was sufficient to take the issue of the town's negligence to the jury.
Accord: Hughes v. Lassiter & Co., 193 N. C. 651, 137 S. E. 806 (1927).
" See notes 38-39 infra.
"Lang v. J. C. Nicols Inv. Co., 227 Mo. App. 1123, 59 S. W. 2d 63 (1933).
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ting dirt to wash from the newly graded road upon the highway and
accumulate thereon, and whether his negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the collision were proper questions for the jury. In a
South Dakota case,36 decided only four months before the principal
case, the plaintiff brought an action for injuries sustained when the
truck in which he was a passenger skidded an overturned on the highway. The skidding was alleged to have been caused by Bentonite, a
slippery substance when wet, which defendant had spilled and negligently left on the highway. It was held that the condition which defendant had created, even though hazardous, was not the proximate
cause of the injury but, rather, that the independent acts of the driver
with whom the plaintiff was riding produced the injury. However, the
language3 7 of the South Dakota court indicates that, had not distinguishing facts existed, 38 it would have reached the same result
rendered in the principal case.
There are certain instances in which the courts have refused to hold
individuals or private corporations liable for injuries to travelers caused
by conditions which the former created in the highway. Thus, the courts
have held it lawful, within certain limits,30 to obstruct or place objects
upon a highway for the purpose of erecting or repairing a building on
land adjoining,40 or for the purpose of taking goods or merchandise
in or out of an adjoining landowner's premises. 4 ' Consequently, persons who make such temporary, reasonable, and necessary obstructions
of a highway usually are not held liable to travelers who are injured
" Norman v. Cummings, 45 N. W. 2d 839 (S. D. 1951).
37Id. at 841, "It is the duty of every traveler to avoid any unusual or unreasonable use of the highway and by such use obstruct it or make it dangerous for
travel, and the damages resulting from failure to perform that duty may be recovered by any person who sustains injuries therefrom."
" In the South Dakota case there was evidence that the highway was slippery
when wet, that large signs warning of such condition were posted along the highwvay, and that other cars had been passing along the area in question all day
without injury. In the principal case, on the other hand, there was evidence that
the highway was not slippery when wet, that no warning signs of such a condition
were posted, and that other persons traveling upon the area in question had had
extreme difficulty in retaining control of their car.
" The condition created thereby must not be allowed to continue for an unreasonable time. Jones v. Hedges, 123 Cal. App. 742, 12 P. 2d 111 (1932);
Whittaker v. Town of Brookling, 318 Mass. 19, 60 N. E. 2d 85 (1945). Furthermore, while the condition thus created continues, the person so creating it is bound
to use ordinary care to warn and protect passers-by from any damages to which
they are exposed. Kaps v. Consolidated T. & E. S. Co., 279 N. Y. 739, 18 N. E.
2d 687 (1939).
" Hasselbach v. St. Louis, 179 Mo. 505, 78 S. W. 1009 (1904) ; Kahn v. King
Petroleum Corp., 13 N. J. Super. 334; 80 A. 2d 460 (1951) ; Culbertson v. Alexandria. 170 Okla. 37, 87 Pac. 863 (1906).
"' Chase v. Merchant, 315 Mass. 684, 54 N. E. 2d 51 (1944) : Jones v. Hayden,
310 Mass. 90, 37 N. E. 2d 243 (1941) ; West v. City of N. Y., 265 N. Y. 139,
19 N. E. 864 (1889) ; Collins v. Leafey, 124 Penn. St. 203, 16 At. 765 (1889).
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thereby.4
The courts have also held that there is no liability where
the condition created on the highway is slight or its location and character are such that there could be no reasonable likelihood of an accident resulting therefrom. 43 Accordingly, a Washington court 44 held
that ordinarily an accumulation of oil and grease deposited on a highway by passing automobiles would not permit recovery against the
motorists depositing the same, nor against the public body whose duty
it is to keep the highway in repair, for an accident arising out of the
slippery condition. The court based its decision on the ground that
the vehicle operator knows of such conditions, and in using the highways, takes upon himself the risk of injury arising therefrom. The court
further held, however, that the rule is different where the situation is
unusual; as, for example, where motorists deposit an unusual amount
of oil and grease on the highway, or where a city restricts traffic to such
a narrow space in a street that unusually large deposits of oil and
grease is dropped thereon, giving rise to a hazardous condition, either
the motorists or the city may be held liable for injuries sustained by
travelers as a result of a slippery condition caused thereby. It seems that
the latter rule laid down by the court supports the decision in the principal case; for there the accumulation of mud was indeed unusual.
From the foregoing analysis, it seems that two conclusions may be
drawn with regard to the liability of private persons and corporations
for injuries to travelers proximately 45 resulting from conditions created
or maintained upon a highway. If the condition amounts to a nuisance
there is liability for resulting injuries without regard to the question of

negligence.

If, on the other hand, the condition does not amount to a

nuisance liability will depend upon the existence of negligence. In the
principal case, the decision of the court seems entirely correct in submitting the issue of negligence to the jury.
WILLIS D. BROWN.
42 Brey v. Rosenfeld, 71 R. i. 28, 48 A. 2d 177 (1946).
In order to absolve *such persons from liability for such conditions, all these
uses must be reasonable, temporary and such as is usual and customary in connection with the particular business or construction. O'Neil v. City of Port
Jervis, 253 N, Y. 423, 171 N. E. 694 (1930).
," Bennett v. Ill. Power & Light Co., 355 Ill. 364, 189 N. E. 899 (1934);
Snyder v. State Highway Commission, 139 Kan. 150, 30 P. 2d 102 (1934) ; Miss.
Power Co. v. Sellers, 160 Miss. 512, 133 So. 599 (1931) ; Wood v. Carolina Tel.
& Tel. Co., 228 N. C. 605, 46 S. E. 2d 717 (1948).
"Gabrielson v. Seattle, 150 Wash. 157, 272 Pac. 723 (1928).
Although proximate cause is seldom in issue in these cases, in order to recover for an injury resulting from a hazardous condition in a highway, such condition must be shown to have been the proximate cause of the injury. Arnold v.
Bd. of Comm'rs, 131 Kan. 343, 291 Pac. 762 (1930); Fiddler v. Lafayette, 226
Mich. 635, 198 N. W. 262 (1924) ; Chapman v. Town of Lee, 80 N. H. 484, 119
Atl. 440 (1922) ; McCreary v. Thurston, 300 N. Y. 683, 91 N. E. 2d 333 (1950) ;
Harton v. Forest City Teleg. Co., 146 N. C. 429, 59 S. E. 1022 (1907); Sheley
v. Swing, 65 Ohio App. 109, 29 N. E. 2d 364 (1940).
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Practice and Procedure-Service Upon Foreign CorporationsCorporate Presence
Defendant railroad, a foreign corporation which had no tracks or
other property in North Carolina, employed a traveling freight and
passenger agent, who maintained an office at Winston-Salem. His job
was to solicit business by inducing the manufacturers in the western part
of the state to route their shipments to other parts of the country in
such a way that defendant would be one of the connecting carriers. To
further his employer's interests, the agent entertained a group of shippers' representatives, one of whom was plaintiff's intestate. The party
was transported in an automobile belonging to the agent, and as a result
of his negligence an accident resulted, in which plaintiff's intestate was
killed. Suit was brought in North Carolina, the defendant being summoned by service on the agent. The corporation appeared specially and
moved for dismissal on the ground that the service was void because
the soliciting agent was not an agent for service of process within the
purview of the statute governing service upon non-residents. 1 A denial
of this motion by the lower court was reversed on appeal. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that a foreign corporation could not be
served with process unless it was found within the state, exercising
some of the functions for which it was created ("doing business").
Solicitation of interstate shipments, the court ruled, was an activity
which was purely incidental to the business of a common carrier. It
was not sufficient to constitute "doing business" so as to make the cor2
poration amenable to the jurisdiction of the local courts.
This decision is a clear example of the application of the "corporate
presence" test, which was conceived by the United States Supreme
Court as a means of determining the jurisdictional status of a foreign4
3
corporation in regard to local suit, and which has, for some years,
become firmly entrenched in both the state and federal courts, Under
this test, it is said that if the corporation is carrying on sufficient activities within the state to constitute "doing business," it is "present" there
and consequently subject to local process. Whether the company is
1

Service was made under N. C. GEIr. STAT. §1-97 (1943).

Lambert v. Schell, 235 N. C. 21, 69 S. E. 2d 11 (1952).
'Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264 (1917) ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1897).
' The "corporate presence" test appears outmoded in the light of the language
of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
1E.g., Allentown Record Co., Inc. v. Agrashell, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 790 (E. D.
Penn. 1951); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915
(1917); C. T. H. Corp. v. Maxwell, 212 N. C. 803, 195 S. E. 36 (1938); Ivey
River Land and Timber Co. v. National Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 192 N. C.
115, 133 S. E. 424 (1926); Shambe v. Delaware and H. R. Co., 288 Pa. 240,
246, 135 Atl. 755, 757 (1927).
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"doing business" is decided upon all the facts of each case." The
amount of activity implied by the term "doing business" may vary with
the context, for "licensing and taxing laws have been held to contemplate more extensive activities than would be required . . . to bring a

corporation into the jurisdiction of the court."'7 If the rationale of
the "corporate presence" rule is to be consistently adhered to, the origin
and nature of the cause of action would appear to be immaterial for the
purpose of service, once the "presence" of the corporation has been
established. Some courts therefore have held that causes of action arising from activities which took place outside the state and which were
unrelated to the acts which occurred within the forum could fall within
the jurisdiction of the local courts.8 Others have refused to allow service of process in such cases. 9
The activities performed within the state must be some substantial
part of the ordinary business of the corporation ;1O mere isolated acts
or transitory actions will not suffice." Solicitation of business, which
People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 87 (1918);
Toothill v. Raymond Laboratories, 100 F. Supp. 350 (E. D. N. Y. 1951) ; Harrison v. Corley, 226 N. C. 184, 37 S. E. 2d 489 (1946) ; Ivey River Land and Timber

Co. v. National Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 192 N. C. 115, 133 S. E. 424 (1926).
' State Highway and Public Works Commission v. Diamond Steamship Corp.,
225 N. C. 198, 202, 34 S. E. 2d 78, 80 (1945). Cf. Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v.
Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615 (1951); C. T. H. Corp. v. Maxwell, 212

N. C. 803, 195 S. E. 36 (1938).

For a discussion of this "double standard," see

45 MicH. L. REv. 218 (1946).
"Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U. S. 565 (1921); Perkins v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S. D. Cal. 1951); Steele v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S. E. 583 (1934) Subsequent decisions
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, in King v. Robinson Transfer Motor Lines.
219 N. C. 223, 13 S. E. 2d 233 (1941) ; Hamilton v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.,
220 N. C. 815, 18 S. E. 2d 367 (1942); and Central Motor Lines v. Brooks
Transportation Co., 225 N. C. 733, 36 S. E. 2d 271 (1945), have distinguished this
case, and it would appear to be no longer sound authority. For an extreme
decision, see Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Superior Court, 237 P. 2d
297 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1951), where the California court asserted jurisdiction
over the foreign corporation, although the cause of action arose in England.
'Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8
(1907); Central Motor Lines v. Brooks Transportation Co., 225 N. C. 733, 36
S. E. 2d 271 (1945) ; Hamilton v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 220 N. C. 815, 18
S. E. 2d 367 (1942); King v. Robinson Transfer Motor Lines, 219 N. C. 223, 13
S. E. 2d 233 (1941). But cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 72
S. Ct. 413 (1952). See also Note, 29 COL. L. REv. 187, 190 (1929).
" Perkins v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S. D. Cal. 1951);
Harrison v. Corley, 226 N. C. 184, 37 S. E. 2d 489 (1946); Ruark v. Virginia
Trust Co., 206 N. C. 564, 174 S. E. 441 (1934). However, the mere shipment
of products into the state in interstate commerce is not "doing business." Cannon
Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925).
1 E.g., Rosenburg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516 (1923)
(president of the company was in New York briefly to purchase stock) ; Schoenith,
Inc. v. Adrian X-Ray Manufacturing Co., 220 N. C. 390, 17 S. E. 2d 350 (1941)
(director, at plaintiff's request, serviced the machine which his company had sold
to plaintiff). But cf. State Highway and Public Works Commission v. Diamond
Steamship Transportation Corp., 225 N. C. 198, 202, 34 S. E. 2d 78, 80 (1945),
where, in holding that a single extended trip by defendant's ship constituted "doing
busipess," the court stated: "The nature of the activities themselves, their magni-
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is generally considered by the "corporate presence" requirement to be
merely incidental to the main functions of a corporation, is not "doing
business."'1 2 However, when the company conducts other activities in
addition to solicitation, it may become amenable to the local jurisdiction.13 The court in the instant case, having found no corporate activity
within the forum except solicitation, was dearly in accord with wellestablished precedent in refusing to hold the service valid.
The standard applied by the court should be compared, however,
with the rule formulated by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.14 There, the foreign corporation
had engaged in enough acts in addition to solicitations to be considered
"present" and thus to be subject to the state unemployment compensation tax. 15 Yet, the Supreme Court did not employ the "corporate
presence" test. Rather, it ruled that jurisdictional requirements can
be met if the corporation's "operations establish sufficient contacts or
tude, the multiplicity of contacts, the possibility that incidents may occur and
liabilities be created-especially where the entrance into the state is in the ordinary

prosecution of the business which the corporation is chartered to carry on and is
carrying on; and which definitely regards the state as a theater for future transactions of a like sort as often as occasion might arise-these are important considerations in determining whether a corporation is, in a given instance, doing
business in the state. On a single visitation to the state the matter in hand may
explode into a multitude of transactions of far-reaching importance." Accord:
Lindner v. Plastic Toys, Inc., 96 N. Y. S. 2d 513 (City Ct. 1949) (company's
president maintained a hotel room for thirteen days to accept orders for his
product, and this was held to be "doing business").
2Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U. S. 530 (1907) ; Radio
Station WMFR, Inc. v. Eitel-McCullough, Inc., 232 N. C. 287, 59 S. E. 2d 779
(1950); Schoenith, Inc. v. Adrian X-Ray Manufacturing Co., 220 N. C. 390, 17
S. E. 2d 350 (1941); Plott v. Michael, 214 N. C. 665, 200 S. E. 429 (1939);
Carnegie v. Art Metal Construction Co., 191 Va. 136, 60 S. E. 2d 17 (1950).
But cf. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij v. Superior Court, 237 P. 2d 297
(Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1951) (continuous solicitation is sufficient) ; American Asphalt
Roof Corp. v. Shankland, 205 Iowa 862, 219 N. W. 28 (1928) (continuous solicitation resulting in deliveries within the state will support jurisdiction). Accord:
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
" International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 205 U. S. 530 (1914) (agents received payment in either money or notes) ; Barnett v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 145 F.
2d 800 (2d Cir. 1944) (agents sold tickets and issued bills of lading); State v.
Winsted, 66 Idaho 504, 162 P. 2d 894 (1945) (agents used cars owned and licensed
by the company); Lindner v. Plastic Toys, Inc., 96 N. Y. S. 2d 513 (City Ct.
1949) (agent's acceptance of orders was binding on the company); Parris v.
Fischer & Co., 219 N. C. 292, 13 S. E. 2d 540 (1941) (agent signed a conditional
sales contract in behalf of the company, visited plaintiff's residence twice to collect
back payments, and repossessed the machine on the second visit); Mauney v.
Luzier's, Inc., 212 N. C. 634, 194 S. E. 323 (1937) (agent collected payment for
the goods). But cf. Davega v. Lincoln Furniture Co., 29 F. 2d 164 (3d Cir.
1928); Pellegrini v. Roux Distributing Co., 170 Pa. Super. 68, 84 A. 2d 222
(1951). See also Comment, 3 RuTGERS L. REv. 298 (1949).
14326 U. S. 310 (1945).
15 International Shoe Co. v. State, 22 Wash. 2d 146, 154 P. 2d 801 (shoe company had from eleven to thirteen salesmen who resided in Washington, displayed
samples, occasionally rented permanent sample rooms or temporary space in
hotels and business buildings, and transmitted orders to the home office for
acceptance).
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ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to
permit the state to enforce the obligations which ... [the company] ...

The court indicated that the nature of the parhas incurred there." '
ticular suit being brought is to be considered, and that "an estimate of
the inconveniences which would result to the corporation from a trial
away from its

.

..

principal place of business is relevant in this

connection." 17
Three basic differences between the "fair play and substantial justice"
rule of the International Shoe case and the older "corporate presence"
test can be detected. First, the newer rule provides a more direct and
realistic method of determining whether or not jurisdiction can be
asserted. Instead of following the circuitous route of deciding that the
corporation's activities are sufficient to constitute "doing business,"
which in turn manifests the "presence" of the company and makes it
amenable to local process, the "fair play and substantial justice" test
merely requires examination of the corporation's contacts with the
forum to decide whether they justify jurisdiction over the suit in
question. 8
A second difference is that the new rule makes allowance for the
origin of the cause of action. A dictum in the InternationalShoe case
suggests that a court can take jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
regardless of where or how the cause of action originated. It is indicated however, that a greater amount of corporate activity within the
forum is necessary to meet constitutional requirements where the cause
of action arises outside of the forum than where the suit is based on
9
A recent decision by the
acts of the company within the state.'
02
Supreme Court has since made the dictum law.
"- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 320 (1945).
17326 U. S. at 317. "[This] question is certainly indistinguishable from the
Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d
issue of 'forum non conveniens."
788 (2d Cir. 1948), criticized in 61 HAv.L. Rav. 1254, 1255 (1948).
" "Since the corporate persoriality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to
be acted upin as though it were a fact . . . it is clear that unlike an individual
its 'presence' . . . can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by
those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so far
'present' there as to satisfy due process requirements ... is to beg the question to
be decided. For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize
those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem
to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process." 326 U. S. at 316.
"0'While it has been held . . . that continuous activity of some sorts within
a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to
suits unrelated to that activity . . . . there have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." 326 U. S. at 318.
20Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 72 S. Ct. 413 (1952).
Defendant, a Philippine mining company, had been displaced by the Japanese invasion and
had transferred its limited wartime activities to Ohio, where its president and
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The third difference is that the "fair play and substantial justice"
test would seem to indicate that courts may now exercise wider jurisdiction over foreign corporations.2 1 Although not specifically overruled
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the "mere solicitation" rule
seems abrogated by the new test. In modern business, solicitation is a
substantial and vital part of the activities of a corporation.2 2 Furthergeneral manager resided. It maintained two bank accounts in Ohio, carried on
correspondence, and held several directors' meetings there. Nevertheless, the Ohio
courts refused to accept jurisdiction over it in a suit for unpaid dividends and
damages caused by failure to issue stock certificates because the cause of action
arose outside of the state. In vacating judgment and remanding for further proceedings, the United States Supreme Court ruled that, although it could not order
the Ohio courts to take jurisdiction, it could not prevent them from summoning
the corporation, because the activities in Ohio were sufficient to justify jurisdiction,
even where the cause of action arose from outside, unrelated conduct. The decision
did not indicate, however, what minimum of activity would be required before
jurisdiction over such a cause of action would be constitutional; and the unusual
magnitude of the defendant's forum operations in the case casts no light on this
point.
2 The "minimum contacts" requirement appears to demand a lesser degree of
forum activity than is indicated by the term "corporate presence." In addition,
it seems significant that the court stressed the fact that service on the agent in
the case being considered would certainly give the corporation sufficient notice
of the suit. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 320 (1945).
Also compare Travelers Health Assn v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643 (1950) with
Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140 (1923) (a decision
under the "corporate presence" rule). See Comment, 41 ILL L. REv. 228, 236
(1946); Note, 16 U. oF CH. L. REv. 523, 525 (1949); 3 RuTGERS L. REV. 298,
300 (1949).
There is argument that "fair play" requires subjection of the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction whenever it commits a tort within the state against
a resident, or breaches a contract which is to be performed in whole or in part
within the forum. See McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations;Actions
Arising Out of Acts Done Within tre Forum, 34 CALIF. L. RZEv. 331, 336 (1946) ;
Note, 39 Ky. L. J. 357, 362 (1951). Such a rule, it is said, would be less vague
than either of the present rules, and therefore would be easier to apply. Furthermore, due process would be observed as long as the court made certain that the
corporation received actual notice. The 'non-resident motorist statutes are cited
in support of this point. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927). Normally,
no hardship would result under the proposed rule, it is said, since usually most
of the witnesses will reside within the forum. In the few cases where the foreign
corporation would suffer unduly from suit away from its "home," the doctrine of
forum non conveniens might be applied. Two state courts have applied rules,
based upon local statutes, which come close to adopting this attitude. See Johns
v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950), discussed
in Comment, 64 HAxv. L. Ruv. 500 (1951) and Note, 20 U. oF CIN. L. Rlv. 129
(1951). Cf. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664
(1951).
While there is as yet no indication that the United States Supreme Court will
allow such broad jurisdiction, the language of the Vermont court appears significant: "We recognize that there is a dual trend in jurisdictional decisions: in
defining the court with jurisdiction, a trend away from the court with immediate
power over the defendant to the court where both parties may most conveniently
settle their dispute; and in defining due process of law, a trend from emphasis on
the territorial limitations of courts to emphasis on providing notice and opportunity to be heard. The implications of InternationalShoe Co v. State of Washington are a part of this dual trend. Its broad standard we expect will prevail.
Any change will be, most likely, a further extension." 116 Vt. at 575, 80 A.
2d at 668.
" "Solicitation without . . . additional activities . . . may be more sustained,
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more, under the older rule it may be possible for a corporation, by
merely making all orders obtained by its agents subject to approval at
the home office, to procure a large amount of business from a state,
while remaining immune from suit in the local courts.m Gradually, the
courts appear to be reaching the conclusion that "fair play" requires
that the corporation submit to the jurisdiction where the solicitation conducted by it is extensive 2 4
The distinction between continuous activities and isolated acts is preserved in the "fair play and substanital justice" test, which holds that
isolated activities ordinarily do not furnish sufficient contacts.25 However, the language in the InternationalShoe decision did leave the possibility open that certain isolated acts "because of their nature and quality
and the circumstances, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to Suit."' 2 6 Also, it is possible that the broader exercise of
jurisdiction possible under the new rule may influence courts to be less
willing to label a corporation's forum activity as "isolated acts."
The broad language of the "fair play and substantial justice rule is
more insistent, more productive of business than it is with them. Solicitation is
the foundation of sales. Completing the contract often is a mere formality when
the stage of 'selling' the customer has been passed. No business man would regard 'selling,' the 'taking of orders,' 'solicitation' as not doing business. The
merchant or manufacturer considers these things the heart of business." Frene
v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F. 2d 511, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
"'In Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., 367 Pa. 125, 79 A. 2d 222 (1951), the
defendant company rented, equipped, and maintained an office in Philadelphia,
employing a staff of six persons, including a district sales manager. In addition
to soliciting business, the office transmtted complaints to the home office in Connecticut and contacted it to expedite local deliveries. Defendant's customers cancelled orders through this branch office, called there to transact business, and sent
drawings and blueprints to it. The branch office also handled settlement of difficulties created by shipment of defective materials, exhibited samples of defendant's products, and processed all orders received from defendant's local distributors.
Yet, because all orders taken at the branch office were subject to final approval at
the Connecticut office, the Pennsylvania court refused to allow jurisdiction, ruling:
"The criterion is . . . whether the local solicitors have authority to bind the
corporation by which they are employed." 367 Pa. at 129, 79 A. 2d at 224. See
also2 Pellegrini v. Roux Distributing Co., 170 Pa. Super. 68, 84 A. 2d 222 (1951).
Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d 788 (2d Cir.), cert. dent., 335
U. S.814 (1948) ; Star Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Red Ash Pocahontas Coal Co., 102
F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Ky. 1951); Perkins v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 94 F. Supp.
946 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Western Smelting & Refining Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
81 F. Supp. 494 (D. C. 1948); Schmikler v. Petersine Insulator Co., 77 F. Supp.
11 (D. Mass. 1948); Boyd v. Warren Paint & Color Co., 254 Ala. 687, 49 So.
2d 559 (1950). But cf. Toothill v. Raymond Laboratories, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 350
(E.D. N. Y. 1951); Anderson v. Page & Hill Homes, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 408
(D. N. D. 1950); Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.
N. Y. 1946) ("This case is a step backward from the implications of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington." 60 HARv. L. REv. 654 (1947)) ; Jacobs v. Horan Engraving Co., 137 N. J.L. 520, 61 A. 2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Cohen v. Gulf,
Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 95 N. Y. S. 2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Law v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 367 Pa. 170, 79 A. 2d 252 (1951) ; Hoffman v. D. Landreth Seed
Co., 566 S.E. 2d 813 (S.C. 1951).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S.310, 317 (1945).
20 326 U. S. at 318.
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vague, and therefore may well form the basis for disagreements as to
the result of its application in specific situations. Indeed, the decision
in the instant case might easily have been the same had the new rule been
used by the court. But it would seem that, although the North Carolina Supreme Court is not alone in speaking in terms of "corporate
presence" and "mere solicitation,"-2 7 it would have a fairer and more
effective means of approaching future cases of this type if it employed
the rule and language of the InternationalShoe case.
JOHN G. GoLmNG.
Sheriffs--Relationship to and Liability for Deputy
The office of deputy sheriff is ". . coeval in point of antiquity
with the sheriff" 1 and as such is one of the oldest in the common law
system of jurisprudence. 2 Although some states provide for deputies4
sheriff by statute,8 in North Carolina it remains a common law office.
The exact relationship between the sheriff and his deputy was not
dearly defined until Styers v. Forsyth County,5 in which Stacy, C. J.
stated:
"Under our law a deputy is authorized to act only in ministerial matters, and in respect of these matters he acts as vice
principal or alter ego of the sheriff, for the sheriff 'and his deputy
be, in the contemplation of law, one person.' . . . In short, a
deputy is a lieutenant, the sheriff's right hand man. . . . To call
him an under sheriff . . . is more nearly correct than to style
him an employee." 6
"E.g., Westerdale v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 6 N. J. 571, 80 A. 2d 91 (Sup.
Ct. 1951); Vassallo v. Slomin, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 60, 278 App. Div. 949 (2d Dept.
1951); Allentown Record Co., Inc. v. Agrashell, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 790 (E. D.
Penn. 1951). See also note 24 supra.
'Lanier v. Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 316, 93 S. E. 850, 853 (1917).
21 ANDERSON ON Sxamirirs §2 (1st ed. 1941) ; Boland, The Ancient Office of
Sheriff, 211 L. T. 177 (1951), ". . . the office of sheriff is, except for kingship,
the oldest office in the country and the only secular office remaining from Saxon
times! '
847 Am. JUR. §154 (1943) ; 1 ANDERSON ON SHERrrs §60 (1st ed. 1941).

'There is no provision for the office of deputy sheriff in either the constitution (Gowans v. Alamance County, 216 N. C. 107, 3 S. E. 2d 339 (1939)), or
the statutes (Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 286 (1937); Jamesville
& Washington R.R. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 13 S. E. 698 (1891)), except where
modified by public-local law. See note 10 infra.
212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937).
212 N. C. at 564, 194 S. E. 308. The court describes the deputy by four
terms, the total of which would seem to embrace the definition of the office:
". .. he acts as 'vice-principal'" (one to whom the employer has confided the
entire charge of the business or a district branch of it, or one to whom the master
has delegated a duty of his own which is a direct personal and absolute obligation.
Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951)) ; "alter ego" ("second self." Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary, 5th ed. (1945)); "a lieutenant" ("one who holds the post
or office of another, in the place and stead of the latter." Black's Law Dictionary
(4th ed., 1951)) ; "the sheriff's right hand man" ("one chiefly relied on." Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (5th ed., 1945.)).
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Prior to7 that case the deputy had been inaccurately classified as an
"agent," "servant and agent,"" and "employee." 9
Except where regulated by local laws,10 North Carolina follows the
common law in that appointments of deputies sheriff are made by the
sheriff." Despite this, the North Carolina court considers the charge
a public office.' 2 A deputation need not be in writing; it is sufficient
to show that the deputy acted with the consent and privity of the
sheriff.' 3 Other than general constitutional restrictions,' 4 qualifications
for the office seem to be within the discretion of the sheriff "under the
general principles of agency."'
Generally, the deputy begins his tenure
upon being deputized and holds the office for the incumbency of the
sheriff unless relieved by the sheriff, 16 or county commissioners where
local law empowers them to do so.' 7 A deputy may not be removed
from office by the direct action of the public for he is not amenable to
' Somers v. Commissioners, 123 N. C. 582, 31 S. E. 873 (1898); Brinson v.
Thomas, 55 N. C. 414 (1856) ; Horne v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844).
' jamesville & Washington R.R. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 13 S.E. 698 (1891);
Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62 (1860).
' Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S.E. 305 (1937): "...
in

some of the cases a deputy is loosely spoken of as an employee of the sheriff. .. "
10 Some local laws permit county commissioners to appoint deputies sheriff,
e.g., N. C. Public-Local Laws 1931 Ch. 128; others authorize appointment by the
sheriff within the discretion of the county commissioners, e.g., N. C. Public-Local
Laws 1935 Ch. 576. In at least one instance, N. C. Public-Local Laws 1937 Ch.
382, a deputy sheriff was appointed by the General Assembly.
" Towe v. Yancey County, 224 N. C. 579, 31 S. E. 2d 754 (1944) ; Jamesville
& Washington RR. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 135 S.E. 698 (1891) ; Willis v. Melvin,
53 N. C. 62 (1860).
" Towe v. Yancey County, 224 N. C. 579, 31 S.E. 2d 754 (1944) ; Blake v.
Allen, 221 N. C. 445, 20 S. E. 2d 552 (1942) ; Gowens v. Alamance County, 216
N. C. 107, 3 S.E. 2d 339 (1939) ; Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194
S. E. 305 (1937); Lanier v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850
(1917); State v. Alston, 127 N. C. 518, 37 S. E. 137 (1900). But cf. Potts v.
United Supply Co., 222 N. C. 176, 22 S.E. 2d 255 (1942). The court -held that
there were cases or dicta which would suggest that a deputy is not a public officer
within the meaning of N. C. GEN. STAr. §1-77 (1943), citing Blake v. Allen, 221
N. C. 445, 20 S.E. 2d 552 (1942) ; Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194
S. E. 305 (1937) ; and Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937).
" jamesville & Washington R.R. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 13 S. E. 698 (1891);
Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62 (1860); Home v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844);
Buchanan v. McIntosh, 24 N. C. 52 (1841).
N. C. CoNsT., Art. VI, §8; Art. XIV, §2. These restrictions apply to the
qualifications for all public offices within the state.
" Jamesville & Washington R.R. v. Fisher, 109 N. C. 1, 13 S.E. 698 (1891).
In holding the appointment of an infant as deputy sheriff valid the court said:
"... the sheriff is civilly responsible for the unlawful acts of his deputy . ..he
selects and appoints his agents at his own hazard...."
1 Somers v. Commissioners, 123 N. C. 582, 31 S. E. 873 (1898)
(court held
that a deputy's tenure terminated upon the sheriff's being declared insane) ; Willis
v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62 (1860).
"'N. C. Public-Local Laws 1929 Ch. 451. Where the sheriff has the tax list
in his hands when his tenure of office expires, any resistance to his deputy who
thereafter attempts to collect the taxes is considered resistance to an officer. State
v. Alston, 127 N. C. 518, 37 S. E. 137 (1900). However, collecting taxes is
considered a mere incident to the office and does not terminate with the other
duties. State v. Alston, supra; Perry v. Campbell, 63 N. C. 257 (1869).
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them for his misfeasance.18
Deputies are divided into two classifications, general and special.
The general deputy is an officer who has the authority to execute all of
the ordinary ministerial duties of the sheriff. The special deputy has
been defined as an officer of specific limited duties, usually employed to
execute a particular writ on a particular occasion.1 9 This definition
does not seem adequate in the light of present day practices. It would
perhaps be better to expand the definition to include officers who perform particularduties as well as execute particular writs. 20 Although
the acts of the deputy are representative and are done in the name of
the sheriff,21 the sheriff may not delegate a part of the authority of his
office to his deputy and thus relieve himself of obligation, for he alone
is responsible for the incumbencies of his office. 22 Nor may a general
or special deputy delegate his duty to another unless authorized to do
so by the sheriff,23 though a general deputy has it within his power as
24
the general "acting arm" of the sheriff to appoint a special deputy.
If the law requires that an act be done by the "sheriff of the county,"
if ministerial, it may be performed by his deputy since the direction
25
refers to the office and not the man.

The deputy, like the sheriff, is territorially confined to the boundaries of his county. 26 At common law the only exception to this was
where the sheriff or his deputy was in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon in
which case the boundaries could be crossed. North Carolina has limited this "extra-territorial" jurisdiction to bonded deputies,2 7 but as
has expanded it to include violators of the state's prohibition
to them
laws. 28 In some few cases local laws permit deputies to pass from
"2 Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62 (1860).
"0Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937) ; Lanier v. Town of
Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850 (1917).
20 See note 48 infra.
"Blake v. Allen, 221 N. C. 445, 20 S.E. 2d 552 (1942) ; Styers v. Forsyth
County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S.E. 305 (1937) ; Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472,
S. E. 826 (1937) ; Lanier v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S.E. 850
193
(1917).
(Laer v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S.E. 850 (1917) ; Cansler
v. Penland, 125 N. C. 578, 34 S. E. 683 (1899). The duties and authority of the
sheriff are prescribed and directed by law and are not within his discretion. However, the sheriff does have the administration of his deputies within his discretion.
Blake v. Allen, 221 N. C. 445, 20 S. E. 2d 552 (1942); Borders v. Cline, 212
N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937). Although the sheriff has judicial as well as
ministerial duties, the deputy may act for him only in the latter. Blake v. Allen,
spra; Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937) ; Borders v.
Cline, supra; Lanier v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S.E. 850 (1917)
Yeargin v. Siler, 83 N. C: 348 (1880). E. 2d 552 (1942).
2 Blake v. Allen, 221 N. C. 445, 20 S.
" 1 ANDERSON ON SHERIFFS §74 (Ist ed. 1941).
"5Lanier v. Town of Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 850 (1917).
Wilson v. Mooresville, 222 N. C. 283, 22 S. E. 2d 907 (1942).
27
N. C. GEr. STAT. §15-42 (1943).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §18-45(0) (1943).
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one county into another.Generally, a sheriff is held liable for the wrongful acts or omissions
of his deputy committed under color of office. 30 The basis for this
responsibility is the principle that "the hand that does or procures the
act [to be done] is liable." 3' Thus, the receipt of claims by the deputy
is regarded as the same as receipt by the sheriff ;32 a demand on a defaulting deputy for money collected is equivalent to a demand on his
superior;33 and admissions or declarations of a deputy may be used as
evidence against the sheriff.3 4 The deputy, on the other hand, is liable
to the sheriff for his misfeasance of office, and where he gives a bond
to the sheriff for the faithful discharge of his duties, it is for the sheriff's
protection and not the public at large.35 At common law the sheriff
alone could be sued by the injured party, and he in turn would recover
from his deputy,3 6 whereas today the suit may be against the deputy
37
as well as the sheriff.
It is a fairly common practice in North Carolina for a deputy sheriff
to be engaged in private employment while also serving as deputy.38 In
29 N. C. Public-Local Laws 1941 Ch. 23.
" Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 33, - S. E. 2d - (1952); Towe v. Yancey
County, 224 N. C. 579, 31 S. E. 2d 574 (1944) ; Blake v. Allen, 221 N. C. 445,
19 S.E. 2d 871 (1942) ; Davis v. Moore, 215 N. C. 449, 2 S. E. 2d 366 (1939) ;
Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305 (1937) ; Borders v. Cline,
212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937); Jamesville & Washington R.R. v. Fisher,
109 N. C. 1, 13 S. E. 698 (1898) ; McClean v. Buchanan, 53 N. C. 444 (1862) ;
Martin v. Martin, 47 N. C. 285 (1855) ; Home v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844) ;
Satterwhite v. Carson, 25 N. C. 549 (1843); Spencer v. Moore, 19 N. C. 264
(1837). As to the extent of the liability of the sureties in the sheriff's bond, the
present view imposes liability for any wrong committed under color of office,
whether negligent or willfull. Dunn v. Swainson, 217 N. C. 279, 7 S. E. 2d 563

(1940) ; Price v. Honeycutt, 216 N. C. 270, 4 S. E. 2d 611 (1939).

Previously,

the sureties had been held responsible for the performance of only those duties
incumbent upon the sheriff by virtue of his office. For a discussion of the old view
see 12 N. C. L. REv. 394 (1934).
Generally, a sheriff may not be held criminally liable for the act of his deputy,
though when a sheriff made a false return on a writ based entirely on the false
return of his deputy, be was held liable to a criminal charge. State v. Johnson,
2 N. C. 293 (1796).
" Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S.E. 305 (1937).
"2State v. McGhee, 29 N. C. 377 (1847) ; Home v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844);
Lyle v. Wilson, 26 N. C. 227 (1844) ; State v. Roane, 24 N. C. 144 (1841).
Lyle v. Wilson, 26 N. C. 227 (1844).
"Home v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844).
"Blalock v. Peake, 56 N. C. 324 (1857); Brinson v. Thomas, 55 N. C. 414
(1856) ; Lyle v. Wilson, 26 N. C. 227 (1884). If the sheriff is held liable for
the acts of his deputy and his sureties are compelled to indemnify, the sureties,
under the principles of subrogation, may bring action against the sureties of the,
deputy to recover sums paid out.
" Brinson v. Thomas, 55 N. C. 414 (1856); Willis v. Melvin, 53 N. C. 62
(1860); Martin v. Martin, 47 N. C. 285 (1855); Hampton v. Brown, 35 N. C.
18 (1851) ; Tarkington v. Harsell, 27 N. C. 359 (1845) (where a deputy promised to make good a default the sheriff was not held liable) ; Lyle v. Wilson, 26
N. C. 227 (1844).
"'Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 33, - S. E. 2d - (1951) ; Davis v. Moore, 215
N. C. 449, 2 S. E. 2d 366 (1939).
" Such functions include serving as special town policeman, peace officers in
and around amusement centers, and as guards and night watchmen for municipal,
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such cases the question of liability for the wrongful acts of the deputy
takes on dual aspects: is the sheriff responsible, the private employer
responsible, or are they jointly liable? In most cases the question would
seem to depend upon whose employ the deputy was in at the time the
wrong was committed, the issue being one for the jury.30 The difficulty comes where it is found that the deputy was in the employ of
both the sheriff and the private employer. Should the liability be joint,
and if so, should it also be several? Apparently, North Carolina has
not passed upon the point; but since generally the deputy is in the
relationship of principal and agent with his private employer, 40 and in a
comparable relationship with the sheriff, 41 the general rules of agency
should be followed.
North Carolina needs to clarify its position as to the liability of
the sheriff for his deputy and also to provide answers to other questions involving the office. If the deputy sheriff is a public officer, does
he come within the statutory requirements of public officers respecting
dual office holding, oath of office, official bond and similar requirements?42 Is on-the-spot deputization still possible or is it necessary
that there be a ceremony and written appointment? Can a sheriff limit
his liability for the wrongs of his special deputies by specific instructions? Are all deputies actually within the existing classifications of
general and special deputies?
Clearly, there is a need in North Carolina for legislation to provide
for the office of deputy sheriff and to define its limits and obligations.
In addition, the varied and often conflicting local provisions pertaining
to this office serve no apparent purpose, and should be eliminated and
replaced by uniform requirements.
JAMEs R. TRoTTER, JR.
industrial and other locations. See e.g., Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 331, - S. E.
2d - (1952).
" Where a special police officer, appointed by the governor as a railroad guard,
but paid by the railroad, killed another in the exercise of his duties, the court
held that if the guard was engaged in the performance of a duty owed his employer by reason of his employment, then the railroad would be liable; otherwise,
he would be held in his capacity as a public officer. The question was one of fact
for the jury. Tate v. Southern R.R., 205 N. C. 51, 169 S. E. 816 (1933). In a
similar case in which the question was one of joinder of parties, the court held that
it was proper to join the private employers with the sheriff, the deputy and their
sureties, on the premise that if the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom
he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants to determine which
is liable, the question of whether the deputy was acting as a servant or public
again being one for the jury. Cain v. Corbett, 235 N. C. 33, - S. E. 2d officer
(1952).
(5 It is conceivable that the deputy could be an independent contractor. In such
a case the liability would be different, depending upon the circumstances. Such a
relationship is beyond the scope of this note.
"1While the deputy is not an agent of the sheriff, the relationship is closely
akin to agency, and in many cases the liability of the sheriff for his deputy has
been based on agency. Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S. E. 305
(1937).
2
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §128-1 through §128-41 (1943).
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Unincorporated Associations-Cacapity to Sue and Be SuedNorth Carolina and Federal jurisdiction
In the absence of an enabling statute an unincorporated association
can neither sue nor be sued in its common or association name, on the
theory that such an association has no legal entity distinct from that
of its members.' Thus at common law the action must be brought by
or against the members individually. Some courts have avoided the
rule without express statutory authority when its application would
produce unfair and unjust results,2 and others, among them a North
Carolina inferior court,3 declare that whether an unincorporated association can sue or be sued as a legal entity is purely a question of procedure and a failure to raise the question before judgment is a waiver
and cannot be taken advantage of after judgment. 4 But aside from
these two deviations any relief from the common law rule must be by
statutory provision.
Suits by or against unincorporated associations in federal courts are
governed by Federal Rule 17(b) 5 which adopts the rule of the Coronado Coal Case,6 and provides that "... . a partnership or unincorporated
association . . . may sue or be sued in its common name for the pur-

pose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under
the Constitution or laws of the United States. . .. ,,7 In suits not
I Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U. S. 113 (1932) ; Grand International Brotherhood v. Green, 206 Ala. 196, 89 So. 435 (1921) ; Pickett v. Walsh,
192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 (1906); Tucker v. Eatough, 186 N. C. 505, 120 S.E.
57 (1923) ; Nelson v. Relief Dept., 147 N. C. 103, 60 S. E. 724 (1908) ; bu see
Winchester v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 203 N. C. 735, 167 S. E. 49 (1932).
' United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344
(1922). The court relied upon the concept of equitable class suits, the recog-

nition of unions as entities expressedly or impliedly in social and economic legislation, and "... . out of the very necessities of the existing conditions and the utter
impossibility of doing justice otherwise, the suable character of such organizations
as labor unions has come to be recognized." See Taft Vale R.R. v. Amalgamated
Soc. of R.R. Servants, 1 B. R. C. 832 (1901) ; Comment, 32 YALE: L. J. 59 (1922).
'This judgment of the General County Court of Buncombe County is unreported, but the text is set forth in Operative Plasters' Association v. Case, 93 F.
2d 56, 61 (D. C. Cir. 1937).
"Beatty & Richie v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566 (U. S. 1829); Iron Moulders' Union
No. 135 v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908); Barnes v. Chicago
Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 402, 83 N. E. 932 (1908); Contra: Proprietors of
the 5Mex. Mill v. Yellow Jacket Mining Co., 4 Nev. 40 (1868).
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), 23 U. S. C. §723(c) (1940). See also FED. R. Civ. P.
4(d)3 and 4(d)7 which provide for service of process upon an officer, managing
or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or law (federal
or state) to receive service.
'United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
Schmidt v. Peoples Telephone Union of Maryville, 138 F. 2d 13 (8th Cir.
1943) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Thermoid Co. v. United Rubber Workers,
70 F. Supp. 228 (D. N. J. 1947) (War Labor Disputes Act); United Brick &
Clay Workers v. Robinson Clay Product Co., 64 F. Supp. 872 (N. D. Ohio 1946)
(Sherman Anti-Trust & National Labor Relations Act) ; Sperry Products, Inc. v.
Association of American R.R., 44 F. Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) (patent
infringement).
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involving a federal substantive right, Federal Rule 17(b) provides that
"capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the State
in which the district court is held. . .

."

This makes it necessary to

determine when unincorporated associations can sue and be sued in state
courts.
When can an unincorporated association be sued as a legal entity
in North Carolina? North Carolina by piece-meal legislation specifically
authorizes suits against unincorporated associations where the suit concerns: (1) insurance policies issued by the unincorporated associations, 8
(2) real estate held by the unincorporated association in its common
name, 9 and (3) acts performed by certain religious, educational, or
charitable associations formed prior to 1894.10 More important than
these narrow specific abrogations of the common law are the cases interpreting G. S. 1-97(6)ll which, under the title, "Service by Copy,"
provides for service upon the process agent of any unincorporated asso12
ciations doing business in North Carolina. In the Ionic Lodge Case,
the first one arising under this statute, it was held (in a suit by an
unincorporated association) that an unincorporated association could
sue or be sued in its common or association name, by reasoning that
G. S. 1-97(6) was an expression of legislative intent to change the
common law rule. But on rehearing 13 the court reversed itself, stating
that in the previous hearing G. S. 1-70 had been overlooked; that the
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §39-24 (1950).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-70 (1943).
1
oN. C. GEN. STAT. §55-13 (1950).

C. GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943), "Any unincorporated association or
21N.
organization, whether resident or non-resident, desiring to do business in this
state by performing any of the acts for which it was formed, shall, before any
such acts are performed, appoint an agent in this state upon whom all processes,
and precepts may be served, and certify to the clerk of the superior court of each
county in which said association or organization desires to perform any of the
acts for which it was organized the name and address of such process agent. If
said unincorporated association or organization shall fail to appoint the process
agent pursuant to this subsection, all precepts, and processes may be served upon
the Secretary of the State of North Carolina. Upon such service, the Secretary
of State shall forward a copy of the process or precept to the last known address
of such unincorporated association or organization. Service upon the process
agent appointed pursuant to this subsection or upon the Secretary of State, if no
process agent is appointed, shall be legal and binding on said association or organization and any judgment recovered in any action commenced by service of process,
as provided in this subsection shall be valid and may be collected out of any real
or personal property belonging to the association or organization.
Any such unincorporated association or organization, now performing any of
the acts for which it was formed shall within thirty days from the ratification
of this subsection, appoint an agent upon whom processes and precepts may be
served, as provided in this subsection, and in the absence of such appointment, such
processes and precepts may be served upon the Secretary of State, as provided in
this subsection. Upon such service the Secretary of State shall forward a copy
of the process or precept to the last known address of such unincorporated association or organization."
12 Ionic Lodge No. 72 v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted Masons No. 72
Co., 232 N. C. 252, 59 S. E. 2d 829 (1950).
13232 N. C. 648, 62 S. E. 2d 73 (1950) ; Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 335 (1950).
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common law rule still prevailed in North Carolina except as modified
by G. S. 1-70, which permitted class suits and suits concerning insurance
policies issued by an unincorporated association; that therefore unincorporated associations were not permitted to sue in their common name.
The Ionic Lodge Rehearing'4 left open the question as to whether
G. S. 1-97(6) authorizes suits against an unincorporated association in
its common name.
In Stafford v. Woods,' 5 the most recent case interpreting G. S.
1-97(6), Justice Ervin, for the unanimous court, declared that the
statute
ciation

"...
. . .

when read aright provides that any unincorporated assowhich is doing business in North Carolina . . . is subject

to suit as a legal entity." In the light of this decision the only limitation to suits against unincorporated associations in North Carolina is
the application of the words ".

.

. associations or organizations desiring

to do business in this state, by performing any of the acts for which it
was formed. . ...16

This is basically a problem of jurisdiction, with

7
the limitation being also applied to suits against foreign corporations.'
When can an unincorporated association sue as a legal entity in
North Carolina? By statute North Carolina permits unincorporated
associations to sue in their common name in suits concerning: (1) insurance policies held by the unincorporated association,18 (2) real
estate held by the unincorporated association in its common name, 19
and (3) acts performed by certain religious, educational or charitable
associations formed prior to 1894.20 In all other cases the common law
rule applies. G. S. 1-97(6) is not construed as implying legislative
intention to permit unincorporated associations to sue,2 ' though it is
interpreted as implying an intention to permit suits against unincorporated assocations .22 This construction of G. S. 1-97(6) forces unincorporated associations to resort to the cumbersome joinder of all
its members or as an alternative in most instances they are allowed to
bring a class action.2 3 Most statutes dealing with this problem either
4
Ionic Lodge No. 72 v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted Masons No. 72
Co., 232 N. C. 648, 62 S. E. 2d 73 (1950).
15234 N. C. 622, 68 S. E. 2d 268 (1951).
'o See note 11 supra.
Carolina test of "doing business" as applied to
1"For a review of the North
corporations, see Note, 30 N. C. L. REv. 454 (1952).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §1-70 (1943).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §39-24 (1950).
'IN.C. GEN. STAT. §55-13 (1950).
" Ionic Lodge No. 72 v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted Masons No. 72
Co., 232 N. C. 648, 62 S.E. 2d 73 (1950).
22 Stafford v. Wood, 234 N. C. 622; 68 S.E. 2d 268 (1951).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-70
(1943) authorizes the use of class actions by unincorporated associations when the question is one of common or general interest
to many persons, or where the parties are so numerous that it is impractical to
bring them all before the court.
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specifically provide for suits by and against unincorporated associations2 4
or provide for suits against unincorporated associations without mentioning suits by unincorporated associations. 25 The legislative intent of this
latter type statute is clearly to restrict the privilege to suits against
unincorporated associations. 26 G. S. 1-97(6) is not comparable to either
of these classes of statutes for it merely implies a change in the common law rule by providing for service of process. Inasmuch as the
2
legislative intent of the North Carolina General Assembly is not clear, T
the court is not bound to construe this statute as implying legislative
intent to permit suit against but not by unincorporated associations.
It seems that basic principles of fairness dictate that if one has
capacity to be sued he must also have capacity to sue in a like manner.
There is sentiment within the North Carolina Supreme Court to interpret G. S. 1-97(6) as implying legislative intent that unincorporated
associations should have the right to sue as well as be sued even though
there is no language within the statute which compels this interpretation.28
If the North Carolina Supreme Court continues to hold that G. S.
1-97(6) authorizes suits against but not by unincorporated associations
this will not violate the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as the prescribed method of service extends to all unincorporated associations.29
24

DEL. REV. CODE §4676 (1935) ; IDAHO CODE §5-328 (1947) ; LA. GEN.

STAT.

§1295 (1939); MINN. STAT. ANN. §540.15 (West 1945); MoNT. REV. CODE ANN.

§9089 (1947); NEV. Comp. LAws ANN. §8564 (1929); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12
§182 (1941); S. C. CODE ANN. §7796 (1942).
21;ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7 §142 (1940) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. rule 17(b) (1935);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §5490 (1930); MD. CODE GEN. LAWs Art. 23 §123 (1939);
MIcH. ComP. LAWS §14020 (Mason 1929); N. J. REV. STAT. §2-78 (1937); N. M.
STAT. ANN. §19-605 (1941); N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr §2 22a (1945); N. D. REV.
CODE §28-0609 (1943); TEX. STAT., REV. Crv. Art. 6133 (1936); UTAH CODE
ANN. §104-3 (1943); VA. CODE ANN. §6058 (1950).

" St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinder's Union No. 37, 94 Minn. 351,
102 N. W. 725 (1905) ; Kline v. Knights of the Golden Eagle, 113 N. J. Eq. 513,
167 At. 758 (1933).
Note, 25 N. C. LAw REv. 319, 320 (1946).
28 In Ionic Lodge No. 72 v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted Masons No.
72 Co., 232 N. C. 252, 258, 59 S. E. 829, 834 (1950), Justice Seawell stated for
the court: "It can hardly be questioned that if the association might be sued in
its common name by service upon the process agent or the Secretary of State, it
follows as a corollary conclusion that it might also have the capacity to sue." On
rehearing, Ionic Lodge No. 72 v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted Masons
No. 72 Co., 232 N. C. 648, 652, 62 S. E. 2d 73, 76 (1950), Juqtice Devin in a
vigorous dissent, with Justice Ervin concurring, said: "As a result of the decision
in this case a complainant can bring an association into court and by judgment
take away its property, but when the association's property has been wrongfully
taken by another, it is powerless to come into court for redress. It should have
the right to sue as well as be sued." See Venus Lodge v. Acme Benevolent Association, Inc., 231 N. C. 522, 58 S. E. 2d 109 (1950), where Justice Ervin expressed a similar view.
2'Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. 2d 756 (1931), appeal dismissed
284 U. S. 592 (1932); Diamond v. Minnesota Saving Bank, 70 Minn. 289, 73
N. W. 182 (1897); Edgar v. Southern R.R., 213 S. C. 445, 49 S. E. 2d 841 (1941).
The theory is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not restrict the power of a
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Even when an unincorporated association is recognized as a legal
entity by a state access to the federal courts is not assured. While Rule
17(b) makes unincorporated associations suable as legal entities, it
does not confer federal jurisdiction upon such suits. Where jurisdiction is based on a federal question no problem arises. 30 In cases where
federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship it is held that
although the unincorporated association has been accorded capacity to sue
or be sued in its common name, the citizenship of the individual members
must, nevertheless, be made to appear, and their citizenship must be
wholly diverse from that of the opposing parties. 31 The fiction that for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction a corporation is to be deemed a citizen
of the state creating it32 has not been applied to unincorporated associations.3 3 The alternative for the unincorporated association might then
be the use of Rule 23 (a) 34 which authorizes class actions where the persons constituting the class are so numerous as to make it impractical to
bring them all before the court. In such class actions only the citizenship
state to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obliga-

tions enforced, provided the methods of procedure adopted for these purposes give
reasonable notice and afford fair opportunity to be -heard before the issues are
decided. See Note, 20 HARv. L. REv. 58 (1906).
o Bartling v. Congress of Industrial Organizations et al., 40 F. Supp. 366
(E. D. Mich. 1941).
SRosendale v. Phillips, 87 F. 2d 454 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Levering & Garrigus
Co. v. Morrin, 61 F. 2d 115 (2d Cir. 1932), aft'd, 289 U. S. 103 (1933) ; Western
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Samson Bros. & Co., 42 F. Supp. 1007 (S. D. Iowa
1941) ; but see Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F. 2d 355 (3d Cir. 1948)
where the court failed to distinguish the issue of capacity of an association to sue
or be sued from the issue of citizenship required for jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. Note, 34 IowA L. REv. 356 (1949). There are some who
argue that the present federal rule of using the citizenship of each member of the
unincorporated association to determine diversity jurisdiction may undergo a
change, for the Supreme Court has treated a sociedad en comadita, an organization
under Puerto Rican law which is similar to our limited partnerships, as a citizen
and resident of of Puerto Rico for the purpose of determining federal jurisdiction
based on diversity, without regard to the citizenship of the members. Puerto Rico
v. Russel & Co., 288 U. S. 476 (1932) ; Note, 33 COL. L. REv. 540, 541 (1933),
"The present case thus appears to represent not merely the overruling of a long
line of decisions in the lower federal courts but carries with it the germ of the
overturn of a basic Supreme Court doctrine." But the lower federal courts have
not followed this case and consistently hold that it is the citizenship of the members of the unincorporated association which determines federal diversity jurisdiction. Sperry Products v. Association of American Railroads, 132 F. 2d 408 (2d
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 744 (1943); Rosendale v. Phillips, 87 F. 2d
454 (2d Cir. 1937); Dillner Transfer Co. v. National Warehouse Ass'n, 58 F.
Supp. 700 (W. D. Pa. 1944). The Supreme Court, when faced with the issue,
may distinguish our unincorporated associations from the unique sociedad en
comandita as at least one district court has done. Gaunt v. Lloyds of America, 11
F. Supp. 787 (W. D. Tex. 1935).
"2Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853) ; McGovney,
A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARv. L. REv. 853 (1943).
" Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel v. Jones, 117 U. S. 449 (1899); DoBrE.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE 198 (1928); Russell v. Central Labor Union, 1 F. 2d 412

(E.3 D. Ill., 1924).

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23 U. S. C. §723(c) (1940).
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of the representatives need appear, permitting the unincorporated association to select a representative group diverse from their adversary.85
One more nick has been carved from the impractical common law
rule by Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act80 which provides for
damage suits by or against unincorporated associations in federal courts
for breach of collective bargaining contracts without regard to jurisdictional amount or the citizenship of the parties.
Because of the uncertainties and limitations of the North Carolina
statutes which abrogate, in part, the common law rule as to suability of
unincorporated associations, and because of the need for a simple method
of suit by and against the many powerful and well established fraternal,
religious, and trade union bodies that exist today, a specific statute allowing such suits in North Carolina courts and thereby in the federal courts
7
sitting in North Carolina is again suggested.
HURSHELL H. KEENER.
Wills-Two Methods of Probate in Solemn Form
in North Carolina'
According to a recent statutory survey,' there are nineteen states
which permit the probate of a will without requiring that notice be
given to all interested parties as a condition precedent. North Carolina
is listed as one of these states,2 since in this jurisdiction both types of
probate, common and solemn form, have been preserved.8 The author
comments: .. . it is clear that a rational basis exists for those [states]
which follow the pattern of the English probate without notice, first,
because, estates commonly need the supervision of the executor immediately on the death of the testator; and, second, because in the vast
majority of cases there is not the remotest possibility of a contest and
the probate of the will can be reduced to an administrative formality.
But since the heir then has no opportunity to contest before probate,
he must be given that opportunity afterward. ' ' 4 The increasing num-

1 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F. 2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948) ; Tunstall
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 148 F. 2d 403 (4th Cir.
1945) ; Philadelphia Local 192 v. American Federation of Teachers, 44 F. Supp.
345 (E. D. Pa. 1942) ; International Allied Printing Trades Ass'n v. Master Printers Union, 34 F. Supp. 178 (D. N. J. 1940).

161 STAT. 136 (1947); 29 U. S. C. A. §141-147 (Supp. 1947); Note, 2

SOUTHWESTERN L. J.246 (1948).
"The text of such a statute was proposed in Note, 29 N. C. L. REv. 335,

338 (1950).

Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 MicH. L. REv. 503 (1946).
See N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-14 (1950); A Survey of Statutory Changes in
North Carolina in 1933, 11 N. C. L. REv. 263 (1933).
2

'In re Will of Chisman, 175 N. C. 420, 95 S.E. 769 (1918).

This conclusion

also follows by necessary implication from N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-32 (1950), which

governs the filing of a caveat during or after probate "in common form."
' Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 Mic,. L. REv. 503, 539 (1946).
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ber of cases which hinge on the procedural relationship between the
clerk of superior court, who has exclusive jurisdiction over probates in
common form, 5 and the superior court, which has derivative jurisdiction
over probates in solemn form, 6 belies the appearance of simplicity imparted to the North Carolina system by the use of these two historically
well-defined forms of probate.
All probate proceedings in this state commence with an application
for probate to the clerk of superior court.7 Since the proceeding is
in rem, no one interested is before the clerk except the propounders
and witnesses, 8 and if there is no objection to the will, it is admitted
to probate. Such probate, called probate in common form, is conclusive
of the validity of the will unless it is set aside in a later proceeding by
direct attack.9 A collateral attack is only permitted if the clerk was
deceived by fraud or perjury, 10 or if the will is so vague as to be a
nullity."' The clerk may set aside the probate on these grounds, but
Such probate
not on grounds which should be raised by caveat."
or by caveat,
clerk
to
the
by
motion
either
must be vacated, however,
and the probate of a later will is not sufficient to meet this requirement.3 All direct attacks are barred after three years from the date
of probate unless the caveator is under twenty-one years of age, insane,
or imprisoned, in which case the bar attaches three years from the
removal of the disability.1 4 Should the caveator be found to have participated in a transaction which is dependent upon the validity of the
will which was probated, he may be barred by estoppel to question the
will.' 5
Anderson v. Atldnson, 234 N. C. 271, 66 S. E. 2d 886 (1951) ; Brissie v. Craig,
232 N. C. 701, 62 S. E. 2d 330 (1950).62 S. E. 2d 330 (1950) ; In re Will of Hine,
6 Brissie v. Craig, 232 N. C. 701,
228 N. C. 405, 45 S. E. 2d 526 (1947).
The court has said that "it is the policy
7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-16 (1950).
of the law that wills should be probated," so it would seem that the application
cannot be withdrawn once it is submitted to the clerk. Wells v. Odum, 207
N. C. 226, 228, 176 S. E. 563, 564 (1934).
8 See, e.g., In re Will of Rowland, 202 N. C. 373, 375, 162 S. E. 897, 898
(1932) ; In re Will of Chisman, 175 N. C. 420, 421, 95 S. E. 769, 770 (1918).
SN. C. GEN. STAT. §31-19 (1950) ; and, e.g., It re Will of Puett, 229 N. C. 8
47, S. E. 2d 488 (1948); In re Will of Rowland, 202 N. C. 373, 162 S. E. 897
(1932). The record of probate in common form is not admissible as evidence in
the caveat proceediugs. In re Will of Etheridge, 231 N. C. 502, 57 S. E. 2d 768

(1950).

10 In re Will of Puett, 229 N. C. 8, 47 S. E. 2d 488 (1948) ; In re Will of
Johnson, 182 N. C. 522, 109 S. E. 373 (1921).
' Burchett v. Mason, 233 N. C. 306, 63 S. E. 2d 634 (1951).
"2itre Will of Hine, 228 N. C. 405, 45 S. E. 2d 526 (1947). In re Will of
Brock, 229 N. C. 482, 487, 50 S. E. 2d 555, 559 (1948), for example, lists undue
as among the grounds for caveat.
influence and lack of testamentary capacity
13 In re Will of Puett, 229 N. C. 8, 47 S. E. 2d 488 (1948).
"4N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-32 (Supp. 1951).
" Burchett v. Mason, 233 N. C. 306, 63 S. E. 2d 634 (1951) (.holding that
persons who participated in proceedings to sell timber from lands devised by the
will in question are thereafter estopped from attacking the validity of the will).
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The usual type of probate in solemn form is by formal caveat,1"
which immediately raises an issue of fact (devisavit vel non). The
clerk must then transfer the case to the superior court for trial. 17 Citations must be issued to all interested persons,' 8 who may come in and
align themselves with either the propounder or the caveator if they
wish, but if they have notice, they are bound by the proceedings whether
they participate or not.' 9 At this stage of the proceedings the matter
is out of the hands of the interested persons, and there can be no agreed
statement of facts, waiver of jury trial, or nonsuit.2 0

Those interested

persons not cited are not estopped to file a second caveat, even though
the will was upheld following the first. 21 The converse does not follow, however, for the court has indicated that the executor who propounds the will acts in a representative capacity for all persons who
22
favor the will, and it might extend this concept to any propounder.
Should a person who desires to attack a purported will be unable to
get it propounded by another, he may both propound and 23caveat the
will, and thus secure an early determination of its invalidity.
The other type of probate in solemn form, which may be concluded
without a formal caveat, has remained in the background until recently.
This is the proceeding by which the propounder petitions the clerk to
issue citations to all interested persons to come and "see proceedings."
In 1834, Chief Justice Ruffin, well known for his comprehensive opinions, set out the procedure for such a probate as follows: "To enable
See N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-32 (Supp. 1951).
' 7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-33 (1950).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-33 (1950); In re Will of Rowland, 202 N. C. 373,
162 9S.E. 897 (1932).
See Mills v. Mills, 195 N. C. 595, 143 S. E. 130 (1928); Redmond v. Collins, 15 N. C. 430 (1834).
" See, e.g., In re Will of Morrow, 234 N. C. 365, 67 S. E. 2d 279 (1951)
Collins v. Collins, 125 N. C. 98, 34 S.E. 195 (1899). But see Bailey v. McLain,
215 N. C. 150, 1 S.E. 2d 372 (1939) (caveator allowed to withdraw pursuant to
agreement with propounder), criticized in Note, 18 N. C. L. REv. 76 (1939).
21 Mills v. Mills, 195 N. C. 595, 143 S. E. 130 (1928).
22 Redmond v. Collins, 15 N. C. 430, 442 (1834).
2 Such a problem faced the plaintiff in Brissie v. Craig, 232 N. C. 701, 62 S. E.
2d 330 (1950). He was in doubt as to whether he had a sufficient interest to propound the will and feared that, if he did, he might then be estopped to file a
caveat, so he sued in superior court for a judgment declaring the instrument in
question to be invalid as a will. He desired to remove the instrument as a threat
to his title to property inherited from the purported testator. The superior court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff, but the supreme court reversed, holding that
the superior court had no iurisdiction to hear a case within the exclusive iurisdiction of the clerk. Justice Ervin, speaking for the court, by way of dictum,
proposed to the plaintiff that he should have simultaneously propounded and filed
a caveat to the will. Two conclusions are implicit in the decision: first, that N. C.
GEN. STAT. §31-15 (1950), which gives the clerk the power to compel the production of a will for probate, does not give him the power to compel probate of the
will when produced; and second, that a propounder is not estopped to caveat the
will which he is propounding. This case is discussed in Note, 29 N. C. L. Rev. 331
(1951).
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the propounder to bind others a decree is taken out by him to summon
all persons, 'to see proceedings,' not to become parties, but to witness
what is going on, and take sides if they think proper. If the propounder
does not choose to adopt that course, he may at once take his decree;
which in relation to this subject is called proving the will in common
form. If he take out a decree and summon those in interest against
him, 'to see proceedings,' they are concluded, whether they appear and put
in an allegation against the will or not, and as against those summoned
this is called probate in solemn form." 24 This judicial type of probate
was recognized by Justice Pearson, in 1855,25 but, except for an occasional quotation, 26 the procedure so clearly set out lay dormant until
approval was again granted in 1952. In the latter year, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided the case of In re Will of Ellis.2 7 Citations
had been issued to the interested persons, and the clerk had held a
hearing. One of the witnesses to the will had testified that he did not
sign in the presence of the testator. This testimony was contradicted
by that of three other persons, but the clerk had refused to admit the
will to probate. The propounder had appealed to the superior court,
which had granted a motion by the heirs to remand the proceedings to
the clerk, holding that the hearing before the clerk constituted a final
trial on the merits which concluded the propounder on the issue of
devisavit vel non. The propounder then appealed to the supreme court,
which reversed the superior court order. Justice Denny, speaking for
a unanimous court, held that the ruling of the clerk is only conclusive
2s
on the subject when no issue of fact is raised by the parties, and
that if there is an objection to the will, whether by formal caveat or not,
2,Redmond v. Collins, 15 N. C. 430, 437-38 (1834).
"Etheridge v. Corprew, 48 N. C. 14, 17 (1855).
" Mills v. Mills, 195 N. C. 595, 597, 143 S. E. 130, 132 (1928). Without citation of authority, the following language is found in

DOUGLAS, ADmINISTRATION OF

§43 (1948): ". . . the propounder may himself
elect to have the original probate in solemn form and thus force all dissatisfied
persons to file a caveat then or never. The law is not entirely clear as to how
this should be done, but-it would seem that the propounder may file a petition
asking for probate in solemn form and obtain an order from the clerk for citations
to be issued to all interested parties, returnable on a day named in the citation,
notifying them of the application for probate and directing them to appear if they
wish to do so and 'see proceedings,' in the same general form as citations in cases
of caveats. When such a procedure is followed, dissatisfied persons must file a
caveat in these proceedings, or be forever barred from doing so!'
S235 N. C. 27, 69 S. E. 2d 25 (1952).
28 The opinion quotes the following statement as a correct analysis of the law
on the two forms of probate in solemn form: "(1) Where the next of kin and
other interested persons are cited to appear and 'see proceedings'-and a judgment is entered for or against the will, but there is no verdict of a jury because
no issue is raised by the parties; (2) where a person, entitled to do so, intervenes and enters a caveat-denies the validity of the will-and thereby raises an
issue of devisavit vel non, upon which issue a verdict is taken, and judgment
entered in accordance with the verdict." 2 MoRDEcAT, LAW LF=crmzs 1211 (2d
ed. 1916).
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then the issue of devisavit vet non is raised and must go to the superior
court to be tried by a jury.29 Nothing in the opinion conflicts with
the original statement of Chief Justice Ruffin, 30 and this intermediate
procedure, standing between probate in common form and formal caveat,
as defined in 1834 and clarified one hundred and eighteen years later,
will bridge the gap confronting persons who seek to get the validity of
a will settled without having to wait for the three year limitations period
on caveats to expire.3 1 They may now force an early caveat or none
at all, which is the converse of the situation dealt with in Brissic v.
Craig,32 where a prospective caveator was seeking to have the invalidity
of a will settled. In completing the picture of will probates by the
decisions in Brissie v. Craig and the Ellis case, the court has followed
the path of logic with consistency and accuracy, and the way is now
clear for rapid settlement of estates.
HARPER JOHNsTON ELAM, III.

Workmen's Compensation-Right of Employee to Bring Common
Law Action Against Negligent Co-employee
Plaintiff was injured while riding in an automobile driven by the
president of the corporation by which plaintiff was employed. The
plaintiff was awarded compensation under the North Carolina Work" Inre Will of Ellis, 235 N. C. 27, 32, 69 S. E. 2d 25, 28 (1952). The court
cited as authority N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-273 (1943), which requires the clerk to

transfer cases to superior court when issues of law and fact, or of fact, are raised
before him in civil cases. In view of the constant reiteration by the court of the
proposition that will probates are proceedings in rem, perhaps a stronger basis for
the requirement of a jury trial on the issue of devisavit ,el non is found in the
following language from In re Will of Roediger, 209 N. C. 470, 476, 184 S. E. 74,
77 (1936) : "A trial by jury cannot be waived by the propounder and the caveator.
Nor can they submit to the court an agreed statement of facts, or consent that
the judge may hear the evidence and find the facts determinative of the issue.
The propounder and the caveator are not parties to the proceeding in the sense
that they can by consent relieve the judge of his duty to submit the issue involved in the proceeding to a jury.
"In the instant case, it was error for the judge to render judgment on the facts
agreed upon by the propounder and the caveator, and supplemented by the facts
found by him, with their consent. The proceeding was in ren, and could not be
controlled by the propounder and the caveator, even with the consent and approval
of the judge. In that respect it is distinguishable from a civil action." (Italics
added.) See also In re Will of Morrow, 234 N. C. 365, 67 S.E. 2d 279 (1951).
" Respondents relied on the statement by Chief Justice Ruffin that "if he [the
propounder] take out a decree and summon those in interest against him, 'to see
proceedings,' they are concluded, whether they appear and put in an allegation
against the will or not. .. " The court did not concern itself with this point,
but a reasonable interpretation of this language, and one which would reconcile
it with the holding of the Ellis case, is that it means only that those interested
persons cited are bound by the final disposition of the case, rather than that the
parties are precluded from appealing to the superior court from the decision of
the clerk.
" See REPORT OF THE CoMMIssION ON REVIsIoN OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA RELATING TO EsTATEs

provided by statute).
2 See note 22 supra.

§2 (1939) (where it is suggested this procedure be
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men's Compensation Act. Thereafter he brought a common law action
against the president for negligence. In Warner ,. Leder,' the supreme
language of the Workmen's Compensation
court held that the specific
2
Act prohibited the action.
Where an employee who is covered by a Workmen's Compensation
Act is injured as a result of the negligence of a third party, the acts
of most states make some provision for a common law action against
this third person.3 Most acts also provide for subrogation of the employer or his insurance carrier to the rights of the employee in such
actions. This right of subrogation 4includes all amounts paid by the
employer or carrier to the employee.
In many cases the employee's injury will be due, as in the instant
case, to the negligence of a fellow employee or superior employee in
the organization. When this situation occurs, the question is presented
as to whether this fellow employee or superior employee is a "third
person" within the meaning of the statute allowing suits against third
parties. This situation is covered by statute in many states. Some have
5
statutes specifically granting immunity to all fellow employees, others
have been judicially construed as doing this even though the wording
(1952).
1234 N. C. 727, - S. E. 2d' "Every employer ..

. or those conducting his business shall only be liable to

any employee who elects to come under the article for personal injury or death
by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified." (Emphasis added.)
N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-9 (1950).
In the cases of Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., 214 N. C. 449, 199 S. E.
623 (1938) and McCune v. Rhodes-Rhyne Manufacturing Co., 217 N. C. 351, 8
S. E. 2d 219 (1940) (see note 9 infra) actions by employees against fellow employees were allowed. G. S. 97-9 was not mentioned in the opinions. The later
cases of Warner v. Leder, 234 N. C. 727, - S. E. 2d - (1952) ; Essick v; Lexington, 232 N. C. 200, 60 S. E. 2d 106 (1950) ; and Bass v. Ingold, 232 N. C.
295, 60 S. E. 2d 114 (1950), relying on G. S. 97-9, modified and limited the
decisions in the two previous cases.
8 See e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §40-1213 (Supp. 1949), Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Keith, 89 Ind. App. 233, 146 N. E. 872 (1925) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§44-504 (1949), Bittle v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 147 Kan. 227, 75 P. 2d 829
(1938); LA. Rav. STAT. §23:1101 (1950), Lowe v. Morgan's Louisiana & T. R.
& S. S. Co., 150 La. 29, 90 So. 429 (1922) ; N. Y. WoRi. CoMP. LAW §29 (1946),
Caulfield v. Elmhurst Contracting Co., 268 App. Div. 661, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 25
(1945), aff'd, 294 N. Y. 803, 62 N. E. 2d 237 (1945); VA. CODE ANN. §65-38
(1950), Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 65 S. E. 2d 575 (1951). Some acts have
been construed as abolishing actions for damages as against third persons, except
as expressly provided therein. See Note, 106 A. L. R. 1042 (1937). The acts of
New Hampshire, Ohio, and West Virginia contain no provisions relative to employee or employer remedies against negligent third parties. See generally,
Behrendt, The Rationale of the Election of Remedies Under Workine's Compensation Acts, 12 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 231 (1945).
'See e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-10 (1950). See Note, 106 A. L. R. 1053
(1937). In some jurisdictions the employer or insurer is held not entitled to
See Note, 19 A. L. R. 786 (1922).
indemnity.
8
TEx. STAT. REV. Civ. art. 8306, §3 (1941), Grandstaff et al. v. Mercer, 214
S. W. 2d 133 (Tex. 1948) ; AcTs OF THE WEST VIRGINIA LEGISLATuRE c. 136, art.
2, §6-a (1949), reprinted in ScHNEDmE, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES
§2516(1) (6-a) (Upkeep service 1950) ; cf. N. Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §29 (1946),
Pantolo v. Lane, 185 Misc. 221, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 227 (1945).
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does not require such construction,- while others have no such statutes.
Of these latter states the majority hold the fellow employee to be a
third person and amenable to suit,7 while a few grant immunity by
judicial decision. 8 There appear to be no decisions dealing specifically
with intentional torts by fellow employees. 9
The "immunity clause" relied upon by the court in the instant case
exempted the employer "and those conducting his business." 10 The
question "was not raised as to whether the defendant (being the president of the employer corporation) was "conducting" his employer's business. This might be important in some cases, as the generally accepted
definition of "conduct," when so used, would not cover all fellow employees, but only those in a managerial position. 1 The North Carolina
court has indicated in other cases that the immunity clause will be given
' See e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-9 (1950), Warner v. Leder, 234 N. C. 727,
- S. E. 2d - (1952) (See note 11, infra.); Oa. ComP. LAWS ANN. §102-1752
(Cum. Supp. 1947), Kowcun v. Bybee, 182 Ore. 271, 186 P. 2d 790 (1947); VA.
CODE ANN. §65-38 (1950), Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S. E. 2d 73 (1946).
The Illinois Act, while not entirely clear, would seem to prohibit a common law
recovery against a fellow servant, but the courts have construed the Act otherwise and allowed such suits. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 48, §166 (1950), Botthof v.
Fenske, 280 Ill. App. 362 (1935), 7. U. OF CHI. L. Ra,. 362.
'Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 Atl. 130 (1929) (leading case), 15
CORNELL L. Q. 148 (1930); Wells v. Lavitt, 115 Conn. 117, 160 At. 617 (1932);
Echols v. Chatooga Mercantile Co., 74 Ga. App. 18, 38 S. E. 2d 675 (1946);
Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369 (La. 1934) ; Webster v. Stewart, 210 Mich. 13,
177 N. W. 230 (1920); Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 212 N. W. 461 (1927);
Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo. App. 543, 38 S. W. 2d 497 (1931); Rehn
v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N. W. 2d 856 (1949); Churchill v. Stephens, 91
N. J. L. 195, 102 Atl. 657 (1917) ; Hall v. Hill, 158 Misc. 341, 285 N. Y. S. 815
(1936), overruled by Puccio v. Carr, 177 Misc. 706, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 805 (1942) ;
Judson v. Fielding, 227 App. Div. 430, 237 N. Y. S. 348 (1929) (decided prior to
amendment, see note 5 supra); Tawney v. Kirkhart, 130 W. Va. 550, 44 S. E.
2d 634 (1947) (decided prior to amendment, see note 5 supra); McGonigle v.
Gryphan et al., 201 Wis. 269, 229 N. W. 81 (1930).
' Murphy v. Miettinen, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N. E. 2d 252 (1945) ; Rosenberger
v. L'Archer, 31 N. E. 2d 700 (Ohio 1941).
'Cf. McCune v. Rhodes-Rhyne Manufacturing Co., 217 N. C. 351, 8 S. E. 2d
219 (1940) (The court indicated that an employee might maintain a suit against
a fellow employee who wilfully injured him. Later cases have indicated that this
decision is applicable where the injury was inflicted by a superior employee acting
as alter ego of the employer.). Warner v. Leder, 234 N. C. 727, - S. E. 2d (1952) ; Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N. C. 200, 60 S. E. 2d 106 (1950). The
fact that an injury is caused by the wilful act of the employer has the effect, in
the majority of jurisdictions, of giving the employee the right to maintain an
action for damages. HoRovITz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMFrom this it
PENSATION LAWS, 336 (1944); see Note, 68 A. L. R. 301 (1930).
might be concluded that employees in the majority of jurisdictions, at least, would
not be exempted from suit for intentional injury.
See note 2 supra.
11 Conduct means to manage; lead; carry on; direct. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNIt
ARY, 4th ed. (1951); WEBsTR's NEw CoLImEiATz DIcrIONAARY, 2d ed. (1949).
might be difficult to apply this phrase to a fellow employee who is a ditch digger,
or other common laborer. Thus, if this section be given a restricted interpretation,
those employees who are generally considered to work in a directive capacity,
such as foremen, supervisors, and managers would be protected under the "immunity clause," while common laborers would be liable. The injustice of this is
obvious.
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a "liberal construction," but has not defined its limits.12
However, the court did not rely solely upon the "immunity" statute,
but further justified the decision on another theory. It was noted that
if the injured employee, after receiving compensation, were allowed to
recover from a negligent fellow employee, the employer would be subrogated to the extent of the compensation paid.13' Thus, the burden
of compensation, in such cases, would be shifted from the employer
(and the industry) to the employee. Such result, reasoned the court,
would violate the purpose of the Act. 1 4 Other North Carolina decisions would seem to sustain this theory.' 5
Fundamentally opposed to this reasoning is the argument advanced in
cases where the Workmen's Compensation Act contains no such immunity clause. These courts state that the Compensation Law does not
specifically relieve a fellow employee of his liability in tort and since
there is no contractual relation between the two employees there is no
reason for exempting one employee from liability for his torts against
another employee.' 0
A great deal of sympathy must be accorded the idea that it was the
intention of the legislature to have industry shoulder the burden of industrial accidents. Both the employee and employer make concessions
under the Act, and while the employee gains more security, the compensation is often much less than might be recovered in a common law
17
suit.
Legislation might effectuate a compromise of two divergent views and
still allow an employee adequate legal redress for his injuries. This could
be done as follows: repeal any immunity clause pertaining to fellow
employees and specifically provide for suit against any employee causing
injury to his fellow employee; preclude an employer or his insurance
carrier from subrogation to any rights an employee might have against
his fellow employee; require the injured employee to exhaust his rem12

Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N. C. 200, 210, 60 S. E. 2d 106, 113 (1950).
See note 4 supra.
234 N. C. at 733, -S. E. 2d -.
Z "The philosophy which supports the Workmen's Compensation Act is 'that
the wear and tear of human beings in modem industry should be charged to the
Industry just as the wear and tear of machinery has always been charged. And
"

while such compensation is presumably charged to the industry, and consequently

to the employer or owner of the industry, eventually it becomes a part of the fair
money cost of the industrial product, to be paid for by the general public patronizing such products.' Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co., 108 Kan. 320, 195 P. 863
(1921)." Vause v. Vause Farm Equipment Co., 233 N. C. 88, 92, 63 S. E. 2d
173, 176 (1951). Accord: Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N. C. 28, 31, 153
S. E. 2d 594, 596 (1930).
" Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369, 370 (La. 1934) ; Sylcox v. National Lead
Co., 225 Mo. App. 543, 38 S.W. 2d 497 (1931) ; Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529,
146 Atl: 130 (1929).
" For example, in Warner v. Leder, the recovery in the lower court was
$40,000. See A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N. C.
L. REv. 351, 428 (1951).
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edies under the Act before this right may be exercised; deduct any
compensation recovered under the Act from the judgment recovered in
the common law suit ;18 pay the balance to the injured employee. The
employee would thus recover full damages for his injury without
receiving a double recovery. 19 The spirit of the Act would not be
violated, for industry would be shouldering the burden of industrial
accidents to the extent that the legislature contemplated. 20 The coemployee's common law liability would be relieved to the extent that the
employer was liable for compensation. However, any attempted statutory amendments, unless drawn with extreme care, might foster inequitable situations. 21
CHARLEs F. LAMBETE, JR.
Wrongful Death Action-Recovery for Breach of WarrantyEx Delicto-Ex Contractu Distinction
Plaintiff executrix brought an action for wrongful death based upon
breach of warranty of fitness on the part of defendant retailer in the
sale of a drug to plaintiff's intestate. In a 4 to 3 decision," the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that the wrongful death statute of that state2
18 In the present North Carolina Act, the amotmt of compensation paid by the
employer, or the amount of compensation to which the. injured employee or his
dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any action against a
third party. N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-10 (1950).
" Double recoveries occur where employees receive compensation under the
Act and also recover at common, law for the same injury. See Behrendt, The
Rationale of the Election of Remedies Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 12
U. OF CHr.L. REv. 231, 238 (1945).
" Industry (through the employer) would pay the compensation required by
law and would be unable to recover this amount by subrogation.
1 Suppose the foll6wing situation occurred: Employer and fellow employee
(E 2 ) are each 50% negligent in causing the injury of plaintiff employee (El).
El receives $8,000 under the Act from the employer. Total damages to E1 , as
assessed by a jury in a suit by El v. E2 , amount to $50,000. As tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable for their torts in North Carolina (Cunningham v.
Haynes, 214 N. C. 456, 199 S. E. 627 (1938)), El could collect from E2 full
damages ($50,000) minus the $8,000 already received. E 2 could not have joined,
nor would he have a right over against the employer, as would normally be true
in the case of joint tortfeasors under N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-240 (1943). The injustice of this is apparent. To take care of this situation it would be necessary
to enact a proviso to the effect thaf'in cases of joint negligence on the part of a
co-employee and an employer, the co-employee shall only be liable to the extent
of his own negligence.
Again, suppose co-employees Ei and E2 are both injured in the course of their
employment due to the negligence of E2 . Both receive $8,000 under the Act. Et
is damaged to the extent of $16,000. Thereafter Ei sues and recovers an additional $8,000 from E2 .. Here we have an injured employee who receives nothing
under the Act because he was negligent, though the Act relieves negligence as a
bar to compensation. Is this an unduly harsh result, quaere?
1Whiteley
v. Webb's City; Inc., 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951) (defendant retailer
sold to plaintiff's intestate a drug known as "Westsal" which was to be used as
a salt substitute, and -the complaint alleged' the use of this drug caused the death
of intestate). '
.
'
I FLA. STAT. A'.
§768.01
(1949).
,'I ,
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does not permit an action for death based upon breach of warranty of
fitness.
Parallel to the sharp split of the Florida court is the split of other
jurisdictions which have passed on this question. The New York
Statute has been construed as permitting such an action.3 New Hampshire 4 and Mississippi5 are in accord with Florida in not allowing the
action to be brought under their wrongful death statutes.
In the principal case, the argument of the majority was that the title
of the death act when under consideration by the legislature contained
the word "negligence"; that the statute, therefore, is limited to actions
where death results from tortious acts of the defendant and has no
application to the breach of a contractual obligation like warranty of
fitness." The dissernt was based upon the reasoning of the New York
holding in Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co.7 That case did not hold that the
wrongful death statute was designed to support both actions ex delicto
and those ex contractu; but it allowed an action based on the breach
of warranty of fitness to be brought under the statute upon the theory
that the breach of such a warranty was tortious in nature.8
An analysis of these and other cases reveals that a court's decision
on the question of allowing an action based upon breach of warranty
of fitness to be brought under its death statute is likely to turn upon
the following considerations: (1) the particular phraseology used in
the statute under interpretation; (2) the character that the court attaches
to a breach of warranty of fitness (i.e., whether it regards the breach as
in the nature of a tortious act or one purely contractual) ; (3) the over-all
approach taken by the court to the death statute itself (i.e., whether it
thinks that the statute should be given a strict or a liberal construction).
'Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. 2d 557, 115 A. L. R. 1020
(1938).
"Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N. H. 365, 189 AtI. 865 (1937) ; Howson v. Foster
Beef Co., 87 N. H. 200, 177 Atl. 656 (1935).
Hasson Gro. Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 17 So. 2d 791 (1944).
'The following seems to set out the theory giving rise to the distinction drawn

by the principal case: "Since under the common law, contract actions survived in
favor of the plaintiff's representative while tort actions did not, it seems reason-

able to suppose that the wrongful death statutes were intended to refer only to
torts." PROSSR, LAW OF TORTS 956 (1941). But does not this supposition overlook the fact that an action for death, though arising out of a contract, did not
survive at common law any more than one arising out of a tort?, With this in
mind, why should the wrongful death statutes have been intended to refer to one
kind of death and not to the other?
1277 N.Y. 26, 12 N. E. 2d 557 (1938).
"'The inquiry here is whether the breach of the implied warranty as alleged
in the complaint, negligence being disclaimed, was a 'wrongful act, neglect, or
default' within the meaning of the statute. The answer depends wholly upon a
solution of the question as to whether breach of the implied warranty, in a case
such as this, where personal injury to the person to whom the warranty is made
results from the breach, is tortious in nature and effect and is due to the wrongful act or neglect or default of the person making and breaching the warranty."
Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 26, 31, 12 N. E. 2d 557 (1938).
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The words used in the original death statute, passed in England in
Where, as in about
1846, are "Wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default."
one half of the states in this country, the statute uses these same
words, 10 it would seem to be all inclusive, considering that "wrongful
act" may be construed to mean crimes and intentional torts, "neglect"
to mean passive torts, and "default" to mean breach of contract." But
where the statute, by using some of these words alone' 2 or in connection
with other words, 13 or by using other and different words altogether,14
contains narrower phraseology (in the sense that it is more susceptible
of being interpreted to refer to tortious acts only), then, obviously, a
court will be more likely to decide that the statute applies to actions
arising ex delicto and not to those arising ex contractu.
The cases illustrate how courts take into account this "narrow"
phraseology. In New Hampshire the wrongful death statute contained
the word "tort."' 5 The supreme court of that state held that it did
I "Be it therefore enacted . . ., That whensoever the Death of a Person shall
be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default
is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to
maintain an action and recover Damages in respect thereof, then and in every
such Case the Person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall
be liable to an Action for Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured, and although the Death shall have been caused under such Circumstances

as amount in Law to Felony."

FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT OF

1846, 9 & 10 V\IT., c.

93 (Lord
Campbell's Act).
10
E.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (Supp. 1951) ; N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW
§130 (1949).
"1In Randle v. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co., 169 Ala. 314, 324, 53 So.
918, 921 (1910) an "act" or "wrongful act" was held to denote affirmative action
or performance and an expression of will or purpose as distinguished from "omlission" or "wrongful omission," which was held to denote inaction.
In People v. Gaydica, 122 Misc. 31, 49, 203 N. Y. Supp. 243, 259 (Kings
County Ct., 1923) it was said: "To neglect means to omit. . . . It does not generally imply carelessness or imprudence, but simply an omission to do or perform
some work, duty or act."
In Grein v. Imperial Airway, [1937] 1 K. B. 50, Green, L. J., said: "The
word 'default' is a word of wide signification, and in its ordinary use does, I
think,
include a breach of contract."
2 E.g., IDAHO CODE §5-311 (1947) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §93-2810 (1947)
"wrongful act or neglect."
11 ALA. CODE tit. 7, §123 (1940) : "wrongful act, omission, or negligence." FLA.
STAT. ANN. §768.01 (1949): "wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default."
IND. ANN. STAT. §2-404 (Supp. 1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. §573.02 (Cum. Supp.
1951) : "wrongful act or omission." Ky. REv. STAT. §411.130 (1948) : "negligence
or wrongful act." TENN. CODE ANN. §8236 (Supp. 1951) : "wrongful act, omission, or killing." TEx. STAT. REV., REV. Civ. Art. 4671 (1936): "wrongful act,
neglect, carelessness. unskillfulness, or default."
"DEL. REV. CODE §4638 (1935) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1601 (1931) : "unlawful violence or negligence."

MASS. ANN. LAws c. 299, §5 (1933) : "negligence or

• . . wilful, wanton or reckless act." Miss. CODE ANN. §1453 (1942) : "real
wrongful or negligent act, or omission."
The Georgia statute uses the word "homicide" and defines "homicide" to mean
"all cases where death of a human being results from a crime or from criminal
or other negligence." GA. CODE ANN. §§105-1301, 1302. 1307 (1935), 1306 (Cum.
Supp. 1951).
The New Hampshire statute states: "Actions of tort for physical injuries to
the person ...

shall survive." N. H. REv. LAWS c. 355 §9 (1942).

"; N. H. REV. LAWS c. 355 §9 (1942): "Actions of tort for physical injuries
shall survive."
to the person ...
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not apply to a breach of contract because "tort" had been defined as "a
wrong apart from contract."' -Likewise, where the Mississippi statute
peculiarly contained the additional adjective "real,"' 7 it was held not
to apply to a breach.of contract, the court saying, "We mfst impute
some emphasis to the words 'real wrongful' in our statute as narrowing
its meaning to an actual and not a nominal or constructive wrong.""'
And where the wording used in the Rhode Island death statute was
merely "wrongful act," the court in that state interpreted it to apply
only to acts carelessly or negligently done and not to cases of mere
passive neglect or omission of duty. 19
In the principal case,. the majority of the court did "not deem a
their holding
detour into the field of semantics necessary," 20 but based
21
upon the particular legislative treatment of the statute.
Once it be determined that the wrongful death statute is to apply to
actions arising ex delicto only and not to those arising ex contractu,
the legal character of the breach of warranty of fitness (as interpreted
by that court) becomes important. There is much authority to support
the proposition that an action is within the death statute even though
it may have arisen out of a contractual relation between the defendant
and the decedent rather than out of a duty owed by the defendant to
persons in general. 22 Thus, as in Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., if the
8
" Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N. H. 200, 206, 177 Atl. 656, 660 (1935).
CODE ANN. §1453 (1942): "real wrongful or negligent act, or
'Miss.
omission."
" Hasson Gro. Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 462, 17 So. 2d 791, 793 (1944).
" Bradbury v. Furlong, 13 R. I. 15, 43 Am. Rep. 1 (1880). The present Rhode
Island death statute is R. I. GEN. LAws C. 477 §1 (1938), and uses all three
words: "wrongful act, neglect, or default."
20 Whiteley v. Webb's City, Inc., 55 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 1951).
"1It should be noted that in Florida the wrnogful death statute, FLA. STAT.
ANN. §768.01 (1949), is placed in the consolidated statutes under the main title
"Torts," thus emphasizing its tort aspect. It appears in Chapter 768 (entitled
"Negligence") of Title XLIII (entitled "Torts").
In the great majority of the other states the wrongful death statute appears in
that part of the consolidated statutes which pertains to subjects like decedents'
estates, actions by and against personal representatives, civil actions, survival and
abatement of actions, etc. E.g., the North Carolina wrongful death statute, N. C.
GEN. STAT. §28-173 (Supp. 1951), appears under Art. 19 (entitled "Actions by
and against Representatives") of Chapter 28 (entitled "Administration") of
Division VI (entitled "Decedents' Estates").
"--Carrierand passenger: Earley v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 79, 167
Pac. 513 (1917) (collision); Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Co., 205 N. C. 292,
171 S. E. 100 (negligence in operating bus) ; Grein v. Imperial Airway [1937] 1
K. B. 50 (negligence in operating airplane).
Employer and employee: American Tin-Plate Co. v. Guy, 25 Ind. App. 588, 58
N. E. 738 (1900); Mueller v. Winston Bros. Co., 165 Wash. 130, 4 P. 2d 854
(1931) : negligence in failing to comply with contract to provide medical services.
Landlord and tenant: Keiper v. Anderson, 138 Minn. 392, 165 N. W. 237
(1917) (negligence in performing contract to keep leased premises heated).

Utilit, and customer: Coy v. Indianapolis Gas. Co., 146 Ind. 655, 46 N. E. 17

(1897) (failure to supply gas for heating dwelling) ; Hoehler v. Allegheny Heating Co., 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 21 (1897) (negligence in turning off gas with which
home was heated).
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breach of warranty of fitness be regarded as tortious in nature, it
vill still be within the statute notwithstanding an adherence to the doctrine that wrongful death actions must arise ex delicto.
And there does not seem to be any good reason why the warranty
of fitness should not be so regarded. Indeed, the action against a
vendor for breach of warranty was originally a pure action of toit.2
Even today the tort character of the action is recognized by the courts.
Some hold that one having a right of action for breach of warranty
may sue in tort as well as contract. 24 Others have applied a tort measure
of damages 25 or the tort statute of limitations 26 to the action.
Finally, some correlation appears to exist between the result a court
will reach on the issue of the principal case and the general rule of
construction adopted by it for the wrongful death statute. The liberal
rule of construction states that the statute is remedial and should be
liberally construed.27 The strict rule is that the statute being in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. 28 The New York
court, which adheres to the liberal rule, allowed the breach of warranty
to come within its statute. 29 The Mississippi court, on the other hand,
has adopted the strict rule, and declined to allow the breach of warranty
to be brought within its statute.30
The North Carolina Supreme Court up to the present time has not
passed directly on the issue of whether an action for wrongful death
may be grounded on the breach of a warranty of fitness. If and when
the issue is presented squarely to the court, all circumstances appear
favorable to the allowance of such an action. First, the wording of
the North Carolina statute is sufficiently broad,3' and it is not limited
Physician and patient: Thaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 609, 119 So. 647 (1928) ;
Peck v. Henderson, 218 Ala. 233, 118 So. 262 (1928) ; Randolph v. Snyder, 139
Ky. 159, 129 S. W. 562 (1910) : negligence in treating.
Vendor and vendee: Cake v. Ligon, 115 S. C. 376, 105 S. E. 739 (1921) (negligence in selling defective oil).
" Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HAgv. L. Rzv. 1, 8 (1888).
" McLachlan v. Wilmington Dry Goods Co., 41 Del. 378, 22 A. 2d 851 (1941);
Spillane v. Corey, 323 Mass. 673, 84 N. E. 2d 5 (1949) ; Simone v. Felin and Co.,
35 D. & C. 645 (Pa., 1939); Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605,
611 5 S. E. 2d 785, 787 (1939) : "While an implied warranty in the sale of food
for immediate consumption is, in its nature, contractual, its violation savours of
tort."
" Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N. W. 309 (1939).
2
Schlick v. N. Y. Dugan Bros., 175 Misc. 182, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (N. Y. City
Ct., 1940).
27 Cibulla v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 25 N. J. Misc. 98, 50 A. 2d
461 (1946); Low Moor Iron Co. v. La Blanca's Adm'r, 196 Va. 83, 55 S. E. 532
(1906); Richards v. Riverside Ironworks, 56 W. Va. 510, 49 S. E. 437 (1904).
"Cain v. Bowlley, 114 F. 2d 519 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Rhoads v. Chicago & A. R.
Co., 227 II. 328, 81 N. E. 371 (1907) ; Carrigan v. Cole, 35 R. I. 162, 85 Atl. 934
(1913).
29 Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E. 2d 557 (1938).
"0Hasson Gro. Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452, 17 So. 2d 791 (1944).
2

N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (Supp. 1951) : "wrongful act, neglect, or default."
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

by any special treatment like that given to the Florida statute.3 2 Second,
the North Carolina court is not bound like the New Hampshire court
by old decisions drawing a sharp line between contract and tort, placing
breach of warranty squarely on the contract side. 33 Third, the North
Carolina court has adopted the liberal rule of construction.3 4 Moreover, it must be noted that the North Carolina Supreme Court has had
before it facts similar to those in the principal case.35
Of the situation as it was before the wrongful death statutes were
enacted, it has been said that it was more profitable to kill a man than,
'
'

See note 21 supra.
In Mahurin v. Harding, 28 N. H. 128, 130 (1853)

(cited in Howson v. Foster

Beef Co., 87 N. H. 200, 207, 177 Atl. 656, 661, 1935), it was said: "The dis-

tinction between the two classes of action [deceit and breach of warranty], as
being founded respectively on tort and on contract, is nowhere neglected or disregarded. There are substantial differences at common law, and . . . the distinction
is not merely formal, but in the present state of our law there is a substantial difference, which must not be overlooked."
In contrast is Ashe v. Gray, 89 N. C. 190, 193 (1883) (holding that there
may be recovery in tort for breach of warranty if the complaint contains a cause
of action for deceit also een though scienter be not proved and no issue as to
deceit be submitted to the jury) where Smith, C. J., said: "But the complaint is
for tort, to which is annexed a cause of action based on false warranty according
to the former usage and practice, which did not change the character of the action
as still one ex delicto, for the reason perhaps, that a false warranty was also a
false representation, and partook of the nature of deceit."
But where the complaint alleges only a cause of action for breach of warranty, the action, for the purposes of determining jurisdiction, is treated in North
Carolina as one in contract Hill v. Snider, 217 N. C. 437, 8 S.E. 2d 202 (1940).
However, even though it could be said that North Carolina treats the breach
of warranty generally as a contract action, still, the court might in a proper case
declare that breach of warranty or fitness for human consumption is tortious in
nature, distinguishing such a warranty from warranties in general. Such a distincton would be in line with Poovey v. Sugar Co., 191 N. C. 722, 133 S.E. 12
(1926), which held that a warranty of fitness would be implied in the sale of
foodstuff for human consumption but would not be implied in a sale of foodstuff
for cattle, the difference being made for reasons of public policy, for the preservation of life and health.
' Hall v. Southern R.R., 149 N. C. 108, 62 S.E. 899 (1908) ; Vance v. Southern R.R., 138 N. C. 460, 50 S.E. 860 (1950).
" Davis v. Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951), 30 N. C. L. REv.
191 (sale of "Westsal" as in principal case). In the Davis v. Radford case, the
complaint alleged two causes of action, one for personal injuries prior to death
and one for wrongful death, both of which were based on breach of warranty of
fitness on the part of defendant retailer in the sale of a drug to plaintiff's intestate. On defendant's motion, his wholesaler was joined as a party-defendant, and
it was on a demurrer by the wholesaler that the case came before the supreme
court. The supreme court sustained the overruling of the demurrer on the grounds
that it was proper to join one who would be liable over to the original defendant
if the latter were found liable on the causes of action alleged in the complaint.
No mention was made of the possibility that the action for wrongful death was
unauthorized because of its being based upon the breach of warranty of fitness.
However, the holding of the case would seem to be an indirect recognition that
such a cause of action may validly exist under the North Carolina wrongful death
statute.
Of sidelight interest is the fact that after Davis v. Radford was sent back to
the trial court judgment by consent was, rendered against the wholesaler for
$1,000; all claim for personal injuries or wrongful death for the breach of warranty was released as against the retailer. Letter from Mr. J. E. Swain, Clerk
of Superior Court, Buncombe County, April 16, 1952.
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to scratch him. ( Of those jurisdictions which do not allow a personal
representative to recover under the wrongful death statute for a death
caused by the breach of warranty of fitness of food for human consumption, it can now be said that it is more profitable to kill a man
than to make him sick on an unwholesome food product.
I
ARNED L. HINSHAW.
'
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